Bhutan: Private Sector Survey by unknown
w-)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
Surey 24975/ 
- - .. 
. -;-- - 4- . .x!- 
~~~~~~~~ ~~ ~ - - 1 es_<.-- X.r;. e.
IJ,~ ~~I 
.1 ' - eu 14.r ''
Iii. -JUiie 14, 2002 
t~~ -~.s i-~ -vrf -i $w sg^ s. -t X9
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed

Currency Equivalents
Currency Unit = ngultrum (Nu)
I ngultrum = US$0.02083
US$1 = ngultrum 48.00
(December 2001)
Fiscal Year
January I to December 3 i
Abbreviations and Acronyms
AsDB Asian Development Bank
BCCI Bhutan Chamber of Commerce and Industry
BCCL Bhutan Carbide and Chemicals Limited
BDFC Bhutan Development Finance Corporation
BEPC Bhutan Export Promotion Center
BFAL Bhutan Ferro Alloys Limited
BNB Bhutan National Bank
BoB Bank of Bhutan
BBPL Bhutan Board Products Limited
C&F Carriage & Freight
CCP Critical control points
cft Cubic foot
Cu.m. Cubic meter
DIT Department of Information Technology
Dol Departnent of Industry (Ministry of Trade and Industry)
DRC Department of Revenue and Customs (Ministry of Finance)
EDP Entrepreneurship Development Program
FDC Forestry Development Corporation
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FIAS Foreign Investment Advisory Service
FIE Foreign Invested Enterprise
FMU Forestry Management Unit
fob Free on board
FSC Forestry Stewardship Council
GDP Gross domestic product
HACCP Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points
HRD Human Resource Development
ICOM International Council of Museums
ISP Internet Service Provider
IT Information Technology
kBbps Kilobytes per second
Kg Kilogram
LDC Less developed country
MoA Ministry of Agriculture
MoF Ministry of Finance
Mb Megabyte
MGS Matching Grant Schemes
MT Metric tons
MTC Ministry of Transport and Communications
MTI Ministry of Trade and Industry
NEB National Employment Agency
NFYDP Ninth Five-Year Development Plan
ii
NGO Nongovernmental organization
NPPFB National Pension and Provident Fund Bureau
NTTA National Technical Training Authority
Nu ngultrum
PCAL Penden Cement Authority Limited
PPD Policy and Planning Department
QCRS Quality Control and Regulatory Service
RAA Royal Audit Authority
R&D Research and Development
RGOB Royal Government of Bhutan
RICB Royal Insurance Corporation of Bhutan
RMA Royal Monetary Authority (the central bank)
Rs rupees
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SNV Netherlands Development Organization
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific & Cultural Organization
UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund
USD United States dollar
WTM World Travel Market
Acknowledgments
The report was undertaken on a fully collaborative basis with the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Bhutan
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BCCI), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the
World Bank. The World Bank team consisted of Simon Bell (Task Leader), John Nasir, Asya Akhlaque
(World Bank), Andrew Proctor (Foreign Investment Advisory Service - FIAS), Gerald Tyler, Christopher
Oates (generously financed by the UNDP), and Cian O'Carroll (consultants). Representatives from the
Ministry of Trade and Industry involved in the survey included: Sonam Wangdi (Director of the Policy
Planning Department, Ministry of Trade and Industry), Karma Tsering (PPD, MTI), Tshewang Dorji Q.PD,
MTI), and Jambay Yeshi (Dol, MTI). The representative from the Bhutan Chamber of Commerce and
Industry was Tashi Tshering. The survey work was also supported by a team of four accountants including
Nim Sherpa (Sherpa Consultancies), Alok K. Mira, Jayanta Banik, and Ujjwal Kumar Basu (N.C. Mitra and
Co., Calcutta, India). The work of the mission was ably assisted by Dawa Sherpa from Sherpa Consultancies.
Initial background work was done on this survey by both Karma Tshiteem and Tshewang Norbu (from the
Ministry of Finance, Bhutan) when they were interns with the World Bank.
The survey data was entered, in country, into a Microsoft (MS) Access data file by a Bhutanese firm - Visual
Information Technology - recruited for this purpose. The survey team benefited greatly from two interaction
sessions at the end of the mission. One was with the Higher Level Committee on Private Sector
Development, which was recently constituted by the Royal Government of Bhutan under the leadership of the
Secretary of Finance - specifically to address issues pertaining to private sector development. The second
meeting was with working-level representatives of the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Bhutan
Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
The survey team would specifically like to register its deep appreciation to the almost 100 firms that gave
freely of their time and insights during the period of the survey. This report would not have been possible
without their excellent cooperation - and the important information that they willingly provided.
This study was peer reviewed by Benoit Blarel (IFC) and Geeta Batra (World Bank). Marilou Uy was the
Sector Director (Private Sector Finance) and the Country Director for Bhutan - responsible for oversight of
this report. The Vice President for the South Asia Region is Mieko Nishimizu.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.ito xi
Chapter One
INTRODUCTION ........................................................ 1
Chapter Two
GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR .................. .................. 5
1. Macroeconomic Overview .5
2. Bhutan's Private Sector - An Overview .6
3. Financial Sector .12
4. Privatization .13
5. Bhutan's Trade Regime .14
6. Foreign Investment .15
7. Infrastructure .16
8. Labor and Employment .16
9. Conclusion .19
Chapter Three
AGROPROCESSING INDUSTRIES ........................ 23
1. Present Situation .23
2. Costs and Competitiveness .27
3. Impediments to Growth .33
4. Potential .36
5. Recommendations for the Sector .38
Chapter Four
WOOD AND WOOD-BASED INDUSTRIES .................................. 41
1. Present Situation .................................. 41
2. Costs and Competitiveness .................................. 44
3. Impediments to Growth .................................. 47
4. Potential .................................. 53
5. Recommendations for the Sector .................................. 55
Chapter Five
TOURISM ............................... 58
1. Present Situation .................................. 58
2. Costs and Competitiveness .................................. 63
3. Impediments to Growth .................................. 66
4. Recommendations for the Tourism Sector .71
iv
Chapter Six
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY .......................................... 74
1. Current Situation .......................................... 74
2. Opportunities .......................................... 76
3. The Way Forward .......................................... 78
4. Conclusion .......................................... 80
Chapter Seven
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI) .......................................... 81
1. The Need for FDI in Bhutan's Private Sector Development .......................................... 81
2. Current Constraints to FDI in Bhutan .......................................... 83
3. Essential Elements of the Currently Proposed FDI Regime .......................................... 85
4. Remaining Issues to be Addressed .......................................... 89
Chapter Eight
CROSS-CUTING ISSUES ........................................... 90
1. Introduction .90
2. The Biggest Business Problems for the Private Sector .91
3. Labor Issues .91
4. Technology Issues .98
5. Financial Sector Issues .101
6. Land Issues .108
7. Taxation/Auditing and Accounting Issues .108
8. Infrastructure .111
9. The Regulatory Environment .113
10. The Trade Regime ........................................... 116
11. Institutional Issues ........................................... 117
12. Benchmarking Bhutan ........................................... 119
13. Alternate Development Tracks ........................................... 120
14. Privatization ........................................... 123
Chapter Nine
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................... ............ 124
1. Cross-Cutting Issues and Conclusions ........................................... 124
2. Sector-Specific Conclusions ........................................... 132
3. Vision for the Development of the Private Sector in Bhutan .......................................... 134
4. Main Recommendations .135
vAnnexes ............................................ 137
Annex One
List of Registered Companies in Bhutan, 2001 . .............................................................. 138
Annex Two
Tax Regime/Policies .............................................................. 141
Annex Three
Yields of Major Crops in Less Developed Countries and Other Developing Countries ........ 144
Annex Four
Bhutan - Cash Crop Report, 1995 to 1998 ............................... ............................... 145
Annex Five
SWOT Analysis of the Tourism Sector ..................... ......................................... 146
Annex Six
Pilot Visitor Survey .............................................................. 147
Annex Seven
Tourists Entering Bhutan, by Nationality ......................... ..................................... 149
Annex Eight
Tourist Arrivals, by Month and by Tour Operator .............................................................. 150
Annex Nine
Tourist Arrivals, 1984 to 2000 .............................................................. 152
vi
Tables, Charts, and Boxes
Tables
Three Biggest Business Problems ............................................................... vi
Table 1.1 Size of Firms Surveyed ................. ............................................... 2
Table 1.2 Firms Interviewed by Sector, Size, and Location ................................................... 3
Table 1.3 Mean and Medium Annual Employment Growth Rates by Sector and Group ....... 3
Table 1.4 Employment and Share of Non-National Labor Force, by Location and Group ....4
Table 2.1 Bhutan: Annual Licensed Business Establishments by Sector, 1987-1997 ........... 7
Table 2.2 Public Ownership in Listed Companies ............................................................... 13
Table 2.3 Total Work Force - Graduates and Dropouts, 2000-2010 .................................... L8
Table 2.3 Bhutan: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 1995/6-2000/1 .......... 2....... 2
Table 3.1 Typical Agroprocessing Early Entrants in Developing Countries ............ 4............... ,4
Table 3.2 Profile of Survey Respondents ............................................................... 26
Table 3.3 Summary Price Competitiveness of Agricultural Subsectors . ............................... 28
Table 3.4 Agroprocessing - Can Bhutan be Competitive? .9.................................................... 9
Table 3.5 Labor Productivity ............................................................... .32
Table 4.1 Forestry Development Corporation Disposal of Timber, 1998 to 2000 .......... ....... 41
Table 4.2 Comparative Timber Log Prices ..................................... .......................... 45
Table 4.3 Comparative Output and Costs Between Countries in Typical Firms .......... ......... 46
Table 4.4 Comparative Timber Yield Figures ............................................................... 46
Table 4.5 Wood Exports from Ghana per Product Type, 1999-2000 ................ .................... 47
Table 4.6 Typical Timber Lot - Price Paid by Firm and Actual Value to Firm . ................... 48
Table 4.7 Time Taken for Technology to be Transferred to Bhutanese Firms ........... ........... 51
Table 5.1 Employment in the Tourism Sector ............................................................... 60
Table 5.2 Tourism Arrivals, Gross Earnings, and Goverrnent Revenues, 1999 to 2000 ..... 62
Table 5.3 Comparative Costs of a Seven Day Tourism Package to Five Countries, 2001 .... 63
Table 5.4 Cost of a Seven-Day Visit to Bhutan ............................................................... 64
Table 5.5 Location of Overseas Travel Agents ............................................................... 65
Table 6.1 Mean Earnings for Sales and Office Workers ........................................................ 77
Table 6.2 Monthly Fees for Leased Lines ................................................................. 78
Table 8.1 Three Biggest Business Problems ................................................. .............. 91
Table 8.2 Average Monthly Salary By Region and Ethnicity ............................ .................... 93
Table 8.3 Mean Value Added Per Worker Per Year .............................................................. 94
Table 8.4 Percentage of Indian and Bhutanese Workers in Sample by Type ............ ............ 94
Table 8.5 Percentage of Firms Training and Training to Sales Expenditure ............ ............. 96
Table 8.6 Major Reasons for Not Training ...................................... ......................... 97
Table 8.7 Interest Rates and Collateral Ratios ............................................................... 103
Table 8.8 Percentage of Credit Constrained Firms .............................................................. 103
Table 8.9 Nonpayment ............................................................... 104
Table 8.10 Percentage of Firms that Invested Over the Last Three Years ............. ............... 107
Table 8.11 How Investment is Financed ............................... ................................ 107
vii
Table 8.12 Comparative Electricity Prices in the South Asia Region for Industrial Usage ... 113
Table 8.13 Govermment Unpredictability ........................... ................................... 114
Table 8.14 Bhutan's Trade with India and the Rest of the World, 1996 to 1999 .......... ........ 116
Table 8.15 Predictability of Laws and Regulations .............................................................. 119
Table 8.16 Regulatory Constraints .... 120Table~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~. 8.16.egulaory.onstrints..............................................................12
Table 8.17 Firm's Perceptions of the Quality of Public Services .................... ..................... 120
Charts
Chart 2.1 Bhutan Power Sector, 1991 - 2000 . .............................................................. 5
Chart 2.2 Annual Industrial Licensed Businesses ............................................................... 6
Chart 2.3 Industries by Ownership Classification ............................................................... 7
Chart 2.4 Industries by Size Classification, 1997 ............................................................... 8
Chart 2.5 Industries by Type Classification ................................ ............................... 8
Chart 2.6 Distribution of Industries by Industrial Subdivision, 1997 . .................................... 10
Chart 2.7 Labor Force by Sectors, 1999 . .............................................................. 0
Chart 2.8 Employment and Value-Added by Subsector, 1997 .......................... 11.................... 
Chart 2.9 Total Bank Lending .............................................................. 12
Chart 5.1 Tourist Arrivals into Bhutan, 1985 to 2000 ............................................................ 59
Chart 5.2 Tourist Entry by Month, 1998 to 2000 .............................................................. 67
Boxes
Box 2.1 Bhutan's Biggest Companies ............................................................... 9
Box 2.2 Bhutan: The Power Sector .................. ............................................ 20
Box 2.3 Bhutan: Five-Year Development Plans .............................................................. 21
Box 3.1 Location is Important .............................................................. 31
Box 3.2 Poor Management Damages Bhutan's Market Potential .................... ...................... 35
Box 3.3 Penetrating Niche Markets Through Innovation and Proactive Relationships ......... 38
Box 4.1 Supply and Demand for Government Trained Labor ........................... .................... 43
Box 4.2 Firm Eleven's Attempts to Source New Machinery .............................. ................... 52
Box 5.1 2002 - An Appropriate Year for Public-Private Sector Cooperation in Marketing . 65
Box 8.1 Matching-Grant Schemes .................. ............................................ 101
Box 8.2 Accounting and Auditing Issues .............................. ................................ 110
Box 8.3 The Legal Environment - Law and Justice ............................................................ 115
Box 8.4 Yangphel Handicrafts .............................................................. 122
Box 8.5 Incense Production - A Possible Niche Market? ..................................... .............. 123

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
BHUTAN PRIVATE SECTOR SURVEY
Background
Bhutan has a small, new, and relatively underdeveloped private sector.
Prior to opening up the economy in the 1960s, the only private sector activity was in agriculture
supplemented by some trading activities. Since that date, however, the transformnation of the
economy has been dramatic with a rapid growth in urban centers, the establishment of a basic set of
infrastructure services, and the development of an important hydro-power sector. Rates of national
income growth in the 1990s have averaged around 6 percent per annum - strongly supported by
revenues from the hydro sector.
Overall economic growth has, in turn, fostered private sector development and by the end of 2000,
the government had issued over 9,000 industrial licenses, almost 12,000 trading licenses, and 124
registered companies operating in a wide range of activities from power intensive industries such as
cement, ferro alloys, and calcium carbide; a range of light manufacturing industries in areas such as
fruit processing; some mining companies which mine and process locally available products; a
group of saw milling and other upstream processing industries around the wood industry; a group of
service industries supporting the tourism sector; and a fast-growing segment of service industries in
areas such as construction and transport (spurred, in large part, by the construction activities of the
government and the development of additional hydro facilities at the Tala Hydro Plant).
Reflecting the nascent stage of the private sector - and the small size of the economy - the sector is
dominated by a handful of medium-sized companies. However, the vast majority of enterprises
operating in Bhutan are very small in size and operate with considerably less than 10 employees.
Around 85 percent of all firms in Bhutan are classified as cottage or mini (with less than $ 100,000
invested capital). As shown by the number of registered companies, there is only about 100
companies of any size at all - the largest of which employs less than 540 workers. The sector, like
the overall economy, is small.
Increasingly, however, the government is looking to the private sector to provide investment in
support of growth and employment opportunities for a growing number of Bhutanese school
leavers. The government recognizes that, while it has long been the main engine of economic
growth, this situation must gradually evolve with an increasingly greater reliance upon private
sector activities as the main motor for development. Nowhere is this more true than with respect to
employment generation.
Employment
Although employment data is weak in Bhutan, it is estimated that around 60,000 people are
employed in the formal sector. Of these, approximately 22,0000 are employed in public sector
institutions (of which 14, 258 are employed in the civil service). This implies that around 60
percent of total formal-sectorjobs are in the private sector. However, of the total 60,000 formal
sectorjobs, it is estimated that 50 percent are held by non-nationals. As the share of non-nationals
in public sector institutions is likely to be very small the majority of these 30,000 non-national
workers are employed in the private sector.
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Rural-urban migration has not yet become a major source of urban unemployment in Bhutan. The
vast majority of the rural population continue to remain in rural areas (although this is also likely to
change with time). However, good progress in achieving educational and literacy goals has meant
that a growing number of educated and literate Bhutanese are now seeking urban employment
opportunities. While the majority of these school leavers have been absorbed into the civil service
in the past - and this has indeed been the preferred employer for most Bhutanese - the govemment
has now largely reached saturation point. There is a general expectation that the civil service, will
not grow much beyond its current size.
This saturation of public sector employment opportunities has taken place at a time when the
benefits from investment in education are increasingly bearing fruit. Hence, over the decade 2001
to 2010, it is projected that approximately 90,000 school leavers and graduates will be produced by
the school system - with exponential increases taking place each year. As the current formal sector
work force is only 60,000 (of which 30,000 are thought to be non-nationals - and a further 22,000
are in the civil service or in public sector institutions, which are not growing) the creation of an
additional 90,000 jobs appears as a formidable challenge.
The govermnent recognizes that dynamizing the private sector to create employment opportunities
for this increasingly literate work force is a high-priority issue; it now forms a central tenet of the
Ninth Five-Year Development Plan. Absorbing this level of school-leavers into the private sector,
however, will not be easy.
Advantages and Disadvantages for Private Sector Development
As in all countries, Bhutan has a unique set of advantages as well as disadvantages with respect to
the development of the private sector. To promote private sector employment, the government
should seek to build upon the advantages that exist - while attempting to ameliorate the
disadvantages to the maximum extent possible. While it may sound painfully obvious - it is
extremely important that the government should not diminish any potential advantage or reduce its
potential impact - while at the same time it should not add to the disadvantages that the private
sector faces. The task for the private sector is so formidable that it will require all the resources and
support available if it is to begin to address the problem of growing youth unemployment.
The report has identified the following factors as being important advantages for private sector
businesses operating in Bhutan:
* Relatively free access to the large Indian market under current trade arrangements -
although this advantage will gradually lessen as tariff and non-tariff barriers fall as a result
of India's gradual liberalization in line with World Trade Organization requirements;
* Access to cheap skilled and unskilled labor from India, which provides Bhutan with a
considerable cost advantage in labor-intensive production;
* Extremely stable labor relations. No company in the survey indicated any problem with
disruptive union activity, and no working days were lost as a result of strike activity;
* Labor regulations are also very flexible with very little restrictions on the capacity to hire
and fire or determine wage levels;
* Electricity prices are also very low (between one-half and one-fifth of the costs in
competing countries/states in the region). Although electricity subsidies are likely to be
removed over the medium term, they will still confer a considerable advantage in power-
intensive industrial development activities;
* Bhutan is politically stable;
* The Royal Government of Bhutan is clean, efficient, and corruption free.
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These various attributes amount to considerable advantages compared with many countries in the
region. While the impact of some these (e.g., preferential access to the Indian market, very cheap
electricity) are likely to decrease in importance over time, every effort should be made to retain the
positive effect that these features confer on private sector activity in Bhutan.
Unfortunately, the list of disadvantages to undertaking business in Bhutan is equally impressive.
The main problems identified in the survey include:
* A lack of entrepreneurial talent due to the very "new" nature of most private sector
activities in Bhutan;
* Bhutan is remote and landlocked;
* Bhutan has an extremely small domestic market of only around 750,000 (although this is
compensated for by preferential access to the significantly larger Indian market of over 1
billion people);
* A lack of skilled Bhutanese workers and a seeming unwillingness of Bhutanese workers to
undertake menial or unskilled work (although, again, this is more than compensated by a
plentiful supply of low-cost skilled and unskilled Indian workers);
* Bhutan's financial system is rudimentary and noncompetitive. It only offers very basic
financial products and at a fairly high cost;
* Transportation, particularly in the more remote central and northern parts of the country,
poses a considerable cost disadvantage to undertaking many business activities. Road
transport is slow and regularly disrupted by monsoons and associated landslides, while air
transport is erratic and costly;
* Links with outside markets have been extremely limited due to a concentration of trading
relationships with India (with exports of electricity - the main export - dominated by
government-to-government deals) and the almost total absence of foreign direct investment
(as a conscious policy of government).
Ameliorating the impact of many of these problems will prove difficult - Bhutan, for example, will
always remain landlocked. However, action with respect to the financial sector, a gradual
improvement in the transport infrastructure, a gradual increase in the skill levels of Bhutanese
workers, and an increasing emphasis on external linkages through more diversified trade and
increased FDI, are all policy choices that are under the control of the Government. While action
may prove costly or complex, action is, nonetheless, possible.
Sector Specific Conclusions - Agroprocessing, Wood-Based Industry, Tourism, and
Information Technology
Agroprocessing. Agriculture contributes about 35 percent to gross domestic product (GDP), and
85 percent of the population depends on some form of agricultural production. However, only 3
percent of output is processed for commercial use - mainly fruit and vegetables. The
agroprocessing industry is dominated by 104 small firms. There are only three large companies
that export over 65 percent of their production. More than 90 percent of the industry (excluding
alcoholic beverages) is fruit processing and worth some US$3.0 million. With respect to domestic
demand, imported produce is increasing as urban populations grow and tastes move to higher-value
products.
Raw materials are uncompetitive because of poor land utilization, low crop yields, low
productivity, and high transportation costs. Downstream value-adding is adversely affected by an
absence of scale, old technology, bad packaging, a lack of branding, and costly freight.
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Management is insufficiently qualified or experienced to offset these higher costs by innovation and
marketing. Agroprocessing firms mainly depend on Indian labor, which they feel is more skilled
than Bhutanese (although the most non-national-dependent firms are the least profitable). Sorne 90
percent of the agroprocessing work force around Phuentsholing is Indian.
Processed foods are the fastest growing component in world agri-food trade - comprising 75
percent of trade in 1996 (and worth US$384 billion). If Bhutan could overcome impediments to
growth, it has potential in two areas:
o First, in low-volume, high-value products selling into niche markets based on comparative
advantages such as the range of microclimates, biodiversity, and organic production.
Products in this area could include essential oils, traditional medicines, mushrooms, and
incense.
o Second, larger-scale, foreign-investment businesses in border areas based on the
comparative advantages of flexible labor, a stable political environment, and competitive
infrastructure, predominantly using imported raw materials.
To exploit this potential, firms will need access to competitive, consistent, and high-quality raw
materials in a timely manner; supportive policies on transport, labor, and investment; an innovative
approach to products, processes, packaging, and product positioning; and improved productivity
through better management, improved processes, and enhanced labor skills.
Wood-Based Industry. Forestry contributes some 11 percent to GDP and generates over 25,000
informal- and formal-sectorjobs. But wood-based industries, including some 120 sawmills,
furniture workshops, and board manufacturers, employ no more than 2,000 individuals. Low
productivity in firms stems from inadequately qualified and experienced management, low
technology levels, and unskilled labor. There are no economies of scale in the sector, and firms
make a diverse range of products for "walk-in" clients. The government, which buys up to 60
percent of the sector's output, drives down quality and margins. Two recent government policies
have influenced the sector - a 1999 a ban on the export of logs encouraged firms to move
downstream to add value. In mid-2000, a further extension of the export ban, which covers the
export of semi-finished products, was put in place. In addition, firms are required to buy timber in
"mixed-species" lots from Forestry Development Corporation (FDC) auctions, which means that
they cannot get the type and quality of the wood they need.
The sector has potential to serve regional markets, particularly Bangladesh, in specialist categories
not adequately served by local producers or the increasing volume of imports from Southeast Asia
and Europe. Some niche markets in third-countries could be penetrated with easily transported,
low-volume, high-value products. To realize this potential, however, firms must be allowed to
access single-species timber in appropriate sizes and quality; the ban on semi-finished products
must be relaxed so that firms can gain experience and gradually move downstream; productivity
must be raised through improved management, the use of appropriate equipment, and properly
trained labor; and market awareness and marketing skills must be increased. In the medium term,
as a selling point for Bhutanese wood products, it will be desirable to ensure that Bhutanese forests
are certified as being sustainably managed.
Tourism. Tourism has grown by 4 to 36 percent each year for the last decade. Bhutan had a record
year in 2000 with 7,559 arrivals by air and 13,000 by road, providing over US$10.5 million in
direct foreign exchange earnings. Hotels employ some 1,400 persons, and there are about 75
(mostly small) tour operators. The market is highly seasonal, with average hotel occupancy under
20 percent and low repeat tourism. Two Singaporean-based joint ventures have recently been
approved and are likely to influence the development of the industry. A key policy issue for
vtourism is the pricing policy, which requires tourists pay up to US$200 per day ahead of their
holiday (and US$165 in the lean season). Of this, the government collects US$65 (US$63/lean) as
a royalty. Better calibration of these rates - particularly the government royalty - in non-peak
seasons could encourage a more steady stream of tourists into Bhutan throughout the year.
Tourism marketing is weak - the private sector lacks resources and the government plays a passive
role - and the country is concerned about balancing income generation and maintenance of cultural
identity. Holidays in Bhutan are comparatively expensive, but good service is not provided.
Service is usually friendly in hotels, but it is of poor quality and amenities are lacking. This is, in
part, because tourists must pay before arrival. Once they enter Bhutan, they have little choice, so
competition is lacking to drive up standards. The range of tourism products available to tourists is
limited, though some improvements have recently been introduced. Access to Bhutan - particularly
air access - is inadequate and problems are exacerbated by seasonality.
Tourism has considerable growth potential because of its comparative advantages and the problems
in other potential destinations in the region. This potential can be realized if an unambiguous
strategy with appropriate policy and regulations is developed; pricing policy is adjusted
(particularly lean-season pricing); government and firms are more proactive in marketing; access to
Bhutan is improved; seasonality problems are addressed; new products are developed; and
standards of accommodation and service are improved.
Information Technology (IT). IT can impact on the economy in two ways: it can be used as a
business tool in firms or produced as a tradable service. Computers are underused in the private
sector. Almost no firms have local area networks; only 15 percent have Web sites. While 62
percent of firms have e-mail, fax, and telephone dominate communications. An Internet service
provider (ISP) was started two years ago; although lease lines are available, few companies use
them. Impediments to development include comparatively high connectivity charges; a lack of IT
professionals (most must be sourced in India); undeveloped regulatory and financial systems
(online banking business, for example, is not possible); and comparatively high labor costs.
Opportunities being targeted in other developing countries include small niche firms selling
services such as software development, and larger firms selling data entry or operating call centers.
However, in Bhutan, the sector is still in its infancy and several challenges must be overcome
before Bhutan can deliver intemationally competitive services. These include increasing use of IT
as a business tool within the public and the private sectors; developing skilled IT professionals;
introducing appropriate regulations, (for example, to permit online business); establishing an
environment in which services to the IT sector can develop; and improving the infrastructure by
adding data networking infrastructure.
The Private Sector Survey - Biggest Business Constraints of the Private Sector
The private sector survey was conducted for several reasons. The main emphasis was to collect
better information on the private sector and its perceived constraints - to help formulate private-
sector policy for the Ninth Five-Year Plan. The survey covered ten main areas with respect to the
private sector including: entrepreneurship, firm data; labor market issues; training; financial
markets and contractual relations; technology; infrastructure; trade and exports; investor
confidence; and business support services.
The concluding part of the survey requested firms to identify their three biggest business problems
and to rank them in order of relative importance. The results from the 100 surveyed firms is shown
in the table titled "Three Biggest Business Problems," below. The survey data indicate clearly and
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consistently that the main problems faced by private sector firms in Bhutan relate to labor issues -
and most importantly - the issue of skilled labor. Of all firms surveyed, 20 percent listed "skilled
labor" as their "number one" constraint; many other firms listed it within their top three constraints
to doing business.
After skilled labor problems, the next most important constraint identified was bureaucratic burdens
and other regulatory concerns imposed by the government. This attribute encompasses a broad
range of concerns including labor policy (a major concern), tax policy, access to land, and so oni.
This was an interesting result given the general perception that the government is business friendly
and supportive of private sector activities.
The other main constraints, in order of importance, included (a) a lack of demand; (b) financial
sector problems - including problems of cost and access; and (c) problems with infrastructure.
Other concerns were relatively unimportant in comparison to these five main issues, which are
covered in greater detail below.
Three Biggest Business Problems
No. of Times
Problems Cited as Number 1 Problem Weighted
Skilled Labor 20 0.51
Bureaucratic Burden 16 0.38
Lack of Demand 17 0.36
Credit and Finance 16 0.30
Infrastructure 8 0.20
Business Support Services 1 0.06
Import regime 0 0.05
FOREX Regulations 1 0.03
Skiled Labor
By far the most important constraint felt by a majority of private firms was a lack of skilled labor.
In addition there were concerns over labor policy and concerns about the future direction of policy
on the employment of both skilled and non-skilled, non-national labor.
While progress in educating and skilling Bhutanese workers has been remarkable, the skills and
experience required by the private sector are clearly still in short supply. One reason for this is that
the government has, up to this point, absorbed the majority of the skilled and educated work force
into the civil service. A second reason is that most educated Bhutanese have a strong preference for
work in the public over the private sector. This dynamic is now slowly changing as the government
absorbs increasingly fewer and fewer school-leavers and graduates. Another missing component
within the skill dynamic is "experience" - an attribute not learned in an academic institution.
While it is incumbent upon the private sector to employ skilled and experienced Bhutanese - it is
also important to recognize the considerable advantages offered by the country's ready access to a
large pool of skilled, experienced, and relatively low-cost workers in India.
The same is true for non-skilled categories of workers. Most companies complained that Bhutanese
would not perform the functions - menial tasks, dirty, repetitive and backbreaking work - that non-
nationals will undertake on construction sites, road works, and on production lines. They certainly
would not perform these tasks at the wages currently paid to non-national workers.
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The truth is, however, that the increasing numbers of school-leavers and new graduates entering the
work force will have neither the skills and experience to undertake the skilled jobs (at least not
initially) nor will they wish to do the unskilled jobs currently carried out by non-nationals. Hence,
mandating reductions in the use of non-national labor does not seem to be a productive or cost-
effective method of promoting the private sector or of generating employment in the skill areas in
which Bhutanese are most likely to be most suited. The challenge rather is to create employment in
semi-skilled and skilled areas of economic activity that match the qualifications of the school-
leavers - while simultaneously adjusting the school system and vocational training to better match
the private sector's skill demands.
As indicated, the objective is to build on Bhutan's strengthens and try to reduce areas of possible
weakness. Hence, rather than trying to exclude non-nationals (who confer a considerable advantage
in terms of cost effectiveness) the goal should be to increase the productivity of Bhutanese workers
through a mixture of management training, worker training, and technology transfers that raise
worker productivity and permit Bhutan to compete on a cost- effective basis with foreign firms -
initially within the region and later, internationally.
In this respect, training emerged as an area of considerable weakness in the survey. Virtually no
firms undertook any serious staff training - despite their complaints over a lack of skills. Within
the entire survey, only 3 percent of the employees had received training over the preceding 12-
month period. Given the linkages between worker training, work productivity, and firm growth, it
is important to ensure that a correct set of incentives are put in place to encourage firns to
undertake more training. Such activities could include: more transparent tax regulations on the
write-off of training expenses; use of training levies; and the use of matching-grant schemes, and
retired executive officers to assist in training.
Bureaucratic Burden - Public Policy and Regulations
A surprising 26 percent of firms felt that the government was unpredictable - with this
unpredictability exerting a negative impact on their business operations. A majority of firms (56
percent) feared that the government would make policy changes without consultation - again with
negative effects on their businesses. This was an interesting result given the generally benign view
that many people hold of the government.
However, the main concerns in this area tended to be about the opaque nature of policy in many
areas pertinent to these private-sector firms. For example, many enterprises were confused or
ignorant about the tax policy on training expenses, discussed above. In this case, training expenses
are reviewed by the tax authorities on a case-by-case basis and are not necessarily limited to 2
percent of total profits (as was assumed by many companies). However, the application of case-by-
case analysis, in instances such as this, injects exactly the element of uncertainty into business
activity that most good firms dislike.
Indeed, the survey team found many examples of discretionary or ad hoc treatment of important
business issues - and a lack of transparent guidance on matters of considerable importance to firms.
This situation is not surprising given the small size and short history of the private sector in Bhutan.
Business activities have traditionally grown up based on personal relationships and ad hoc
arrangements and, to date, this has not served Bhutan poorly. However, as the private sector grows
and as business becomes increasingly more complex, it is extremely important that business
policies and regulations become more systematized and clear. Precise policies on, for example, the
employment of non-nationals, tax treatment of deductible expenses, business licensing policy in
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Phuentsholing, tax auditing of companies, and a range of other issues were all considered to be
unclear to many members of the private sector. Leaving these policies opaque creates room for
rent-seeking practices to creep into an otherwise clean and well-managed system of governance.
Addressing these issues now, ensures that these potential problems do not fester and also imposes
order and discipline on private-sector activities. Indeed, the government is very aware of these
issues and has already made considerable progress in formulating a body of law, which clarifies
legal rights and obligations.
Non-consultative changes in policy can also have a pernicious effect on the private sector - as in
the case of the ban on log exports followed by the ban on semi-finished wood products in 1999 and
2000, respectively. Companies that invested in semi-finished processing after the log ban was
imposed were severely penalized by the sudden imposition of the later ban on semi-finished
products.
It also needs to be emphasized that a lack of clarity and systematization is not only a problem for
the public sector. It is also rampant in the private sector. A lack of good information systems -
particularly robust and believable financial data - opens the same doors to corruption and other bad
business practices. A systematic approach to auditing and accounting not only clarifies the trme
financial position of companies for the tax authorities, but it should also serve as a useful
management tool to guide the operations of private-sector firms.
Technology (Lack of Demand)
The third concern, lack of demand, presents somewhat of an anomaly. Demand in Bhutan is clearly
not a constraint for an efficient and well-run business. Domestic demand is increasing rapidly as
national income continues to rise - and regional demand for most products from India is well
beyond Bhutan's production capacity. When most companies complain of a lack of demand, they
are often referring to a lack of demand - at the price and quality offered by domestic producers. In
other words, these companies are not cost competitive compared with imports or other domestic
producers.
Being able to produce goods competitively will depend, to a large degree, on a firm's ability to
access technologies that will enable it to undertake its business in a cost effective manner.
Technology - broadly defined - falls into three main categories: (a) management capability; (b)
equipment and processes used; and (c) marketing and design.
Unfortunately, management capabilities in most firms in Bhutan are weak - most managers are
technically unqualified and inexperienced. About half of all managers come from a civil service
background, and only a very small share of the total (less than 13 percent) had any work experience
with a foreign firm (and those, mainly in India). As a result, management practices are weak.
Managers frequently do not know what skills to employ to support their business activities, they do
not value worker training, and they are often unfamiliar with best practices and relevant
technologies required for their operations.
Equipment and processes used are also weak. Most companies operate with outdated and
ineffective equipment from India. Often the equipment was dated even by Indian standards. Yet, if
firms are to become competitive and grow, they need to be able to plug into international best-
practice equipment technologies. This probably implies that these firms will need to leapfrog the
simpler and "easier" technologies, which are currently available from India and are mainly used in
Bhutan.
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Marketing and design technologies are also poor as a result of infrequent contacts with external
buyers and markets. The capacity of Bhutan to enter into small, profitable niche markets in
agroprocessing (wasabi, essential oils, shitake mushrooms, medicinal herbs), wood products
(furniture, artifacts, etc.), and even tourism will depend crucially upon the ability to design products
to meet a specific external demand (for example, in Europe or North America) and to package
produce in a sufficiently attractive manner for sale.
Finding and absorbing technology is an expensive and difficult task and the mechanisms that help
firms do this are not well developed in Bhutan. There are no networks of suppliers or international
buyers regularly visiting Bhutan to teach firms about new technologies. There are few consultants
or technical experts and Bhutan's isolation makes it difficult to find them. Even foreign direct
investment (FDI) - which is one of the most powerful ways of transferring technology - is almost
completely absent in Bhutan. Strengthening and supporting learning mechanisms - through
activities such as matching-grants schemes, providing easier visa arrangements for technical
experts, providing tax incentives for technical improvements, and most critically, liberalizing FDI -
is therefore extremely important. These activities will help firms improve their technological base,
raise productivity, and become more competitive.
Finance
Finance sector issues are to be covered extensively by the Asian Development Bank (AsDB) in
their 2002 financial sector study. Recommendations from AsDB's report should be reviewed
carefully for possible speedy implementation. Firms in Bhutan complained about many aspects of
the financial system and many of their concerns appear valid. Prevalent among these was the
high and inflexible cost of finance. With real interest rates of between 7 to 10 percent, the cost of
capital is exceedingly high in Bhutan. This has serious implications for any policy that seeks to
promote increased capital intensity and mechanization in production processes.
Another interesting feature of the financial sector was the large number of companies that were
credit constrained (around 42 percent of the total sample). Although this was partly a result of a
lack of financial sophistication among firms which did not wish to carry any debt - it is also a
reflection of a lack of sophistication of the banking system which, despite access to large amounts
of liquid resources, did not (or could not) reach out to private-sector enterprises to help them
develop bankable projects.
The team noted serious problems arising from a lack of financial sector competition. This was
reflected in the high and inflexible interest-rate structure; the lack of any sophistication in providing
innovative financial products (leasing, venture capital, factoring, credit cards, ATM machines, etc.);
and a weak payments system, which is almost exclusively paper based and which takes several
weeks to clear funds transfers between branches of the same bank in different towns. Payments are
also negatively affected by a lack of ATMs and use of credit cards - and hence, a more general use
of electronic funds transfers.
Infrastructure
While firms were mostly complimentary about Bhutan's instrastructural base, the one big exception
to this was road and air transport. Poor roads, which are slow and frequently cut off by land slides,
make transport costly and unreliable. In the case of some timber products, the cost of transporting
the timber is more than the value of the wood itself High costs and poor reliability mean that it is
almost impossible to efficiently produce goods that have a high transport content - except in the
xborder areas of Bhutan. This also means that goods produced in central Bhutan, if they have a high
transport-cost component, are unlikely to be cost competitive.
The high altitudes in the Himalayas dictates that only certain aircraft types can be used. These
factors tend to make air transport costly and unreliable. One company complained that raw
materials take three days to travel from the United States to Bangkok - but then take an additional
month to get from Bangkok to Paro. This severely impacts the competitive position of companies
producing niche, time-sensitive goods from Bhutan. Shitake mushrooms, which should be in
Tokyo markets within 48 hours of being picked, are a good example of how an unreliable
transportation infrastructure can effectively destroy a potentially important market.
A Vision of Private Sector Development
Given the constraints and concerns of the private sector in Bhutan, the report recommends a dual-
track development plan:
o . Along the border areas - where labor costs are lower (even Bhutanese labor costs are 13
percent lower in Phuentsholing than in Thimphu) and transport costs and reliability are not
such pressing constraints - firms can take advantage of the low electricity prices, lower
labor costs, ease of access to Indian markets (for raw materials and finished products), and
lack of industrial relations problems to produce more cost effectively than equivalent
markets across the border. This would permit the development of heavier industry with a
high raw-material input as well as a high labor component.
o In central Bhutan, high labor costs as well as higher transport costs make the development
of such industries uneconomic. Instead, these areas should focus on providing services to
the heavier industrial belt along the southern border (increasingly providing accounting
services, IT services, management, and financial services); providing other services such as
tourism, construction and transport; and developing niche markets in specialized fields
(mushrooms, essential oils, Himalayan medicines, handicrafts, furniture).
Developing such a dual-track approach to private-sector development, however, presumes that the
government will also be able to deal with issues related to skilled workers, government regulations
and bureaucracy; to promote greater technology transfer into Bhutan; to address constraints
imposed by the financial sector, and to gradually seek alternative methods of addressing the
restrictions and higher costs imposed by the transport infrastructure.
Main Recommendations
In conclusion, the main recommendations in support of private sector development for the Ninth
Five-Year Development Plan (NFYDP), as proposed by the Private Sector Survey include:
* TRAINING. Establishment of a transparent system of tax relief and possibly a system of
industry levies to support radically increased worker and management training - in an
effort to increase overall productivity.
* LABOR. Develop a transparent, time-bound, policy for the recruitment of non-national
workers with an eye to ensuring the ongoing cost competitiveness of Bhutanese industry.
* FINANCE. Encourage the development of innovative financial instruments and payment
modalities - based upon the AsDB study - including, inter alia, ATM machines, greater
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use of lower-cost credit card transactions, introduction of leasing finance, extension of
factoring services. Simultaneously make every effort to encourage greater financial-sector
competition and greater interest-rate sensitivity.
* TECHNOLOGY. Support technology transfer mechanisms to enhance the private sector
through, inter alia, the immediate establishment of a Matching-Grants System, use of
retired executive schemes, etc. Incentivize technology transfer through the establishment
of, for example, tax breaks on research and development.
* FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT. Ensure that the new FDI Law is finalized and
approved in the next session of the Assembly and that supporting regulations are put in
place shortly thereafter. Actively encourage potentially high-impact FDI ventures in an
early phase of implementation.
* EXPORT INCENTIVES. Immediately implement a system of duty drawback on
imported raw materials used in the production of export products (including exports to
India) and immediately begin a dialogue with the banks on the provision of pre-shipment
and post-shipment finance to the private sector.
* POLICY ENVIRONMENT. Develop a clear, consistent, and transparent policy
environment for the private sector, within the context of the NFYDP, which takes into
account private sector views. Ensure proper and clear systematization, codification, and
regulation of private sector strategy, laws and regulations.
* AUDITING AND ACCOUNTING. Increasingly include a wider group of private sector
companies in the auditing net to encourage the greater use of financial management
information as a tool of management information systems (MIS) for firms - as well as to
assist the tax authorities.
* INDUSTRIAL ESTATES AND DRY PORTS. Further support private sector
development through the establishment of strategically located (for the private sector)
industrial estates as well as dry ports at strategic border locations.
* DIALOGUE. Immediately put in place support mechanisms for private sector industry
interests such as the Bhutan Chamber of Commerce and Industry as well as sector
associations - by bringing in experienced professionals from extemal chambers and the
private sector.

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Objective of the Study. Two of the seven major development challenges of the Royal
Government of Bhutan identified for the Donors Development Forum, held in Thimphu in
November 2000, were private sector development and employment generation. Given the fact that
the public sector is unlikely to expand further in the foreseeable future, these issues become two
sides of the same coin. Future employment generation in Bhutan can only come from the further
growth of the private sector.
These developmental priorities are being translated into effective support activities in the Ninth
Five-Year Development Plan (NFYDP) - which covers the period July 2002 to June 2007. The
principal objectives of this report and associated survey work, therefore, are to assist the
Government in developing an improved information base on the private sector and to thereby assist
it in formulating its strategy for private sector support over the period of the NFYDP.
The Survey. Given a general lack of knowledge and understanding of the private sector, the Royal
Government of Bhutan requested the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI), the Bhutan Chamber of
Commerce and Industry (BCCI), and the World Bank to operate on a tripartite basis to undertake a
survey of the private sector. Support was also provided by the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP). The survey was conducted over a three-week period from September 18 to
October 8, 2001, and covered five major industrial areas - Thimphu, Paro, Phuentsholing, Samtse,
and Gomtu. Surveys were not conducted in the central and eastern regions of Bhutan due to
security and cost considerations - although it is hoped that the work of the Dutch NGO, SNV in
surveying smaller enterprises in these regions may augment the findings of this survey.
The survey aimed to cover 100 firms - and ultimately 98 firms were interviewed, including pre-
testing of the survey instrument, which took place in July 2001. The basis for the survey was
registered companies operating in the Thimphu-Phuentsholing corridor. Emphasis was placed on
the 124 registered companies (registered under the Companies Act) rather than the 6,000 to 7,000
licensed firms (licensed by the Ministry of Industry) as the former group were larger entities and
were required, by law, to have audited financial statements - an important component of the survey
work. Of the 124 registered companies currently operating in Bhutan, over 80 percent operate in
the five surveyed towns (see Annex One).
The list of registered companies was dominated by construction companies and tourism operators.
With this in mind, not all companies in these two sectors, in the surveyed towns, were included in
the sample frame, and some of these were replaced with smaller licensed firms operating in the
wood sector, the agroprocessing sector, and the information technology sector (IT). This
adjustment was made to meet the government's desire to focus the study on the four sub-sectors:
(a) tourism; (b) information technology; (c) wood products; and (d) agroprocessing.
The survey instrument covered ten main areas of interest to the private sector, including:
entrepreneurship, firm data; labor-market issues; training; financial markets and contractual
relations; technology; infrastructure; trade and exports; investor confidence; and business support
services. The survey was pretested on 12 companies in Thimphu and subsequently modified in July
2001.
2The survey was conducted by four three-member teams, comprising a team leader with a
specialization in each of the four subsectors designated by the government for in-depth review
(tourism, IT, wood, and agroprocessing), a qualified chartered accountant, and a representative
from either the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) or the Bhutan Chamber of Commerce and
Industry (BCCI).
Profile of the Companies Surveyed. The following tables provide a profile of the companies
surveyed. As indicated in Table 1.1, the majority of firms were very small. The largest privale
sector firm in the country only employs 532 people. Of the total surveyed firms, 46 percent had
less than 10 workers, which is generally classified as micro-enterprise. Consequently, although the
survey had purposely set out to cover the larger firms operating in Bhutan, in reality a large number
of small, medium, and even micro-firms were actually covered. This reflects the small, nascent
nature of the private sector in Bhutan - and a lack of larger-scale enterprises outside of the public
sector. Tables 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 provide additional background information of the survey group by
sector, size, location, employment growth, and share of non-national labor.
Geographic Spread of Private Sector Activities. Outside of agricultural production, most private
sector activity occurs in the Thimphu/Paro-Phuentsholing corridor. Indeed, around 80 percent of
registered companies are located in this area. Given this large concentration of formal businesses,
the survey focused exclusively on this region - for cost efficiency reasons as well as logistical
reasons (reaching central and eastern Bhutan generally involves many days of car travel). As a
result the survey work does not capture potential regional peculiarities that may exist in these other
regions. In time, and in the context of future private sector survey work, it will be necessary to also
incorporate the views of these regions. While the present concentration of non-agricultural private
sector activity is mostly in the west - for reasons related to broader regional development, rural-
urban migration, and so on, it may well become increasingly important to ensure that there is a
more balanced development of private sector activities throughout Bhutan.
The Views are Those of the Private Sector. Last, by its very nature, a survey of this type covers
the views, perceptions, and concerns of the private sector. In all countries, the private sector will
have views which differ from that of the government. While the Ministry of Trade and Industry
was involved in the data and information gathering exercise, this report basically covers the
concerns and views of Bhutan's private sector - which need to be balanced against the views and
aspirations of the Royal Government of Bhutan.
Table 1.1: Size of Firms Surveyed
Size Category Number
Micro (10 workers or less) 45
Small (11 to 50 workers) 26
Medium (51 to 200 workers) 19
Large (201 to 500 workers) 7
Very Large (greater than 501 workers) 1
The survey includes one foreign-owned firm with 20 percent foreign ownership, ten firms
had some government ownership, six were 100 percent owned, and the others ranged from 6
to 80 percent.
3Table 1.2: Firms Interviewed, by Sector, Size, and Location
Sector Observations Number of Workers
Total Thimphu Phuentsholing Mean Median High/Low
Cement 10 3 7 103 21 532/5
Chemical 5 0 5 145 157 286/10
Construction 4 4 0 54 45 120/6
Food 14 4 10 101 17 364/5
Handicrafts 4 4 0 24 32 60/12
IT 11 8 3 13 9 40/4
Metal 4 1 3 40 19 118/3
Other 1 1 0 43 43 43
Textile 2 0 2 31 38 60/16
Tourism 17 13 4 30 15 150/5
Transport 9 4 5 45 21 190/4
Wood 17 8 9 62 23 373/8
Total 98 50 48 54 20 532/3
Table 13: Mean and Median Annual Employment Growth Rates by Sector and Group
Number Mean Growth Med. Growth
Rate Rate
Cement 8 .026 -.003
Chemical 5 .043 .019
Construction 3 .130 .110
Food 13 .052 .083
Handicrafts 3 .160 .230
IT 11 .083 .069
Metal 4 .027 .034
Other 1 .182 .182
Textile 2 .023 .024
Tourism 16 .079 .067
Transport 8 .088 .084
Wood 8 .056 .009
Manufacturing 43 .050 .019
Services 39 .089 .077
Total 82 .068 .063
Food = Agricultural processing + Food + Beverages
Cement = All cement, tile, blocks, and other construction material
Chemicals = Plastics and chemicals
Manufacturing = Chemicals, cement, food, handicrafts, metal, textile, and wood
Services= Information technology, construction, transport, tourism, and other
4Table 1.4: Employment and Share of Non-National Labor Force, by Location and Group
Thimphu Phuentsholing Sample
Services Manufacturing Services Manufacturing Services Manufacturing
Number 30 20 12 36 42 56
Mean Size 34 23 24 100 32 73
Median
Size 15 15 19 39 16 23
Mean %
of Non- 13% 15% 57% 59% 32% 44%
Nationals
Median %
of Non- 3% 0 63% 70% 14% 50%
Nationals
5CHAPTER TWO
GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR
1. Macroeconomic Overview
A landlocked Himalayan country, Bhutan was largely cut off from the outside world until the 1960s
and its dispersed population depended on subsistence agriculture. Once Bhutan opened up, the
country embarked on a far-reaching development strategy that has been articulated in eight
successive Five-Year Plans. Bhutan's development performance has been impressive and its gross
domestic product (GDP) growth rate has averaged over 6 percent a year since 1985. GDP grew by
6 percent in 2000/01, and in 2000, Bhutan's per capita gross net income (GNI) was US$550.'
Although agriculture continues to account for the largest share of GDP (36 percent in 1998) -
Bhutan's rapid growth has been resource led. Hydropower (11 percent of GDP) and foreign aid (23
percent of GDP) are prominent features in Bhutan's small economy (2000 GDP of US$441
million).
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The Bhutanese economy is closely linked with its significantly larger neighbor, India. The country
enjoys a tariff-free trade agreement with India that dates back to 1949.3 More than 80 percent of
Bhutan's trade flows are with India (over 90 percent of exports and 70 percent of imports), which is
Bhutan's largest foreign donor and source of expatriate labor. India has financed Bhutan's major
hydropower projects and some of its large industrial investments. There are no restrictions on trade
and payments between the two countries. Bhutan's free access to the vast Indian market and almost
unlimited demand for Bhutan's hydropower from India have boosted Bhutan's exports. The
ngultrum is pegged at parity to the Indian rupee, which circulates freely within Bhutan. These links
limit independence of monetary policy, and interest rates in Bhutan closely follow those in India.
In recent years, Bhutan has received approximately US$80 million per annum in disbursements of
concessional assistance. Of this 85 percent is in the form of grant aid with external borrowings
limited by the government's policy of using grants in the first instance. The highly favorable terms
of its aid, combined with efficient, cost effective, and transparent use, has enabled Bhutan to limit
1 Bhutan's population in 2000 was estimated at 805,000 - both figures from the World Development Report, 2002.
2 Although power has a unique and critical place within Bhutan's economy, a review of the power sector is beyond the
scope of this report. The sector is dominated by the public sector and is highly capital intensive in nature.
3Bhutan also has a preferential trade agreement with Bangladesh (Agreement on Trade) that provides for concessions on
a range of negotiated product lines.
6its external debt. Its 1998 ratio of debt service to exports was under 7 percent. There are many
signs of the impact of these large inflows of resources: a high domestic saving rate (38 percent of
GDP), high levels of foreign exchange reserves (around 19 months of import cover), and a high
proportion of financial assets in the form of foreign assets.
Fiscal policy has remained prudent.4 Bhutan has a strong record of public expenditure
management. The overall budget - including grants and concessional credits - has always been
close to balance. The authorities have historically avoided borrowing to finance recurrent
expenditures. Inflation has remained at a moderate rate and was 4.5 percent in 2000/01. The
exchange rate has been relatively stable, and Bhutan continues to experience a strong positive
balance of payments position. Foreign reserves stand at US$293 million, representing over a year
and a half of import cover. The debt-service ratio is estimated at 4.1 percent in 2000-0 1.
The essential development challenge for Bhutan is to convert its rapid economic growth into
effective social transformation, while maintaining it cultural identity and environment, and dealing
with an inadequate supply ofjobs for the growing, increasingly better-educated labor force. Bhutan
2020 Vision firmly identifies "the private sector as the driving force behind employment groNvth".
Given that the private sector is still in an embryonic stage5 and lacks dynamism, considerable
strengthening will need to occur before this vision can be realized. A first step in this process
entails developing a better understanding of the private sector in Bhutan and the key issues
constraining its growth. A lack of reliable, up-to-date statistics makes this task difficult. Indeed,
this is precisely one of the reasons for this private sector survey.
2. Bhutan's Private Sector - An Overview
Based on the limited available information, this section provides a broad overview of the general
composition, distribution, and direction of commercial private sector activity in Bhutan.
Growth, Ownership, Size, Type, and Chart 2. Annual Industrial Licensed Businesses
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4 For a full description of Bhutan's Tax Regime, see Annex Two.
5 One indication underlining the nascent stage of private sector is that the Bhutan Chamber of Commerce and Industry
(BCCI) was established with the assistance of the government.
7Table 2.1: Bhutan: Annual Licensed Business Establishments by Sector, 1987-1997
Year Production Services Contract Total
and
Manufacturing
1987 17 7 13 37
1988 17 12 74 103
1989 8 4 39 61
1990 14 19 54 87
1991 14 23 51 88
1992 37 40 195 272
1993 30 45 118 193
1994 47 1,297 259 1,603
1995 15 140 127 282
1996 36 180 251 467
1997 33 341 315 689
Total 268 2,118 1,496 3,882
Private development received a major push beginning with the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1987-92)
when corporatization of government agencies and divestment of government equity to the private
sector began. In terms of number of establishments, the private sector is far bigger than either the
public sector or jointly owned establishments - although the public sector continues to dominate in
terms of employment. Private ownership in the large public and jointly owned establishments such
as the Penden Cement Authority Limited (PCAL), Bhutan Ferro Alloys Limited (BFAL), and
Bhutan Board Products Limited (BBPL) (see Box 2.1) has also been growing with the
government's privatization program. The government has also privatized bus services and
corporatized postal services. There are plans to privatize some agricultural services, to contract out
road maintenance, and to encourage private sector participation in education and health. However,
the power sector, one of the key sectors in the economy, remains closed to private investment. All
hydropower projects are fully government owned and operated. As a consequence, the power
sector is not covered in this report, although it could be an important area of future private sector
development and exploitation through the privatization process.
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8In terms of the size of the establishments, Bhutan's economy is dominated by cottage and mini
industries. Size of establishments is determined by their capital input: cottage Nu 0.5m
(US$10,500) or less, small NuO.5 to 5 million (US$105,000), medium Nu5 to 20 million
(US$420,000), large Nu2O million or more. In 1993, the cottage, mini and other categories
accounted for around 84 percent of the total by number of establishments. In 1997, this had
increased to 91 percent. Large industries accounted for less than 1 percent, by number. Only two
large projects - Cement and Ferro Alloys - were developed in the 1990s.
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around the capital Thimphu, particularly notable in the Service and Other categories. This is
followed by Regions 2, 3, and 4, in descending importance.
6 Region 1: Thimphu, Haa, Paro, Wangduephodrang, Punakha, and Gasa Region 2: Chhukha, Samtse Region 3: Tsirang,
Daga, Sarpang, Zhemgang, Trongsa and Bumthang Region 4: Samdrupjongkhar, Pemagatshel, Trashigang, Tashi
Yangtse, Mongar, and Lhuentse.
9Box 2.1: Bhutan's Biggest Companies
Chukha Hydro Power Corporation (CHPC) is located in Chukhha Dzongkhag. CHPC was
commissioned in 1988. Built with assistance from the government of India (60 percent grant and 40
percent loan), it is the single largest corporation in Bhutan, contributing to 41 percent of the RGoB's
domestic revenues in 1999. Its annual sales for 1999 were Nu2,141.65 million (US$47.6 million), 90
percent of which came from exports to India. It is fully government owned.
Bhutan Carbide and Chemicals Limited (BCCL). BCCL was established under a joint venture
arrangement between the Royal Government and the Tashi Group of Companies in 1984. Although the
Government had a 80 percent stake, BCCL was managed by its private promoters. By the end of the
Seventh Five-Year Plan (1992-1997), the Royal Govemnnent had divested its entire holding in the
company. In 1998, BCCL had a market capitalization of Nu375.0 million (US$8.53 million). Its annual
sales in the same year were Nu583.6 million (US$13.26 million), almost all from exports to India. BCCL
is also one of Bhutan's most profitable companies, declaring dividends of above 100 percent since 1997.
It is located in Chukhha Dzongkhag.
Bhutan Board Products Limited (BBPL). BBPL is located in Chukhha Dzongkhag and was established
under a joint venture arrangement between the Royal Government and a private promoter in 1983.
Initially, the RGoB held 85 percent of the company which was managed by its promoters. Today, the
RGoB has a 23.9 percent share in the company. The company had a total market capitalization of
NulO7.5 million (US$2.4 million) in 1998. Its total sales in 1998 were Nu383.8 million (US$8.7 million)
of which 95 percent was made up of exports to India.
Penden Cement Authority Limited (PCAL). PCAL was established by the RGoB in 1974. Today the
RGoB's share in PCAL is 42.7 percent. It had a market capitalization of Nu680.0 million (US$15.5
million) in 1998. In the same year, its total sales were Nu564.7 million (US$12.8 million), of which 81
percent was made up of exports to India. It is located in Samtse Dzongkhag.
Bhutan Ferro Alloys Limited (BFAL). BFAL was established in 1995. It is one of only three
companies currently operating with foreign investment (20 percent Marubeni Japan). The Royal
Government has a 25 percent share. It had a market capitalization of Nul80.0 million (US$4.1 million) in
1998. It has been facing problems with landslides and floods caused by the monsoons - particularly in
2000. It is located in Chukhha Dzongkhag.
At the district level, business establishments are mainly concentrated in Thimphu, the capital
followed by Chhukha and Samdrupjongkhar. The medium- and large-scale industries are
concentrated in Chhukha district whereas cottage industries are concentrated in Thimphu and other
districts. Thimphu has the highest number of forest-based, services, contract/construction, and
miscellaneous industries, while Chhukha has the highest number of agro-based industries, and
Samtse has the highest number of mineral-based industries. The distribution of industries by
number of registration conceals the fact that the major industries in Bhutan are mostly located in the
Chhukha district - including Bhutan Carbide and Chemicals Limited, the Bhutan Ferro Alloys
Limited as well as the Chhukha Hydro Power Corporation.
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Data on employment is scarce - and generally of poor quality. However, based on what is
available, of the total labor force, agriculture provides employment to 75 percent, the services
sector to 12 percent, and manufacturing industry to 5 percent (Labor Force Survey, 1999). Data
pertinent to the private sector is limited to the manufacturing and mining industries. (See Chart 6.)
In 1997, total registered manufacturing and mining industries operating within Bhutan employed
12,592 persons. Of these, 47 percent were employed in mineral based industries, 20 percent in
agro-based, and 18 percent in forest-based industries, and the rest in nonclassified industries.
Women accounted for 30 percent of the work force. Excluding the civil service, private companies
employed the most workers (41 percent) followed by publicly listed companies (31 percent), public
sector companies (15 percent), jointly owned companies (11 percent) - with a residual group
Chart 6. Labour Force by Sectors, 1999
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belonging to "semi-government and other" categories, including electricity. Average wages
(including bonus and in-kind payment) were highest in the forest-based industries (Nul 1,315 or
US$257 per month), followed by the other category (Nu10,072 or US$229 per month). The total
value of output of the manufacturing and mining industries in 1997 was Nu4,920 million
(US$111.8 million), the cost of production Nu2.1 million (US$47,000), and the resulting value-
added was Nu2,814 million (US$64.0 million). The highest value-added of 97 percent (as a
percentage of total output) was achieved by the 'others' category. These data on employment,
however, may not always be accurate and do not always concur with the findings of the survey
team in its work.
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In 1989, the number of industries employing more than 100 people was 9 percent (15 out of a total
of 168 manufacturing and mining industries). In 1997, the number had increased to 10 percent (22
out of a total of 213).7 Of these 22 industries, 10 employed more than 300 people.
Due to the lack of data on employment provided by the service and contract/construction sectors
(the two sectors with the highest growth in registrations), no comparison of employment generation
between the major sectors could be made that would provide a meaningful insight into private
sector employment in Bhutan.
The Royal Securities Exchange Board and Performance of Listed Companies
Bhutan's stock exchange, the Royal Securities Exchange Board, was established in 1993. A total of
12 companies are listed on the exchange. These are the largest companies in the kingdom outside
of wholly government-owned firms. Total market capitalization stood at Nu 1.64 billion (US$37.3
million) in December 1998, equivalent to about 10 percent of GDP. The Penden Cement Authority
Limited was the largest in terms of market capitalization at Nu680 million (US$15.5 million),
followed by the Bhutan Carbide and Chemicals Limited (BCCL) (Nu375 million -US$8.5
million), and Bhutan Ferro Alloys Limited (Nul 80 million - or US$4.1 million). In the same year,
the Druk Satair Company Limited had the highest return on capital of 53 percent followed by the
State Trading Corporation of Bhutan with 48 percent and BCCL with 37 percent. Due to low
volume of trading on the stock exchange, market values are not very reliable indicators of a
7 This is based on the "Report on the National Census of Manufacturing Industries, 1998" CSO, Planning Commission,
RGoB. These figures differ significantly from the "Statistical Yearbook of Bhutan 1997," CSO, Planning Commission,
RGoB, which lists the total number of licensed manufacturing and mining industries in 1997 as 405.
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company's true value, which is often understated. With the exception of four companies, all'
companies declared dividends ranging from 10 percent (BBPL) to 150 percent (BCCL) in 1998.
3. Financial Sector
Commercial Banks. Bhutan has two commercial banks - the Bank of Bhutan (BoB) and Bhutan
National Bank (BNB). Both are publicly owned and there is very little competition between them.
Bank of Bhutan, established in 1968, is the oldest financial institution in the country. With assets
of Nu6,613.3 million (about US$150.3 million) in 1999, it is also the largest commercial bank. It is
owned by the government (80 percent) and the State Bank of India (20 percent). It has 25 branches
and 3 extension centers that cover all the 20 Dzongkhags (districts) of Bhutan.
Bhutan National Bank was converted from the Unit Trust of Bhutan in 1997. In 1999 its assets
were Nul,292.2 million (about US$28.7 million). Its largest shareholders are the Royal
Government, the Asian Development Bank, and the Citibank - although in 2001, Citibank sold its
shares back to the government. It has four branches.
Non-Bank Financial Institutions. There are two non-bank financial institutions in Bhutan -- an
insurance company and a development corporation. The Royal Insurance Corporation of Bhutan
(RICB) is the only institution offering insurance products and is 41 percent government owned.
Total assets were Nu2,077.9 million (US$47.2 million) in 1998, including Nul,304.4 million
(US$29.6 million) of provident funds, which have now been transferred to the newly established
National Pension and Provident Fund Bureau (NPPFB). While it enjoys a monopoly in the
insurance business, its preoccupation since inception, has been the management, administration,
and investment of the Government Employees Provident Fund, a defined-contribution scheme that
initially covered only public-sector employees but was later extended to formal private-sector
organizations. The RICB also managed the real estate assets of the funds including construction,
collection of rents, and maintenance of property. In June 2000, these funds and the accompanying
responsibilities were taken over by the newly established National Pension and Provident Fund
Bureau (NPPFB). With this change, it is expected that the RICB will focus on its core business of
insurance, and a wider range of products and services will be introduced.
The Bhutan Development Finance Corporation (BDFC) is fully government owned. With total
assets of Nu614.7 million (US$14.0 million) in 1999, it is Bhutan's smallest financial institulion.
Its focus is agricultural lending and meeting the microfinance demands of the rural population,
although it also lends to small- and medium-scale industries.
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followed by the Bhutan National Bank (27.6 percent); the Royal Insurance Corporation of Bhutan
(21.0 percent); and BDFC (13.4 percent). Growth in bank lending has been slowest to the
manufacturing sector, increasing at an annual average rate of only 12 percent per annum over the
past ten years.
Bhutan's financial institutions are facing excess liquidity problems, most of which are redeposited
in either non-interest-bearing accounts with the Royal Monetary Authority or, increasingly, in high-
interest-bearing deposits with commercial banking institutions in India. Excess liquidity appears to
be a consequence of a lack of investment opportunities in Bhutan - caused, in part, by a
combination of high interest rates (nominal and real), large collateral requirements, conservative
lending practices, and limited financial products on offer from the banks. Interest rates were
deregulated in 1998 but, even in an environment of high excess liquidity, interest rates did not fall
until recently (September 2000) when the Bank of Bhutan lowered its interest rates in all lending
categories (except term loans) in the hope of reducing its excess liquidity. At the same time, it also
reduced its interest on fixed (time) deposits but left the saving deposit rate unchanged. While the
private sector has welcomed this initiative, high excess liquidity is likely to remain, until other areas
that inhibit investment have been addressed.
A related issue in Bhutan's financial sector is the government's dominant role. It owns 80 percent
of Bank of Bhutan, 27 percent of Bhutan National Bank, 41 percent of the Royal Insurance
Corporation of Bhutan, and 90 percent of the Bhutan Development Finance Corporation. There is
clearly a need for the government to divest more of its holdings in these institutions and to focus
more on banking regulatory issues. Experience elsewhere shows that a high degree of government
ownership does not foster competition and growth, and it significantly diminishes and
compromises, the effectiveness of the central bank.
In Bhutan, as in other countries with a short banking history, financial intermediation is
rudimentary and limited to simple deposit and lending schemes. There is a need to broaden and
deepen the financial sector so that it can support broader-based development through the provision
of new financial products such as lease financing, venture capital, mortgage financing, factoring
services, and so on. The availability of such instruments may help foster investment opportunities
that were constrained by their absence and also help to expand borrowing capacity that collateral-
based lending tends to depress.
4. Privatization
Beginning in the late 1980s, the Royal Government Table 2. Public Ownrishp in iJsted CasqTanies
made a strong commitment to private sector ne
development and privatization. The government Ustid Convmles InrKsUon 1994 2mo
embarked on a series of large projects such as BCCL, B P r dus Lld. 85.0 24.9 23.9
BBPL, and Gedu Wood Manufacturing Corporation
(GWMC) that were beyond the capacity of the private C 80.0 0.0 0.0
sector. To pave the way for their entry into large scale tanr FeTo Auoys Ltd 25.0 25.0 25.0
enterprises, favorable terms - such as management of Bhan Natonal Bar* 67.2 27.0
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The Royal Government also began privatization and
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divestment in the 1980s. Since then, the government has divested a significant portion of its
holdings in public enterprises8 (see Table 2) as well as privatizing the road transport and
construction sector. It continued to divest its holdings over the Eighth Five-Year Plan, the most
recent divestment being the sale of 34 percent of its shares in the Royal Insurance Corporation of
Bhutan in October 2000.
The pace of privatization and divestment has largely been dictated by the policy of the government
to encourage and promote broad-based participation by Bhutanese shareholders (as a result of
which shares are sold at less than prevailing market rates, subject to a maximum ceiling per person
and priority for individuals over institutions) and the low absorptive capacity of the private sector.
The government has also started commercializing (corporatizing) selected government agencies
such as the postal and telecom services and the forestry logging services, and is in the process of
corporatizing the Department of Power. This is seen as a first step towards privatization. While
corporatization, with extended autonomy, is expected to result in better performance, there is little
evidence to suggest that improved performance will actually take place as most of these
organizations are managed and staffed by bureaucrats who, understandably, lack a commercial
culture.. Moreover; the majority of these corporatized institutions are monopolies. Competition
(foreign and domestic) should be encouraged in these sectors to make them truly commercial.
From a time when the government virtually carried out all nonagricultural economic activity --
today private sector involvement has increased in most sectors in Bhutan. National contractors
executed about 36 percent of the road works under the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1997-2002) and
private schools are beginning to emerge. Private sector participation is also on the increase in the
forestry sector with the Forestry Development Corporation (fully government owned and
responsible for logging in the kingdom) subcontracting logging operations to private parties.
However, there is still scope for further government disengagement in these areas - particularly in
the areas of road construction and logging.
There is no established procedure for privatization in Bhutan except final approval by the cabinet.
The main government agencies involved in divestments are the Ministry of Trade and Industry and
the Ministry of Finance. There is also no government unit with the sole responsibility for
privatization. While this has not caused any particular problems to date, it would be extremely
useful to establish a single body responsible for this function. Establishing a unit and a framework
for privatization would also increase transparency - which would be highly desirable.
5. Bhutan's Trade Regime
Trade policies have a direct and often dominating impact on economic incentives and resource
allocations within the economy. Bhutan has a very small domestic market with a population of
around 700,000 with some 85 percent of the population estimated to be dependent on small scale
and often close-to-subsistence farming. With such a small market size and with a significant
revenue base from the hydro energy sector, there is little reason to impose high taxes on trade to
either protect domestic producers or to generate government revenue. Gradual integration into the
global trading system is a key government objective to promote economic growth.
s Table 2 shows public ownership in listed companies only. There are unlisted companies such as the Bank of Bhutan,
the largest commercial bank, in which the government share is 80 percent (20 percent is held by the State Bank of India).
In this particular instance, public ownership actually increased. In 1972, the government's share was only 60 percent (40
percent with the State Bank of India).
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Regional Trade Regimes - India. Bhutan enjoys a tariff-free trade agreement with India
(Agreement on Trade and Commerce between the government of the Kingdom of Bhutan-and the
government of the Republic of India). This is a long-established agreement that dates back to 1949.
It provides for trade between the two countries without the application of duties and also provides
for transit of goods from Bhutan to and from third countries without the application of Indian
tariffs. This is the cornerstone of Bhutan's international trade relations and the government is
committed to maintaining and renewing this agreement.
Bangladesh. In addition, Bhutan has a preferential trade agreement with Bangladesh (Agreement
on Trade). This provides for concessions on duties on a range of negotiated product lines. Since its
signature in 1980, Bhutanese exports to Bangladesh have risen to Nu 179 million. The government
intends to foster this agreement with Bangladesh through further negotiations.
Other Regional Partners - Thailand. The history of bi-lateral trade agreements in improving
market access for exporters in Bhutan has been good and the Ministry of Trade and Industry intends
to initiate bi-lateral trade talks with other regional nations such as Thailand.
SAARC. Bhutan has also fully participated in and supported the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and, in particular, the negotiations for the SAARC Preferential
Trading Arrangement (SAPTA). Bhutan will continue to push for greater liberalization of tariffs
within the region and work towards the transition to a South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) by
2002.
World Trade Organization. In order to facilitate Bhutan's integration into the global economy,
the government intends to accede to the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a full member.
Bhutan was granted observer status to the WTO on 24 April 1998. Subsequently, the RGOB
decided to accede to the Multilateral Trading System and submitted its application. The application
was discussed in the WTO General Council Meeting held on October 6, 1999 at Geneva. WTO
will constitute a Working Party to prepare for Bhutan's membership. The MTI has appointed a
WTO liaison officer and established the WTO Reference Center at the Trade Division. MTI
anticipates full membership will be achieved during 2002.
6. ' Foreign Investment
The first foreign investment into Bhutan was the State Bank of India's 40 percent holding in the
Bank of Bhutan in 1972. Since then, Bhutan has pursued a conservative and restrictive foreign
investment policy. Currently, there is not a single foreign-majority-owned firm in Bhutan, and all
foreign investments are approved on a case-by-case basis. FDI has long been a sensitive issue in
Bhutan, largely due to concerns over the potentially undesirable impact that FDI may have on
Bhutanese traditions and culture. Concerns may also be partly based on the sentiments of a private
sector that has enjoyed, and stands to benefit from, such restrictions, as well as a general fear of a
large influx of foreign business houses from the region.
At present, foreign investment only exists in Bhutan National Bank (the Asian Development Bank),
the Bank of Bhutan (State Bank of India) and Bhutan Ferro Alloys Limited (Marubeni Japan). The
State Bank of India has a 20 percent share in the Bank of Bhutan, the Asian Development Bank has
a 20 percent share in Bhutan National Bank, and Marubeni Japan has a 20 percent share in Bhutan
Ferro Alloys Limited. In 2001, the government, for the first time, allowed two international hotel
chains to invest in Bhutan with a majority shareholding. This is considered a major change in
Bhutan's approach to FDI.
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7. Infrastructure
Compared with other countries in the region, infrastructure generally is not considered a major
constraint in Bhutan. The only area within infrastructure that is cause of serious concern is
transport. The rugged terrain and topography provide little alternative to road transport, and the
narrow and winding roads result in high transportation costs. Road standards are low - although
rapidly improving - allowing a maximum tonnage of 8-10 and speeds of up to 40 kms per hour in
the hills. The closest port is in Calcutta, about 950 kilometers from Phuentsholing. Druk Air, the
only airlines operating in the kingdom, flies to five destinations in four countries within the region
but does not have much capacity to handle large quantities of cargo. There are no railways or river
transport facilities.
8. Labor and Employment
Labor shortages (skilled and unskilled) are a serious binding constraint for the private sector in
Bhutan. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the growing number of Bhutanese joining the
labor force either do not have the necessary skills or experience required for more skilled
occupations - or are unwilling to perform the menial work required for unskilled jobs.
Each year Bhutan's educational institutions produce around 4,000 students (see Table 2.3). This is
projected to increase to almost 14,000 per annum by 2010. In 2001, of the 4,700 graduating from
the school system, around 270 are actual graduates while the remainder are school-leavers. The
latter includes some 1,000 who have reached class 12 (fnished high school). A large majority of
the remainder have only reached class 10 or even less and have only a modicum of schooling.
In the past, most graduates have found jobs in the civil service - generally within a year. Private
sector employment still remains a second-best option for most Bhutanese because of perceived job
insecurity, lack of social standing, lower perks, and absence of training opportunities. Employment
opportunities in the civil service, however, are reaching saturation point. Between 1996 and 1999,
the size of the civil service, in terms of graduate officers, increased by only 129 people. In 1999, 30
graduates sat for the civil service, of whom 21 were selected. 9
As Table 2.3 indicates, over 90,000 school-leavers are expected to come out of the school system
over the period, 2000 to 2010 - of which 75,000 will have no tertiary education. Given that current
total formal sector employment in Bhutan is thought to be around 60,000 - of which around 35,000
are estimated to be in the private sector - the need to rapidly create new employment opportunities
is particularly urgent. With the anticipated continued slow growth in public sector employment, the
expectations that faster private sector growth will compensate for this, are indeed, extremely high.
The increasing number of school-leavers represents the most serious employment challenge facing
the government. Forty-two percent of the Bhutanese population is below the age of 15. o Although
the present unemployment rate is low (1.4 percent in 1999), the outlook is bleak with the number of
school-leavers expected to increase dramatically to around 50,0001 l (over 80 percent of current
formal employment) over the next five years. This presents a real challenge given the current
capacity of the Bhutanese private sector and the expectations of Bhutanese workers, especially
those who have received some education. Private sector requirements today are mainly for lowv-
skill manual workers and experienced and high-skill workers, while most school-leavers possess
9 Development Toward Gross National Happiness, RGOB, 2000.
10 CSO Labor Force Survey, 1999.
" National Budget for Financial Year 2000-2001 and Report on the 1999-2000 Budget, June 2000.
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few skills and are averse to manual work. In addition, youth expectations about income are also not
matched by the types ofjobs available. These expectations and preferences are based not on skills
development but on a sense of social standing derived from the level of education achieved and the
degree of literacy attained.
Most businesses are dependent on employment of Indian workers, which is regulated by
government. Of the total formal wage employment in Bhutan of around 60,000 - it is estimated
that non-nationals (mainly Indian) represent approximately 50 percent.'2 Wages for non-national
workers tend to be lower than for Bhutanese workers for all skill classes - although this disparity
narrows at higher skill levels.
The main labor dilemma facing the government is the employment of these unskilled Bhutanese
school leavers. Dealing with high expectations, developing a blue-collar culture, and increasing the
number of tertiary institutes that provide the skills sought by the private sector are some of the
measures that the government will need to continue to address. Two recent initiatives include: (i)
establishment of the National Technical and Training Authority (NTTA) in 1999. NITA's main
responsibility is to coordinate efforts to develop technical and vocational skills, skills certification
to ensure establishment of standards (in close collaboration with the private sector), promotion of
traditional arts and crafts, and formulation of necessary frameworks and regulations; (ii)
establishment of the National Employment Board (NEB) in 2000 (subsequently converted into the
Department of Employment and Labor in the Ministry of Education). It is expected to provide
employment exchange services, support employment generation policies and programs, monitor
unemployment, formulate necessary rules and regulations for employment, working conditions, and
compensation, and take a lead role in the formulation of national human resource policies and
plans. In addition, during the Eighth Five-Year Plan, the government supported entrepreneurial
skills development for the private sector, both through the Entrepreneurship Development Program
(EDP), conducted by the Ministry of Trade and Industry, and through the provision of scholarships
and training in various fields such as hotel management, chef training, and so on.
By establishing these institutions, the government has tried to address some of the supply side
problems. The real challenge, however, lies in creating jobs in a growing and dynamic private
sector. This is all the more critical given the very slow anticipated growth in civil service
employment.
12 RTM Background Document - In addition to this, there are an estimated 10,000-20,000 non-Bhutanese wage workers
who receive 'day" employment along the border areas, as well as around 1,900 seasonal workers who are employed
during the winter months in Southern Bhutan.
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Table 23: Bhutan: Total Work Force - Graduates and Dropouts, 2000-2010
Total
Dropouts
and
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Graduates
E D E D E D E D E D E D E D E D E D E D E D
Class Level
Class VI 8,714 440 9,012 390 9,881 321 10,887 256 11,800 171 12,688 70 13,961 0 15,175 0 16,639 0 17,702 0 18,709 0
Class VII 7,999 436 8,783 395 9,243 324 10,156 259 11,117 222 12,064 241 13,092 262 14,176 290 15,747 315 17,260 345 18,399 368 3,426
Class VIII 6,430 363 7,054 325 7,885 284 8,594 219 9,731 196 10,826 217 11,761 235 12,764 256 14,101 282 14,349 307 16,819 337 2,983
Class IX 5,506 284 5,994 255 6,667 224 7,546 185 8,326 167 9,466 190 10,541 211 11,465 230 12,444 249 13,736 275 14,962 299 6,204
Class X 3,366 1,615 5,190 2,387 6,044 2,659 6,838 2,872 7,737 3,094 8,517 3,236 9,655 3,476 10,769 3,661 11,739 3,756 12,746 3,823 14,049 3,934 30,656
Class Xl 1,226 18 1,312 17 2,149 21 2,672 27 3,229 32 3,887 39 4,450 45 5,238 52 6,058 61 6,840 68 7,684 77 5,777
Class XII 832 657 1,206 953 1,306 1,032 2,136 1,687 2,655 2,097 3,214 2,539 3,875 3,061 4,444 3,511 5,230 4,132 6,050 4,780 6,832 5,397 34,861
Total VI to Xll
(Dropouts) 3,813 4,722 4,865 5,505 5,979 6,532 7,290 8,000 8,795 9,598 10,412 75,511
Graduates 270 270 270 299 362 1,447 1,855 2,211 2,526 2,844 3,160 15,514
TotalEducatedWorkforce 4,083 4,992 5,135 5,804 6,341 7,979 9,145 10,211 11,321 12,442 13,572 91,025
E - projected enrollment
D - projected dropout
Degree outside the country is estimated at 125 per annum.
9. Conclusion
Although at present the private sector in Bhutan is small and lacks absorptive power, the government
places considerable emphasis on its role as the engine of Bhutan's future growth and - even more
importantly - as a growing source of employment opportunities for a rapidly growing number of school
leavers. It is expected to be vibrant enough to generate resources to sustain and diversify Bhutan's
economy and provide employment for the growing number of entrants into the job market. With a
looming problem of unemployment expected to be felt over the current decade, and limited scope for
public sector expansion, private sector development is receiving more concerted and closer attention.
To unleash its growth potential, the key constraints to private sector development must be identified and
acted upon. This is the main challenge of the Ninth Five-Year Plan. Of all the constraints that the private
sector faces - skilled labor shortages - are considered the most binding. The challenge will be to create a
better match between the skills that the Bhutanese workers possess and the needs of private sector
businesses. In addition, it is important to identify and deal with the other constraints that the private
sector must address if it is to grow. The private sector survey addresses these issues. The objective
behind this survey is to shed light on the main constraints - entrepreneurship, labor market issues,
training, financial markets, contractual relations, technology, infrastructure, trade, investor confidence,
and business support. The report also focuses on specific sectors in which Bhutan may well have a
comparative advantage - including tourism, information technology, wood products, and agroprocessing
- the four sectors where Bhutan feels it has a potential to generate more dynamic employment.
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Box 2.2: Bhutan: The Power Sector
Bhutan is endowed with enormous hydropower generation potential. The total capacity is estimated to be
about 30,000 MW, of which over 16,000 MW is techno-economically viable. The development of the power
sector began in the late 1980s with the commissioning of the Chukha hydropower project (336 MW).
The hydropower generation capacity in Bhutan is expected to increase significantly over the next few years, as
new power projects are scheduled for completion. In the 2001 Kurichhu project 45 MW has already been
commissioned, and the last unit of 15 MW will be added by the middle of 2002, bringing the total installed
capacity from the Kurichhu project to 60 MW. The 24 MW Basochhu Upper Stage project has been
completed and was commissioned in November 2001. The Basochhu Lower Stage Project of 40 MW is
expected to begin construction in 2002 with a target completion date in early 2005. Bhutan's generating
capacity will increase threefold in 2006 with the commissioning of the Tala project (1,020 MW) but only to
about one-tenth of the country's technically viable potential.
Looking ahead, the power sector will continue to be the main engine of growth in Bhutan and to be a
significant source of government revenue and foreign currency earnings.
The Indian market is huge and currently faces domestic supply difficulties. At present, Bhutan supplies less
than 0.5percent of its neighbor's total demand. Internal demand in Bhutan will also rise substantially with
progress made on a Rural Electrification Program (supported by a $10.0 million AsDB loan).
The power plants are operated as run-of-the-river schemes and hence sharp contractions in electricity
generation during the dry season are prevalent. The projects are considered to be environmentally benign.
Nevertheless, the power sector in Bhutan faces challenges in the future. First, development of future projects
is dependent on accessing adequate financing. A major source of funding is likely be India and the fiscal
situation there may prove to be a constraint. Second, and more importantly, the Bhutanese authorities must
find a way to promote domestic employment through the promotion of power intensive industries. Since local
contractor skills are limited, the major works in the construction of power projects tend to use expatriate
engineering firms. Despite this shortcoming, a large number of Bhutanese contractors are used in the
construction of houses, access roads, and transportation and hence the power projects have provided good
domestic employment.
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Box 2.3: Bhutan: Five-Year Development Plans
Beginning in the early 1960s, successive five-year plans have provided the basic framework for development
planning in Bhutan. The authorities recently conducted a mid-term review of the Eighth Plan (1997/98-
2001/02) and established guidelines for preparation of the Ninth Plan (2002/03-2007/08).
A. Mid-term Review of the Eighth Five-Year Plan
The Eighth Plan aimed for sustainable growth and improved living standards while ensuring the preservation
of Bhutan's environment and cultural heritage. The review found that Plan objectives had been met in the
following areas:
Macroeconomic performance had been satisfactory with the hydropower projects contributing significantly
to economic growth. Fiscal performances had been solid with domestic revenue increased by improved tax
collection and a higher power tariff.
Most social development goals had been achieved. There had been a substantial increase in the number of
educational facilities and 90 percent of the population now has access to basic health services.
The Department of Urban Development and Housing had been created to provide urban infrastructure
services and to manage the municipal affairs of growing townships in the country. By the end of 1999,45 km
of new road construction had been completed, with funding secured to construct an additional 122 km of
new roads.
Considerable progress has been made in expanding the telecommunication network, which now connects all
20 district headquarters. National television and Internet services were launched in 1999.
Since 1997, government ownership in a number of public enterprises had been substantially reduced through
divestiture. The Agriculture Ministry had established a Marketing Section to induce private sector
participation. In education, one private secondary school and seven private primary schools have been
established, and applications for the establishment of additional private schools are being reviewed.
All infrastructure developments had been undertaken within the policy of conserving the rich natural
resources. More than 72 percent of land area is currently under forest coverage.
As part of the government-restructuring program, two new divisions (the National Employment Board and
the Division of Information Technology) and one new department (Legal Affairs) have been created.
B. Guidelines for the Ninth Five-Year Plan
The Planning Commission released Guidelines for the Preparation of the Ninth Plan in January 2001, focusing
on balanced development, decentralization, and promotion of private sector development. The following
objectives have been emphasized throughout the guideline document:
Greater revenue mobilization through improvement in tax collection and enhancement of the tax base;
Focus on a rural access program to improve the quality of life and income of rural people;
Consolidation and improvement of existing infrastructure and services;
Initiation of regionally based planning, and greater autonomy of local governments in the financing of their
development programs; and
Investment in areas where employment generation will be maximized.
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Table 1. Bhutan: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 1995/96-2000/01 1/
Nominal GDP (19992000): US$446 million GNP per capita (199912000): USS565
Population (1999/2000): 0.78 million Quota: SDR 6.3 million
1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/2000 2000/01
Prov. Proj.
GDP growth and prices (percent change)
Real GDP at factor cost 2/ 7.4 6.0 7.3 5.5 5.9 6.1
Consumer prices 3/ 9.3 7.4 9.0 9.2 3.6 5.0
Consumer prices (India) 3/ 8.8 6.6 12.4 5.3 5.2 ...
Government budget (percent of GDP)
Total revenue and grants 42.8 36.8 33.1 40.5 40.4 38.5
Of which: Foreign grants 22.6 17.6 12.1 19.1 16.8 16.3
Total expenditure and net lending 40.6 39.2 32.1 42.3 44.4 43.2
Of which: Current expenditure 18.8 18.5 17.6 18.6 19.0 19.0
Current balance 1.5 0.7 3.4 2.8 4.5 3.1
Overall balance 2.3 -2.4 1.0 -1.8 -3.9 4.8
Money and credit (percent change)
Broad money 30.4 30.9 41.7 21.4 21.4 ...
Credit to private sector 11.8 -9.4 13.2 12.5 4.1
Interest rates (end of period)
Deposits (I to 3 years) 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 9-10.0
Lending 13-16.0 13-16.0 13-16.0 13-16.0 12-16.0
RMA bills (91-days) 8.0 8.5 8.5 6.0 8.5
Balance of payments (millions of USS)
Trade balance 2/ -13.2 -31.9 -24.8 -57.6 -70.7 -81.7
With India2/ 8.4 4.4 9.3 -17.1 -31.1 -45.4
Current account balance 4/ -37.1 -56.4 -46.5 -97.9 -126.8 -126.2
(In percent of GDP) -12.1 -15.9 -12.0 -24.4 -28.4 -26.8
With India -6.0 -13.1 -25.5 -71.9 -99.6 -99.2
(In percent of GDP) -2.0 -3.7 -6.6 -17.9 -22.3 -21.1
Grants 79.7 74.4 85.4 120.8 149.9 129.1
Of which: India 24.5 31.6 63.0 87.4 113.5 99.2
Loans (net) -12.1 5.4 4.4 26.0 18.6 29.7
Errors and omissions -5.6 -1.2 2.1 -5.8 -5.3 -4.7
Overail balance 24.9 22.2 45.4 44.2 36.4 27.9
(In percentofGDP) 8.1 6.3 11.7 11.0 8.2 5.9
External indicators
Gross official reserves (millions of USS) 145.1 176.0 215.5 258.5 292.6 320.5
(In months of imports) 15.7 16.1 19.0 19.1 19.0 19.9
External debt (millions of USS) 111.5 112.2 128.0 160.4 172.8 202.5
(in percent of GDP; end of period) 37.3 32.1 36.4 40.7 39.7 43.5
Debt-service ratio (percent of exports) 13.2 9.8 8.3 8.1 5.6 5.5
Memorandum items:
Nominal GDP (in millions of ngultrum) 2/ 9,611 11,355 13,971 15,928 18,202 20,686
Ngultrum per US$ (period average) 34.3 35.8 38.4 42.6 43.6 ...
Sources: Data provided by the Bhutanese authorities; and International Financial Statistics.
1/ Fiscal year beginning July 1.
2/ Calendar-year basis, for example, 1995/96 classified under the year 1995.
3/ Bhutans CPI does not include rents and other services and is based on a 1979 expenditure survey. The CPI for India is for
industrial workers. Hence, the two indices are not strictly comparable.
4/ Excluding grants.
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CHAPTER THREE
AGROPROCESSING INDUSTRIES
1. Present situation
Introduction. Agriculture is an important sector in the Bhutanese economy - particularly as 79 percent
of the population depending on some form of agricultural production for their livelihood. Although
agriculture's contribution to GDP has decreased in recent years, it still remains the largest sector. In 1999
it was estimated at 35 percent, consisting of 17 percent from agriculture, 8 percent from livestock and 10
percent from forestry. Agricultural land making up about 7.7 percent of the total land area is composed of
small landholdings, which are highly fragmented and scattered over difficult terrain. Many farming
communities exist in isolation, often several days walk from the nearest road head. In the main river
valleys land is highly priced. In 2000, agro-based industries employed 2,536 persons and had a turnover
of less than $4.0 million, while output constituted 2.8 percent of total manufacturing sector industry value
added.
Traditionally, the agricultural system in Bhutan has been subsistence based and in many areas of the
country, this is still the case. Many farmers are unable to participate in the market economy due to lack of
surplus or are cut off from markets due to poor transportation. Lack of market access is the main reason
why farmers are reluctant to produce a crop surplus beyond that required for barter trade transactions.
Although this situation characterizes a significant proportion of the country, in some regions farmers have
adopted cash-crop farmning.
Leveraging the production base in Bhutan must be a priority for development of the agroprocessing
sector. Discussing strategies for developing the primary sector are beyond the scope of this study, but this
should not detract from its pivotal role. Developing Bhutan's agricultural production base must also be in
tune with the government's self sufficiency program which, under the Ninth Five-Year Plan, will afford
equal priorities to all important cereal crops. Even this situation is questionable given that the land could
be used for cash crops and that earnings from exports could be used to buy rice from cheaper producers
and be kept under silo for at least one harvest.
Bhutan produces about 106,000 metric tons (MT) of cereals, 32,000 MT vegetable, 39,000 MT fruit, and
7,000 MT spices annually (about 60 percent of total requirements). A Cash Crop Report, 1995-98, is
located in Annex Four, listing the types, volumes, and values of the main commodities produced. Due to
higher consumption in its fresh forrn, limited processing opportunities, and the geographic isolation of
farms, only about 3 percent of output is processed for commercial purpose (mainly fruit and vegetables).
The opportunities for on-farm production will be higher when rural infrastructure, packaging,
transportation, and processing capacities increase. Many of these issues are addressed in the Ninth Five-
Year Development Plan (NFYDP).
Commercial-level food processing is virtually absent from the economy, yet given the correct
environmnent, agro-industry could have considerable potential for growth, mainly through exports of low-
volume, high-value products.
Industry structure. Bhutan produces a narrow range of fresh produce and a smaller range of processed-
food products in only a few product categories. In 2000, fruit processing contributed over 90 percent to
turnover and employment in the sector - excluding alcoholic beverages. However, the category that has
experienced the best growth over the last five years is bakery which has grown at 16 percent per annum.
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To put the industry in perspective, in 1996 world trade in agriculture and food was worth US$464.0
billion. Processed foods constituted the fastest-growing component of the world's agri-food trade,
growing at twice the rate of primary products, and totaling some 75 percent of global agricultural trade in
2000 compared with 50 percent in 1985.
Industrial orientation. Of the firms that completed the survey questionnaire, only two identified
themselves as exporters to countries outside the trade-free zone with India. The profile of the respondents
is given in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Profile of Survey Respondents
Employees Turnover Imported Capacity
Raw material Utilization
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Government policy. Several aspects of government policy create a favorable environment for the
agroprocessing sector, in common with other sectors of manufacturing industry. These include the import
and export regime and the stable exchange rate with India.
However, the drafting of the food safety regulations and establishment of Quality Control and Regulatory
Service (QCRS - units set up under the Ministry of Agriculture to introduce product quality standards)
are important steps in moving the industry towards international norms in safety and standards.
Labor and employment. Firms visited in the agroprocessing sector are generally modest in scale, and
over half employ only 5 to 15 persons. The largest processor interviewed employed 364 staff.
Firms minimize labor shortages by hiring Indian workers. With the exception of the Army Welfare
project in the Phuentsholing/ Samste area, Indian day workers compose 90 percent of the work force in
the interviewed firms. Indians are hired because of their skills/experience, better attendance performance,
and their lower rates of pay. In Thimphu, Indian workers comprise only 1-2 percent of the work force,
and are formally employed as regular staff.
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Most firms in the survey identified labor costs as an impediment to their ability to survive. The issue of
Indian versus Bhutanese labor was cited by most companies along the border. The general view of
companies employing Indian workers is that Bhutanese workers do not possess the necessary technical
skills and experience, are too expensive, and are unreliable. Hence, risks associated with training are
thought to be too high to warrant much investment. However, many of the problems identified by firms
may be of their own making - the companies which rely on Indian workers tend to be characterized by
poor working conditions and a lack of sense of ownership. The few companies employing Bhutanese
workers and providing a reasonable working environment appear to be rewarded by employee loyalty.
Reliance on Indian workers was most apparent for firms operating at, or near, a loss. Given the apparent
inefficiencies in their operation, survival is unlikely if full labor rates were paid. Yet, on the other hand,
there is little incentive to automate.
None of the firms interviewed volunteered views about the productivity of labor and none provided or
realized a need for training. No firm articulated the connection between the cost of labor, labor
productivity, and international competitiveness. Firms which ranked "cost of labor" as a significant
factor inhibiting their competitiveness may have really been pointing to low labor productivity - rather
than high wages - which also results, at least in part, from poor management skills, low levels of training
and inappropriate technology. Finally, no firms cited industrial relations as being an issue.
2. Costs and competitiveness
There are three principal determinants of the processed food sector's competitiveness:
* at the front of the value chain, the cost, availability and reliability of raw materials delivered to
the processors;
* along the value chain, the relative efficiency with which value is added - in financing,
manufacturing, packaging, branding, marketing and distribution; and,
* the business environment.
The competitiveness of raw material inputs. In terms of local raw materials the agroprocessing
industry in Bhutan has a number of comparative advantages, including:
* the capability to produce a wide range of produce due to the huge variety of microclimates
including high-altitude zones (alpine), central valleys (temperate) and low-lying foothills of the
Himalayas (subtropical);
* organic farming, which is practiced by default as the country has not had the opportunity to
develop the pest infestations endemic to the rest of the region and has never used - in large
amounts - agricultural chemicals; and
* an extension service which is experienced in introducing new high-value crops.
The list of potential high-value primary products that the country can produce is long, but mechanisms for
realizing the potential are lacking. Processors need to work with farmers to progressively identify and
exploit opportunities.
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Unfortunately, Bhutan's producers are reliant on low-value markets,'4 where the raw materials produced
in Bhutan do not confer any appreciable cost-competitive advantage. The situation is made worse by the
lack of appropriate management or marketing strategies to enable firms to compensate for lack of cost
advantage. Several possible scenarios include:
* Raw materials available below world-parity prices would provide local processors witlh the
opportunity to compete in price-sensitive markets. This is achievable given improved on-farm
efficiencies, higher production, and better linkages between the farm and processor.
* Where raw materials enter factories at, or near, world-parity price, innovative product
development, marketing and sound understanding of consumer expectations are essential to
compete in value-sensitive markets. These were lacking in the firms interviewed.
* Where raw material costs are considerably higher than in competitor countries it is extremely
difficult, if not impossible, for processors to develop products for sale in any export markcet.
Even niche opportunities are sensitive to farm-gate prices.
It was beyond the scope of the survey to carry out benchmarking studies of the raw materials used in the
sector. Nonetheless, respondents provided useful information and some benchmark studies of raw
materials produced in Bhutan have been attempted by various organizations, although their cover is not
comprehensive. The main findings are summarized in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3 Summary Price Competitiveness of Agricultural Subsectors
Raw material Competitiveness
Dairy Bhutanese costs are high because of high transport costs when raw milk is purchased from India.
Local milk costs are high because cow yields are low and herds fragmented.
Chicken meat Bhutanese costs are high because feed must be purchased from India and transported to ThiQpu.
Beef and pig Difficult to benchmark because animals are not usually reared for meat.
Horticulture Bhutan is considered a high-cost producer.
Grain Bhutan is considered a high-cost producer.
In the survey, all the companies said that the high cost of raw materials is a significant impediment to
their profitable operation. Locally produced products are, at farm gate, expensive and incur high transport
costs from farm to factory, which is made worse by a high incidence of product damage and loss. Farm-
gate prices on average are 35 - 300 percent more expensive than in India, transport can account for
another NuO.7 - 1 .0/Kg (assuming a radius of 200 km from the factory) and losses can be as high as 40
percent.
For companies situated away from the border areas, products from India incur high transportation costs
and are subject to an unfavorable tax burden (see Chapter Eight on Cross-Cutting Issues).
The relative high farm-gate price for Bhutanese raw materials reflects low yields, low farmer productivity
and poor land use (farm land is only 45 -50 percent utilized). Available evidence shows that potential
productivity gains are considerable, given the right stimulus, and should translate to lower raw material
prices and higher on-farm income.
4 One processor claimed that he purposely produced low-quality products as they were more suited for the segment of the Indian
market he was targeting.
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In comparison with other developing countries, the agricultural value-added per worker in Bhutan is very
low at $148 - compared with $407 in Cambodia; $526 in Lao PDR; a low income country average of
$567; and a high income country average of $18,918 (World Bank Development Indices). This suggests
that there is much room for improvement.
The most widely used indicator of crop productivity, production per unit of land (or crop yield), is also
lower in Bhutan than in other least-developed countries, which in turn are low relative to those in other
developing countries (see Annex Three). Yields of basic food commodities (cereals, roots and tubers, and
oil crops) are 30-50 percent lower than other least-developed countries (LDC) which are less than half the
average for developing countries - although there is much variation among countries. Thus, there appears
to be potential for substantial gains in productivity. For chilies and peppers, yields in Bhutan are 27
percent those of the developing countries in Asia Pacific countries, which in turn are only 40 percent of
the average in developed Asia Pacific countries. The conclusion is: If local raw materials are not cheaper
than imports, the development of a local agroprocessing industry - for domestic and export markets - to
process-sensitive markets such as India would be unlikely.
Lack of competitiveness in value adding. Value-adding (including manufacturing, packaging,
branding, marketing, and distribution) activities in Bhutan may not be competitive for reasons shown in
Table 3.4, and detailed thereafter.
Table 3.4: Agroprocessing - Can Bhutan be Competitive?
Value chain Critical factor Competitiveness
Raw material Price, quality, length of No price advantage, quality of produce delivered to factories is often low as no grading
(delivered to factory) supply season, reliability system in place. Harvest season could be extended by vertical cropping, but does not
of supply take place. Supply to the factory is not reliable.
Manufacturing Technology, labor, None of the firms had a competitive advantage. Technology is of old design and is not
utilization rates, efficient, labor productivity is low, capacity utilization is poor, and processes lack
innovation innovation.
Packaging Cost, quality, design Uncompetitive processors are reliant on imported raw materials from India. Recycled
bottles are used, which are not appropriate for many markets. The production scale is
too low to implement alternative packaging such as tetra pak.
Branding Recognition, support Bhutanese food products have a good reputation for quality in India but this has not
been built into a brand. Establishing and building intemational (or regional) brands is
beyond the resources of most Bhutanese companies.
Freight Price, time for delivery, Depending on location, firms in the interior are at a disadvantage. Firms on the border
danage have less of a problem unless they require a reefer. Generally the high cost of domestic
freight and time to market reduces shelf life. High incidence of product spoilage or
damage.
Marketing Innovation, investment No competitive advantage. Firms need to learn the requirements of their target
countries and how to take advantage of this knowledge.
Financing Cost of debt, availability No competitive advantage.
R & D For small-scale firms Research and development is absent from the agrobusiness culture.
hands-on development
most appropriate.
Marketing. Key issues for marketing are whether Bhutan is, or should be, price or value competitive
and, in addition, innovative in marketing.
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Price or value competitiveness? Bhutan will have difficulty in competing in processed foods in Asia and
India as their markets rapidly mature. Scale, modem processing and management systems, and brand
awareness are all critical factors that Bhutanese processors will find difficult to address. Realistically,
Bhutan's role in Asia will only ever be as a niche player - although niche markets are often extremely
lucrative. However, Bhutan is in a difficult situation as it is unable to respond quickly to price.-sensitive
markets requiring a quality product. The country lacks world-class management, processing structures,
research and development, and product or process innovation - all of which are necessary to compete in
niche markets. For example, none of the firms interviewed invested in research and development (R&D).
In contrast, over 80 percent of Australian firms support their processing operation with R&D - yet
Australia still struggles to compete in niche product areas because of its lack of innovation. Bhutan's
problems are exacerbated by the fact that all the firms interviewed sourced their technology
conservatively - preferring to buy from India. Indian technology is frequently outdated and cannot be
calibrated or optimized, making it difficult for processors to produce a quality product.
Innovative marketing. Bhutan's main export market is under pressure as the quality of Indian products
increases and prices fall. Indian producers are learning how to increase quality and lower costs as they
respond to foreign companies and imports. Yet, despite awareness of the advantages of Bhutanese agro-
products, neither companies nor government officials articulated a policy to develop innovative ways to
market food products in foreign markets. Those who exported to third-countries, or sold their lproducts in
India, did so in a conventional and conservative manner often relying on established or "chance"
contacts. Bhutanese products are not clearly differentiated and therefore struggle for margins in the
markets in which they are sold. Resources need to be devoted to communicating the nutritional and other
advantages of Bhutanese food products to potential customers.
Human resources. The wide range of firms interviewed generally possessed outdated-to-mediocre
processing technology, lacked vision, and did not demonstrate a capability to battle with the poor
prospects for survival that characterize much of this sector. Overall, firms report weakness in their
capability to export and, in several cases, even sustain present market positions. Many of these
weaknesses relate to the firms' human resources, motivation, training, and outlook.
In essence, Bhutan lacks a cadre of talented bosses with world-class business experience and perspectives.
Managers too are missing foreign-business experience, entrepreneurial and innovation skills. Skill levels
throughout firms are poor and they are unable, or unwilling to invest in training in order to rectify this
situation. However, the sector will not improve unless it addresses shortcomings in general management,
technical skills and marketing skills.
Capacity utilization and scale of operations. Three-quarters of the firms surveyed reported utilization
rates of less than 75 percent while the remainder were working near full capacity." The reasons given for
low-capacity utilization include supply of raw materials - seasonality and logistical issues - and a lack of
market resulting from poor price competitiveness. Box 3.1 demonstrates the problems arising from
difficulties in obtaining raw materials and the cost of transportation.
Without exception, the scale of processing plants was too small to be competitive with Indian umits.
However, being small can be an advantage. It can sometimes mean that a firm can succeed with products
for which the niches of foreign markets are too small to attract the attention of larger companies.
Nonetheless, this is not the case in Bhutan at the present time.
'5 If calculated based on the international standard of 24 hours operation, capacity utilization would be much lower.
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Packaging. Most of the firms interviewed were concerned about the cost and other problems associated
with packaging and how this impacted their competitiveness. An ideal form of packaging for many of the
agro-products produced in Bhutan would be Tetra Pak. However, these systems, in their smallest
configuration deliver several thousand units per minute - a capacity much greater than required at present.
The Bhutanese food-processing industry is not large enough to support a thriving local packaging
industry. Yet, without one, the sector will have extra costs and other constraints that impede it from
growing quickly. In addition, packaging must be acceptable to the buyer. Hence, for example, the bottle-
top used in Bhutan is not acceptable in Thailand as it is difficult to confirm an accurate seal.
BOX 3.1 LOCATION IS IMPORTANT
Major hurdles to development of an agroprocessing sector in Bhutan include, as noted in this chapter, the raw
material supply (regularity and price) and transportation costs. The impact of these hurdles is demonstrated by the
difference in success of two fruit and vegetable firms producing nearly identical product ranges.
"Company A," located in the interior of Bhutan, buys about 43 percent of its raw materials from India and exports
most of its products. Its transport costs are comparatively high (about 6 percent of the ex-works price) as inputs and
outputs are transported to and from the Indian border. The firm also depends on raw materials from local producers
and experiences inconsistency in supply. Because of difficulties in obtaining sufficient raw materials, it usually
works at under 75 percent capacity (based on a single shift). The quality of the raw material is usually poor, further
adding to the production costs. At such a low capacity utilization, the company is not able to take full advantage of
mechanization and production is relatively capital intensive. The firm has experimented with a number of schemes
to promote contract farming and believes some of these are slowly beginning to have an effect.
"Company B," in contrast, is located on the Indian border and reports no problem in procuring raw materials, of
which 98 percent is imported from India and elsewhere. Transportation costs are less (3 percent of ex-works price)
than in the case of "Company A." The firm returns a profit each year. It obtains a regular supply of raw material
and operates at near full capacity for two shifts per day. In the past, the firm was dependent on cheap Indian labor,
which is reflected by the low degree of mechanization and labor intensity of their operation (Nu287,360 output per
worker per year compared with Nu448,240 in "Company A") but is now increasing its mechanization.
Output per worker. Output per worker - an important measure of supply-side efficiency - is very low
in Bhutan. In Thimphu, it is US$9,147 per worker per year and in Phuentsholing it is US$5,864 - by
contrast, in Lao PDR it is US$74,000.
Rudimentary comparisons suggest that Bhutanese food-processing companies are no more efficient than
small-scale Indian processors - and are disadvantaged by high raw-material costs and logistical
constraints. Labor productivity of Bhutanese companies is therefore assumed to be similar to that of the
unregistered Indian food processors - estimated at 9 percent of the American level - as shown in Table
3.5. Registered processors in India, given greater economies of scale, are estimated at 16 percent of the
United States level.
Cost structure of the industry. There are considerable variations in the cost structure within Bhutan and
between different sectors. Raw material costs, for example, are higher for processors in Thimphu due to
the higher proportion of local raw materials or cost of transporting Indian products (see Box 3. 1).
Labor costs vary by district, by the background of the worker, and by industry. Average labor costs paid
are US$120 and US$45.50 in Thimphu and Phuentsholing/Samtse respectively. However, this is not
uniformly the case in all firms. For example, the Army Welfare Project in Phuentsholing employs 90
percent Bhutanese staff- its facilities are located along the Indian border, and the staff are paid a higher
average than employees working in Thimphu (US$153). However, in the Phuentsholing/Samste area
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generally, labor costs are 38 percent of the level in Thimphu. While labor costs 9 percent of the ex-works
price of products in Phuentsholing - in Thimphu the corresponding percentage is 14.5 percent. Much of
the variation in wages per month can be explained by the predominance of Indian workers in
Phuentsholing. While the lower labor cost, as a percentage of ex-works price, is partly explained by the
number of Indian workers. The cheaper raw materials at the Indian border also influence the percentage.
Table 3.5 Labor Productivity
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Critical success factors. There are many factors that need to be present for firms to be successful.
Several of them are favorable - the import/export regime, the exchange rate, the availability and cost of
utilities, and trade agreements with other countries - and are covered elsewhere in this report. Within the
specific context of the agroprocessing sector, however, there are five critical success factors.
Availability of consistently high-quality raw materials. Firms need access to good-quality, graded raw
materials that suit the needs of the market and their processing lines. Raw materials should be available
at market competitive prices. This is currently not the case in Bhutan: factories receive surplus material
of generally low quality, that has not been graded, and is high priced. Supply is inconsistent, as is quality.
Friendly policy towards manufacturers. Government policy must be sympathetic to the needs of
manufacturers and provide an environment in which the processors can develop and grow. Again,
changing policies, unfavorable tax treatment, and cost structures in Bhutan are not beneficial to new
agroprocessing enterprises.
Product innovation. Firms need to transcend price competition by developing differentiated products that
do not need to compete on price. A prerequisite for product differentiation is an investment in innovation,
which must occur along the value chain. Innovation can take many forms, such as process, product, and
packaging improvement; clever new approaches to product positioning; and management of the supply
chain. Government support is critical in providing an enabling environment for companies to innovate.
Access to appropriate technology and labor. Technology needs upgrading in this sector. Firms are
prepared to invest if they are reassured that land leases will not end before the investment in technology
has been paid back. Companies also need guidance in sourcing competitive technology that will propel
them ahead of the competition. The policy environment should be appropriate and consistent. At the
same time, companies need skilled labor at predictable wage rates.
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Market-ledproduction. Industry should be led by the needs of the private-sector market. New product
introductions should start by identifying the target market and precisely defining its needs and
sustainability.
3. Impediments to Growth
Firms reported that they were disadvantaged compared with Indian firms in the following areas: labor,
domestic freight charges, financing new plant, and raw materials.
Labor. This issue is outlined above and again in Chapter Eight - Cross-Cutting Issues.
Domestic freight. Most firms indicated that the cost of domestic freight and transport is a major issue.
In most cases, either raw material, packaging, or finished products (or all of these) had to be transported
within Bhutan or from India (or even further a field). The sector faces a number of serious transport
constraints, many of which are related to the country's land-locked and isolated location. These affect
both supply of raw materials and processing inputs as well as shipment of final products. The most
important constraints cited by companies are:
* distance from the nearest seaport (Thimphu to Calcutta is 950 kms);
* poor standard of roads, including national highways;
* liability of roads to closure during the monsoon season;
* lack of competition in air services to and from Paro;
* high road-transport charges;
* high air-transport charges; and
* specific difficulties in shipping fruit exports through India to Bangladesh.
Transport time is vital when transporting fresh produce from farms that may be several days from a road
head and more days from the processing site. This limits the area within which raw materials can be
sourced. A further issue is the export of finished goods. For example, typical transit times by truck from
Thimphu to Calcutta are reported to be up to 6 days (Thimphu to Phuentsholing - I day; Phuentsholing
(including transshipment) - 1 day; Phuentsholing to Calcutta - 3 to 4 days).
Costs associated with transporting raw materials and finished products also reduce the competitiveness of
Bhutanese agroprocessors. These costs climb dramatically if containers are required. Charges for
containers from Phuentsholing to Calcutta, are quoted at Rs 10,000 for a 20-foot container, and Rs 40,000
to 50,000 for a refrigerated (reefer) container, which will normally have to be shipped empty from
Calcutta.
Some of the above constraints are interrelated, and few will be easily solved. Another problem is that
several fruit and vegetable products with good export potential are only available for export during the
summer months when monsoon weather tends to disrupt both land and air transport.
One particular issue is agro-product exports to Bangladesh. These products exit India at Changrabandh
and then enter Bangladesh,at Burimari. Generally fruit is carried in boxes by Bhutanese trucks to
Burimari, where it must be trans-shipped to Bangladeshi trucks for onward carriage to markets such as
Dhaka, Rangpur, and Chittagong. Problems include:
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1. the poor conditions at Changrabandh, where queues to clear Indian customs are frequently
long, and where even vehicles carrying perishable transit products (which should be given
priority) can be seriously delayed;
2. the flow of apples may be further disrupted by the muddy conditions at the border during the
monsoon months, when many vehicles can become bogged; and
3. once goods have been left for trans-shipment at Burimari, the Bangladeshi importers may
subsequently claim short delivery or loss of product quality, and thereby refuse to pay in full
the amounts specified in the letters of credit.
Other problems include the damage of goods in transit - goods may be loaded and off-loaded several
times and breakages are common (e.g., 7 to 9 percent for glass bottles). Lack of care and handling
procedures by haulers is also an issue.
Financing new equipment. Most firms acknowledged problems with undercapitalization. Small firms
are generally confined to financing expansion or investment in innovation from retained earnings or
borrowing. Using retained earnings in the food sector usually slows the process of development because
profitability tends to be low. Lenders treat the sector conservatively, expecting to lend funds against fixed
assets, so small firms find it difficult to raise new equity and expand.
Raw materials. As discussed earlier, if the backward linkages between the farmer and the processor
were improved, many of the problems with raw materials may be reduced - including fragmented and
small land holdings, erratic production due to natural factors, and nonuniformity and inconsistent supply.
Management problems. In addition to issues cited by survey respondents, a number of management
issues are seen as impacting the agroprocessing industry. At a national level, the management problem in
Bhutan is deeper than in many other countries as there is an absence of (a) qualified and experienced
entrepreneurs and (b) a resource pool from which innovations can grow. This stems from the fact that
there has not been any agro-industrial development and opportunity to develop skills and knowledge
necessary for this sector.
Within firms, low labor productivity is a direct result of a lack of training, a low level of technological
adaptation, and - related to technology - low management aspirations, and a lack of innovation.
Although lower capital intensity, smaller scale, and raw-material supply issues explain part of the
productivity deficiency endemic to Bhutanese agroprocessing firns, they are much less important than
lower management aspirations and limited innovation within businesses. The firms studied were
characterized in the main by:
1. Slowness to adopt innovative new processes developed overseas. In all firms there was a lack
of adaptive skills and interest in systems, technology, and conceptual product development.
Compared with its neighbors, Bhutan lags considerably - and these countries are far from
leading edge. Those firms that had upgraded their technology did so only minimally and
adopted technology from India, which generally is far behind international standards.
2. Poor product and marketing innovation. In the firms interviewed there was a lack of product
and marketing innovation. Management was not able to rethink product categories and
innovate to meet new customer demand. This will become a serious issue as Bhutanese
companies try to identify and enter niche markets.
3. Passive supplier relationship. The food-processing sector has tended not to build proactive
relationships with primary producers - one notable exception being Bhutan Agro Industries -
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although some companies plan to forge closer links in the near future. Collaborative
relationships need to develop that provide opportunities to improve products and processes.
Until recently, there was no framework in which to operate at the community level, but this
has now changed with the recent introduction of the Cooperative Act. This will impact on the
successful introduction of systems, such as quality farming, and help ensure quality through
the supply chain.
4. Modest management aspirations. Innovation transfer is more likely to occur when managers
with high aspirations push for change, or when competitive pressures force firms to improve
their performance to survive. Companies lacking these aspirations and pressures may neglect
promising opportunities. None of the Bhutanese agro processors were focused on this level
of commitment, despite opportunities in the diverse natural resource base - for example,
mineral water remains a largely untapped opportunity.
If Bhutan tackles the key performance inhibitors and makes substantial productivity gains, it will be able
to compete in global niche markets - the high-value, high-quality sector that currently eludes the
country's processors. Box 3.2 demonstrates the consequences of the management of firms not addressing
the needs of buyers.
BOX 3.2: POOR MANAGEMENT DAMAGES BHUTAN'S MARKET POTENTIAL
This case shows poor management in dealing with export markets, establishing a poor reputation for Bhutan, resulting in
business passing to competitor countries.
A European company specializing in the import and distribution of aromatherapy products worked closely with the
Government of Bhutan for up to ten years to develop a market in Europe for lemongrass oil. For a number of years the
company purchased some 2 MT per annum.
According to the company it purchased lemongrass oil and paid around $16/kg C&F compared with a normal price of
some $1 1/kg. Despite the price premium offered, the company found the Bhutanese to be difficult to deal with as
suppliers. Orders were late in arriving; they were often short-weighted; they did not correspond to the technical
specifications; and they were not of a consistent quality. In communicating their difficulties, messages were claimed to
have not been received or, if they were received, were ignored. (Similar comments have been made by other buyers
supplied from Bhutan).
Finally, the company changed suppliers after finding better quality lemongrass oil for sale through other outlets, and it
now purchases from Nepal.
Market information issues. Companies were not fully aware of market information issues - the smaller
ones more so than the larger ones. Overall, all companies lacked knowledge and experience in foreign
markets and none had the resources for export market development. Firms lacked the financial resources
and management time to collect and analyze market information themselves. Few had strong views on
market information issues and none were aware of the role of governments in providing such a service.
These issues are apparent by the lack of response to requests by the Bhutan Export Promotion Center
when organizing trade missions and the overall lack of understanding by firms on how the center could
help them in developing their businesses.
36
4. Potential
New market entrants and smaller firms lack internationally recognized brand names and generally must
rely on making niche or specialized products. An alternative is to supply private-label products to
retailers/processors. However, given the relatively high processing costs and inefficiencies, this is a risky
strategy for Bhutan.
Large vertically integrated firms and supermarket chains dominate the value chains of mainstream food
commodities. To appropriate at least some of the sizeable value-added generated at the marketing and
distribution stages, Bhutanese firms will have to identify specialty and niche products for which markets
are smaller and the scale economies of the large companies are not very important in determining
competitiveness. Naturally, the more processing taking place in Bhutan, the higher will be the returns.
This is the case even when the processing is a rather simple operation such as drying or packing. Organic
markets also offer new opportunities.
Organic produce. Much of the farming system in Bhutan is organic but this advantage has not been
leveraged because of a lack of awareness of organic farming systems; lack of infrastructure; lack of
marketing facilities; limited access to capital; and inability to capture economies of scale. The major
hurdles that need to be overcome include high certification costs; lack of market information and
marketing strategies; insufficient export facilitation; complex procedures in importing countries:; and tariff
and non-tariff protection in import markets. Certification and accreditation issues play a particularly
important role. In most cases, exporters depend on certification by international certification bodies to be
able to market their products as organic in foreign markets. Costs of certification vary, but can be
significant, and Bhutan may find it difficult to establish a national certification infrastructure.
A caveat is appropriate - the issue of rapidly growing markets raises the issue of perceived versus real
opportunities. The rapid demand growth for organic food in developed countries is likely to create
temporary supply-demand gaps that, at times, can be bridged by supply from developing countries. Such
short-term opportunities can, however, only be seized if certification requirements in export markets can
be met and market access is facilitated. Continued presence in the market thereafter will ultimately be
based on the ability of Bhutan to retain significant production cost advantages, maintain supplies, and
ensure consistent quality. In the medium-term, organic production capacity in developed countries is
likely to expand rapidly, spurred by attractive prices and subsidies by various governments.
High-value, low-volume products. Given the range of microclimates and extent of biodiversity, Bhutan
is in a position to grow a number of high-value products such as those used for essential oils or used as
traditional medicines. Bhutan has a further advantage in its capacity to produce the full range of-products,
both high- and low-altitude species. All competitors are severely handicapped in this respect. However,
the exigencies of consumers necessitate a high degree of professionalism. To compete in the international
market, Bhutan will have to offer not just a product, but a range of services, which include approved
quality systems, a degree of assurance about continuity of supply, and the capacity to bring new products
and product presentations to market rapidly.
The "quality" dimension in these markets refers not only to the characteristics of the final product but also
to the way in which the product is produced, processed, packaged, and transported.
Generally, price premiums for major niche food and beverage items are increasingly controlled by a
handful of companies - often only 2-5 companies conduct the bulk of transactions. This market structure
carries the risk that price premiums at retail level are mostly appropriated by the few marketing
companies that dictate far less attractive purchasing prices to producers.
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It is also important to note that price premiums differ significantly between products. Retail premiums
for spices, for instance, generally do not increase by over 5 per cent, whereas price premiums for high-
quality tea have been as high as 1,000 per cent.
Major opportunities lie in traditional medicinal herbs, if Bhutan can develop links with established
exporters and thereby take advantage of the markets that are already established. In essential oils, Bhutan
may find the best prospects lie with specialist niche products, usually those used in aromatherapy and not
commonly grown elsewhere. Products such as lemongrass have, unfortunately, almost lost their niche
advantage. This is becoming a price-sensitive product and generally requires minimum consignments of
1.0 MT.
Foreign companies. Food-processing industries are well established in the industrialized countries and
many developing countries. Developing countries, such as Bhutan, wishing to expand into this field are
advised to do so on the back of an established company as the barriers to entry and costs are prohibitively
high. The economies of scale in certain areas of food processing are considerable. In cases where
developing countries have made significant inroads into food processing - for example, orange juice
production in Brazil, canned pineapples in Thailand, and soluble coffee production in Colombia and
Brazil - the scale required for efficient production means that upstream access to raw materials and
downstream access to markets must also be secured on a large scale.
Foreign companies are sensitive to the business environment of a potential host country and are
continuously seeking friendly enabling locations. Bhutan has a comparative advantage in its business
environment and strategic location to India. This combination is probably sufficient to attract foreign
companies to manufacture in Bhutan for the Indian market using predominantly Indian raw materials.
Bhutan's comparative advantage in terms of its operating environment includes:
1. Nonrestrictive labor laws. Labor laws in India make it difficult for companies to
restructure, thereby hampering their ability to improve efficiency and expand output.
Employment in India's registered sector is highly protected, and companies must obtain
specific permission from the state government to retrench or to close down.
2. Literate laborforce. Low literacy levels within the Indian labor force are a deterrent to
foreign companies seeking higher worker productivity.
3. Minimal red tape and non-corruption. The large amount of red tape and corruption in India
is believed to discourage productive investment. According to surveys of large companies'
executives, corruption levels in India are perceived to be substantially higher than in other
developing countries. Multiple and often conflicting regulations increase red tape, delay
production, and hamper exports. As a result, foreign best-practice players may be deterred
from entering the market.
4. Infrastructure. Poor infrastructure is one of the most frequently mentioned barriers to
investment in India. For example, electricity shortages are common in many regions.
Given low management capabilities in Bhutan, it will be difficult for companies to identify new markets
and to build existing ones. Bhutan needs to identify ways to leapfrog the upgrading of its internal
capability in the agroprocessing sector - and working with foreign companies may be one viable strategy.
The immediate advantages will be training of the local work force and the development of captive
markets for Bhutanese ingredients. Fostering relationships with foreign companies will have benefits
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particularly in addressing many of the strategic gaps in the agroprocessing sector. Some key benefits
include:
* Bhutanese managers will be trained and exposed to international management practices,
technology, and marketing methods. In so doing, they will be forming a pool of high-quality
agro-business managers with the skills and vision in world-class manufacturing and
marketing.
* The modern facilities and international working environment would provide a greater
enticement for more skilled Bhutanese to work in the agroprocessing sector.
* With encouragement, foreign companies could be persuaded to purchase more Bhutanese
ingredients such as spices and herbs. This will have multiple benefits: production systems
will be stimulated and technology and skills will diffuse backward through the supply chain
as companies ensure that they procure the desired quality of product. These skills are needed
in the rural community and will form the platform from which Bhutan will be better equipped
to export its own products to high-value markets.
* Bhutanese-made products will gain greater market penetration and recognition.
* Finally, given sufficient critical mass, support services will be stimulated.
Box 3.3 shows the case of an exporter that penetrated export markets through good management -
differentiating a commodity by packaging innovation and a proactive relationship with its buyer.
BOX 3.3: PENETRATING NICHE MARKETS THROUGH INNOVATION AND PROACTIVE
RELATIONSHIPS
This case shows that consistent third-country exports are possible by working closely with buyers.
"Company C," which exports Bhutanese red rice to America and Europe, turned a chance enquiry into a long-term
relationship. Following an initial inquiry in 1992, despite having no previous experience, the company took a
chance and assured the importer that it could supply rice according to necessary requirements. It then worked
closely with the buyer to ensure that all requirements were met, and the first trial order of 1 metric ton was delivered
in 1994. This was followed by 4 metric tons and, subsequently, by a container load.
The firm's success was due not least to working closely with the importer to design packaging that was appealing to
niche markets and ensuring that logistical problems could be overcome. First, the design, which differentiated the
firm from other suppliers and appealed to gourmet stores and high-end health food chains, was based on traditional
Bhutanese handmade paper bags and included Bhutanese motifs. Second, supply systems were worked out to
overcome traditional customs so farmers would supply the paddy; workers had to be trained on the cleaning and
grading of rice; and issues tackled over customs clearance and trans-shipment.
Growth has been at about 45 percent annually as a result of working closely with the buyer to satisfy the needs of
the niche market in terms of product differentiation, quality, and the ability to deliver in quantity.
5. Recommendations for the Sector
Enabling environment. Bhutan's ability to develop and grow an agroprocessing industry is constrained
by a number of factors - many due to the 'newness' of the industry. Individual firms will not be able to
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jump these hurdles if they are not provided with a supportive enabling environment. Suggestions as to
how such an environment can be created include:
1. Create food laws to include all provisions relating to food products to cover issues concerning
safety standards, nutrition, and merit goods.
2. Create a food processors' association or relevant chapter within the Bhutan Chamber of
Commerce and Industry.
3. Initiate a concerted promotion campaign to create new markets, a first step should involve
strengthening the export promotion center.
4. Expand the availability of quality raw material with extended harvesting seasons through
practicing vertical cropping, increasing production, and improving productivity.
5. Develop or strengthen existing databases and market intelligence systems to enable planned
investment in the appropriate sector to match the availability of raw materials and
marketability of processed products.
6. Strengthen the technical skills of extension services and co-operatives in the areas of post-
harvest management of agro-produce to encourage creation of preprocessing facilities near
the farms such as washing, fumigation, and packaging.
7. Encourage the establishment of agroprocessing facilities as close to the area of production as
possible to avoid wastage and reduce transportation costs. This may include primary
processing units. The establishment of product belts, introduced in the NFYDP, will be an
important step.
8. Promote investments, both foreign and domestic.
9. Build a strong infrastructural base for production of value-added products with special
emphasis on food safety and quality matching international standards.
10. Invest in and provide a human resource development program for all skill levels, especially
on management and marketing systems.
11. Support the development of company-level innovation by providing national level R&D
facilities and resources. The mushroom research center is an excellent example.
12. Encourage the development of an industrial cluster of foreign food processors.
Industry competitiveness. Successful agroprocessing firms need to be competitive along the value
chain, starting on the farm and extending through to a marketing strategy. Firms need to find ways to
encapsulate the "value of values" in their products such as promoting them as "eco-efficient."
Suggestions for increasing industrial competitiveness include:
1. Companies need to devote more resources to developing a better-trained work force - training
is essential.
2. A high priority should be given to improving the general innovative performance of firms in
the agroprocessing sector.
3. A detailed study of the skills gap in the agroprocessing sector should be done to assess more
precisely the range and level of skills needed.
4. Firms should be encouraged to invest in technology and adopt best-practice management
systems.
5. A food-safety program should be initiated.
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Multiphase strategy. Agroprocessing should be promoted by developing in parallel the production base
and marketing base:
Production base
I . Better availability of raw materials - the area from which raw materials are procured needs to
be extended, yields improved, losses reduced, and transport costs lowered. Yield issues will be
addressed as farmers come to understand market opportunities. Dealing with individual
farmers is not efficient, transactions should be through a cooperative or association, which
allows farmers to be managed in groups. Primary processing could also be introduced at the
cooperative level to extend the life of produce and lower transportation costs. It will be critical
to control primary processing through training in quality processing, reinforced by
development and adoption of a management system that links all actors in the chain.
2. Central-collection site development - this would ensure the quality of material processed in the
cooperatives and provide a means of bulking up and regulating quality. The center would need
to work closely with the cooperatives to ensure that quality issues are continuously addressed.
3. Product diversification should be explored through market-directed opportunities
Marketing base
1. Import substitution - some products currently imported from India could be replaced by locally
produced items. Possibilities include most perishable items, including bakery, dairy products,
and ice cream. Other innovations may be derived through processing of vegetable oils, potato
products, maize products, or animal feed.
2. Niche exports - high-value products such as essential oils for aromatherapy, traditional
medicines, and products based on organic produce. Key in this sector is quality, consistency
and responsiveness. The range of products in this category is large - for example, refining,
capsulation and tableting of herbal medicines and mushroom extracts; organic niche products,
such as organic tea; fruit products, such as health bars; herbal drinks; candies; and organic nuts.
This market will require product quality, consistency, and assured supply, as well as vigorous
marketing to support the products.
3. Develop a cluster of foreign companies near the Indian border. In time, these companies will
purchase domestically produced ingredients such as herbs and spices that have a comparative
advantage over those obtainable in India.
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CHAPTER 4
WOOD AND WOOD-BASED INDUSTRIES
1. Present situation
Background. Forestry is an important resource in Bhutan. It contributes some 11 percent to current
GDP and generates about 3 percent of govermment revenues through forest-product sales and royalties.
Forest-related products account for 20 percent of total exports, and forestry generates over 25,000 jobs in
the informal and formal sectors.
The total forest area in Bhutan is 2.8 million hectares, which represents over 70 percent of the country's
total land area. The forests comprise a variety of different types including fir forests, mixed coniferous,
chir pine, and broad-leaved forests. The broad-leaved species, or hardwoods, grow on the lower land,
while the coniferous wood grows on the higher land. A relatively high proportion of forests are in
protected areas and much of the forests that are legally available for wood supply are undisturbed by
harvesting. The estimated annual allowable cut in Bhutan is 35 million cft. About 10 million cft is
extracted each year, of which some 20 percent originates from natural, but managed forests - from the
government's Forestry Management Units (FMU), 16 from which the commercially used wood comes.
Extraction has remained relatively stable in recent years, as shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: FDC Disposal of Timber, 1998 to 2000
1998 1999 2000
Rural 214,826 242,235 162,254
Urban 730,809 44,771 690
Defense 19,208 1,348 0
Industry 158,408 1,000 0
Auction (Export) 720,484 201,004 74,897
Auction (Internal) 1,406,686 1,425,940
Total 1,843,735 1,897,044 1,663,781
Total for commercial use (direct or via auctions) 878,892 1,608,690 1,500,837
SOURCE:.. FDC
The Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) reports that for good forest management it is preferable to extract the
full annual allowable cut, but the MoA lacks the capacity for this. There are presently some 14 FMUs,
which only cover some 8 percent of the forest area. About 53 percent of the timber is coniferous, and the
balance is broad-leaved.
Timber is bought by industry from Forestry Development Corporation (FDC) auctions. The industry
comprises around 56 sawmills; 60 furniture workshops; 1 large particle-board firm; some producers of
broom handles, fruit boxes, veneer, plywood and blockboard; and some wooden handicrafts producers.
Most of the industries are located in the western and southern parts of Bhutan. It is costly to transport
timber from one district to another, so hardwoods are mainly processed in the lowlands and conifers in the
highlands. Sawmills are widely dispersed; specialist furniture firms are predominantly in Thimphu; and
16 Petri Lehtonen, Bhutan Forest Policy Review, IDA and Swiss Development Corporation, January 2000.
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panel and board producers, which consume some 60 percent of hardwoods, are located in the
Phuentsholing area. In mid-200 1, a Wood-Based Industries Association was formed to represent the
views of the sector.
The market is fragmented, as is common in developing countries, and this is exacerbated by Bhutan's
small population and its geography. It is difficult to obtain economies of scale. The government is a
major customer of timber products - of the timber available for commercial use, perhaps 70-80 percent is
consumed by the construction industry and, of this, over 70 percent is said to be funded by the
government and/or donors.
Government policy. As noted elsewhere, several aspects of the policy create a favorable environment
for the wood sector, in common with other sectors of manufacturing industry. These include the import
and export regime, the stable exchange rate with India, and, to a greater or lesser extent, the SAARC
agreement.
Bhutan's Eighth Five-Year Development Plan emphasizes the key importance of the sustainable
management of forests for the dual purpose of conserving environmental resources and supplying wood
resources to the domestic market. In January 1999, a new pricing and marketing policy was introduced
whereby (a) the urban, commercial, and industrial sectors could access timber through open auctions; (b)
prices were determined by the market; and (c) the export of logs and sawn timber was banned - except
where there is a glut in the market. As Table 4.1 shows, the export of timber in 2000, as a result of the
log ban, was only 10 percent of the amount in 1998. Invariably, each timber auction lot consists of mixed
species. Each species within a timber lot may consist of different species, grades, sizes, and qualities. If
a lot is unsold in two auctions, FDC may sell it through an international auction at which foreign buyers
can participate.
While the new policy was generally welcomed by industry, two new regulations introduced in 2000 have
negatively impacted on the sector. In April 2000, the export of "semi-finished" products was banned to
counter, for example, the export of barely processed timber disguised as finished products. In September
2000, the system of measuring timber was changed from the Quarter Girth to the True Volume system,
which has resulted in buyers getting 21.5 percent less timber for the same nominal amount. Earlier, in
reaction to the belief that sawmillers were colluding to keep prices high, FDC started two sawmills to
force private-sector millers to lower their prices. At present, both FDC and private firms buy conifers for
about Nu130/cft and FDC sells the sawn wood for Nu140, while the private sector sells it for about
Nu220/cft.17
During the period since the log ban, two "regulations" have negatively impacted on the sector's labor
market: (a) the announcement that government workers should be paid a minimum of NuI00 per day,
which many private-sector firms have found it necessary to follow; and (b) pressure on firms to reduce
the number of non-national workers employed.
Other factors in the government domain that have a significant effect on the industry include the many
(uncoordinated) ministries and agencies which influence firmns; the termns and conditions of tendering for
government contracts; the perceived discouragement to enter into joint ventures with foreign firms; and
the difficulties (flights and visas) that third-country business persons face in accessing Bhutan.
17 There is no concrete evidence that sawn timber prices are high. A consultant to the Bhutan Forestry Institutional Development
Initiative recently concluded that sawmillers' pricing was reasonable; a Bhutan mission to Switzerland found that a sawmill it
visited was selling timber for over three times its purchase price; while in Indonesia sawn rubberwood is over four times the price
of logs.
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Labor and employment. Firms visited in the wood sector are generally modest in scale, employing on
average 31 persons. By contrast, the two large plywood/blockboard and particle-board making firms
interviewed employ on average 292 persons. It is estimated that total employment in Bhutan's wood-
sector firms is no more than 2,000 persons.
There is a shortage of skilled labor in the sector, which is evidenced by low productivity and poor quality.
Firms report that in towns there is a scarcity of labor, while rural workers are seasonal and lack an
'industrial' culture. Workers do not receive any formal training in the sector because of high levels of
turnover. The Woodcraft Center, which was established in 1991 by the government and Danida,
combines training with production and is the only organization in Bhutan that provides a systematic
training for woodworkers. The center has trained some 36 trainees, some of whom are working in local
firms.
Firms minimize their labor shortages by hiring Indian workers. In the Phuentsholing area, Indian day
workers forn 69 percent of the work force and are hired because of their skills, better attendance
performance, and their lower rates of pay. In Thimphu, Indian workers form 49 percent of the work
force, and are formally employed as regular staff- in other words, they have been approved by the
various government agencies and have identity cards. Generally, the number of such workers is
determined by the size of the firm's investment. However, in practice firms can supplement these regular
workers when they undertake government contracts by saying that additional Indians are needed to
complete the work on time. Some firms have construction companies with Indian workers, and these
workers may work in the woodworking factory.
BOX 4.1 SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR GOVERNMENT-TRAINED LABOR
In a country where skilled labor is at a premium, it is important that use of Bhutanese skilled workers, such as those
trained by the Woodcraft Center, is optimized. However, this case demonstrates a considerable mismatch in supply
and demand. Firm Sixteen reports that "one day in February, eight or nine workers arrived on the door with a letter
from the National Employment Board (NEB) asking if I could absorb the workers. I discovered that they were
trained by Woodcraft, and I thought that I would take three of them. The firm had been stagnating for two years,
and I thought they would help the firm grow. But I could not decide between them, so took eight of them. But there
is no change in sales and now I have more stock."
In the same month, Firm Eleven applied for a permit to hire an Indian. The request was forwarded to the NEB in
March and six months later no reply has been received. In May it applied to Woodcraft for a manager and four
workers. Woodcraft replied that it had no graduates and advised the firm to wait, saying it was taking in new
trainees in September. The needs of the two firms match the number of skilled graduates available from Woodcraft,
but the end result is that one firm has too many workers, and the other firm none. Firm Eleven would like
Woodcraft to write that it cannot provide the necessary skilled workers, rather than saying it will have them in the
future, as it believes this would provide the justification for the firm to get a permit to hire Indians instead.
In most firms, the owners lack technical skills and, in the case of production, have to rely on the skills of a
production manager/supervisor. Such managers, even when from India, are commonly unqualified and
inappropriately skilled. All firms require technicians for maintenance, tooling, drafting, and so on, and
these skills (which are acquired over a long time working on the job) are not found in Bhutanese workers.
In many cases, these skilled technicians are poorly educated, and the agencies responsible for work
pernits are said not to appreciate the indispensable skills of such poorly educated technicians.
Technology. In the sawmilling subsector technology is low. The Indian technology used is decades old.
There is no evidence of firms seeking to upgrade their technology, whether in terms of equipment, saw-
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doctoring and maintenance, or work practices. The low technology results in poor timber yield and
quality. A few frmns visited have moved downstream to use waste wood, and/or to add value, as a result
of the ban on log exports.
Many of the firms have kiln-drying facilities, but technology is weak and performance handicapped by
the drying of timber in mixed species and mixed dimensions as this prevents the optimum drying
schedule from being used.
With the bans on the export of logs and of semi-finished products, there has been investment by furms in
the Phuentsholing area in plywood and blockboard production. Firms have generally identified the
technology required by using Indian consultants and by visiting similar production units in India. The
time and cost involved in searching for and acquiring technology has exceeded expectations, as will be
detailed below.
The most professional firms for the production of funiture are in Thimphu. Compared with frms in
Phuentsholing, the premises of the frms visited are orderly, comparatively clean, and generally have
relatively new equipment. Two newer fmns in Thimphu were assisted by Woodcraft Center in terms of
their layout and equipment specification. Furniture made by firms in Phuentsholing tended to be of
inferior-quality.
Design skills are absent in Bhutan. Firms in Thimphu often use Danida-inspired designs, which are dated
and lack Bhutanese character. In places, UNICEF designs have influenced the products made for schools.
Overall, designs are very poor.
Firms prioritize their technology needs as follows:
* production assistance (in order of priority, machinery rehabilitation and maintenance, advice on
new machines, visits to modem factories, visits to machinery fairs, kiln-drying, and machining);
* marketing (in order of priority, information on foreign markets, marketing techniques, study visits
to foreign markets, promotional materials development);
* new product design; and
* management development (in order of priority, financial management, quality systems, business
planning, computer training, and human resource development training).
However, while these subjects are important, more emphasis should be placed on sawmilling and kiln-
drying, and in business development planning. Above all else, company bosses need to be made aware of
the global environment in which they operate and to become familiar with best practice.
2. Costs and Competitiveness
The competitiveness of furniture firms is mainly affected by the cost of timber (typically 40-50 percent of
ex-works price internationally); the cost of labor (15-20 percent internationally); productivity; and yield -
the amount of the timber which ends up as an output from each stage of manufacture.
Raw materials. It is difficult to compare costs across countries precisely (intemationally there can be a
fourfold difference between the price of different qualities and grades of the same timber species), but
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Bhutan is generally within the range of international competitiveness. Table 4.2 shows that Bhutanese
hardwoods vary between US$65 and$102/m3, compared with international prices of US$126-238/m3.
With teak, the price in Bhutan is US$127/m3, compared with international prices of US$522- 1,695/m 3.
(cubic meters). In the case of conifers, on the other hand, Bhutan's prices are 12-15 percent more than
those of Indonesia.
Table 4.2: Comparative Timber Log Prices
Country Timber USS/m3 Comments
Bhutan Hardwoods (mixed species) 65 FDC auction prices (av. Jan.-Sept. 2001)
Bhutan Hardwoods (Grade A) 102 FDC auction prices (av. Jan.-Sept. 2001)
Malaysia Hardwoods (av. 6 species) 126 Sawmill quality; ex-log yard
West Africa Hardwoods (av. 12 species) 163 FOB; sawmill quality
Indonesia Hardwoods (av. various species/sizes) 238 Air-dried timber for construction industry
Bhutan Hardwood: Teak 127 Firms' reported purchase price (2001)
Bangladesh Hardwood: Teak (Chitagong) 522-696 Prices paid by furniture firms (Feb. 2001)
Myanmar Hardwood: Teak 1,695 FOB; average price for Grades 1-4
Indonesia Conifer (Pine) 80 Mill yard price
Bhutan Conifer (mixed species) 90 FDC auction prices (av. Jan.-Sept. 2001)
Bhutan Conifer (Blue Pine Grade A) 92 FDC auction prices (av. Jan.-Sept. 2001)
Sources: Tropical Timber Market Report, 16-30 Sept. 2001, International Tropical Timber Organization; FDC, Bhutan; Tyler
Associates, Ireland.
There are variations in timber costs within Bhutan. In 2001, mixed hardwoods have, on average, varied
from one region to another from Nu5O to Nu76/cft. Mixed conifers have been more consistent, varying
from Nu85 to Nu 1 00/cft. On top of the timber cost, trucking can be expensive - the price from Mongar to
Phuentsholing is Nu65 per cft - and may exceed the value of the timber.
Labor costs. Bhutan is competitive with a range of countries, as detailed in Table 4.3. A machine
operator in a furniture company costs about US$89 per month, while the cost is US$136 and US$156 in
Bangladesh and the Philippines respectively. However, labor cost, as a percentage of the ex-works price,
is high in Bhutan at 29 percent - nearly twice what is desirable to be internationally competitive.
Labor costs vary by district and by the background of the worker. In Thimphu, production workers are
paid on average US$95 per month and labor accounts for 32 percent on the ex-works price of products.
In Phuentsholing, they are paid US$55 per month and labor accounts for 20 percent of the product price.
Much of the variation in wages per month is determined by the predominance of Indian workers in
Phuentsholing. While the lower labor cost, as a percentage of ex-works price, is partly explained by the
number of Indian workers and the number of comparatively capital-intensive board factories there.
In Thimphu, firms hiring Woodcraft-trained workers pay wages of US$100 per month, whereas other
firms pay an average of US$83. Firms observe that these government-trained workers seek public-sector
pay and conditions - insisting on government-mandated holidays - whereas non-Woodcraft Bhutanese
workers demand half the holidays, and Indian workers one-third of the holidays. Output per worker in the
'Woodcraft-trained' firms is US$3,753 - little better than the overall national average - but in the 'non-
Woodcraft' firms it is US$5,841.'" When all the issues are considered, government-trained workers may
not be more productive, though their work may be of better quality, because of a poor work ethic
compared with other workers.
'
8 These figures are based on a small sampling. Also the product lines vary with 'Woodcraft-trained' firms making Woodcraft-
inspired designs, and the other firms making other types of furniture.
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Table 4.3: Comparative Output and Costs Between Countries in Typical Firms
Country Product lines Output per Labor cost as Cost of machine
worker per year % of ex-works operator
(US$/yr.) price (US$/Io.)
Bhutan Sawmills 3,654 22 59
Bhutan Plywood; particle board; blockboard 8,692 13 58
Bhutan Furniture 3,576 29 89
Bangladesh Furniture 3,668 N/A 136
Jamaica Furniture 10,500 25 350
Romania Furniture 28,000 20 100
Philippines Furniture 30,000 40 (a) 156
Ireland Furniture 115,000 14 1,400
NOTES: (a) It is not uncommon for labor costs to be high in Philippine firms as they specialize in labor-intensive decorative
techniques to add value and to differentiate their products from lower-cost countries.
Source: Firm interviews, Tyler Associates
Productivity. Productivity measured by the output per worker is low in Bhutan. As shown in Table 4.3,
in furniture-making firms output is US$3,576 per worker per year - one of the lowest levels in like
countries. In Bangladesh, for example, output is US$3,668 and, in general, there is less mechanization
there. Some experts believe that an output of US$12,000 per worker per year is needed to export
regionally and US$20,000 to export internationally.
Yield. It is difficult to measure yield (that is, the amount of useable timber which results from each stage
of processing) from short visits to firms - this can vary significantly as shown in Table 4.4. In "best
practice" countries, 34 percent of the tree trunk can be converted into finished products such as furniture
and panel doors. In Ghana, for example, only 7-10 percent of the tree trunk may be recovered. In the few
firms in Bhutan where the information provided seems to be plausible, yield may be 11-20 percent. The
practice in Bhutan is to convert the waste into subsidiary products, a practice which will be further
examined below. Yield is low because of poor equipment, poor work practices, and because traditionally
the price of wood has been low and international competition lacking to force yield efficiencies on firms.
Output prices. Efficiency, if not competitiveness, can be measured by the price firms can achieve per
unit of timber - this tests design and marketing as well as processing skills. Table 4.5 shows that as firms
move downstream, the unit value of the timber increases significantly. At its extreme, a firm can obtain
100 times more for its timber if it makes key rings (US$27,000/m 3) than if it makes rotary veneer
(US$275/m3). At present, however, many Bhutanese firms have not been successful at moving
downstream and are obtaining as little as US$348/m3 for furniture.'9
Table 4.4: Comparative Timber Yield Figures
Best practice Ghana Bhutan
Percentage of tree trunk going to sawmill 80 45-66 60
Percentage of tree trunk converted to finished products 34 7-10 11-20
Source: Ghana Country Economic Memorandum, World Bank, 2000; firm interviews, Bhutan.
'9 But examples in adding-value through timber selection, processing, design, and marketing are demonstrated in Bhutan. In the
Thimphu Weekend Market, plain, new, turned-wooden bowls sell for prices ranging from US$3,492 to US$508,000/rn3.
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Table 4.5: Wood Exports from Ghana by Value (fob, US% per m3) per Product Type, 1999 -2000
Rotary veneer Mouldings Joinery Garden Sub- Finished Handicrafts
furniture parts assemblies garden (carved key
furniture rings)
275 600 1,000 1,200 1,800 3,000 27,000
Critical success factors. There are, of course, a wide range of factors which have to be present for firms
to be successful. Some of them are favorable - such as the import/export regime, the exchange rate, the
availability and cost of utilities, and trade agreements with other countries. There are four critical success
factors specific to Bhutan's wood sector.
Availability ofpreferred raw materials. Firms need access to good quality raw materials in species and
sizes which suit the needs of the market and their technology and is available at predictable prices.
Supportive policy towards manufacturers. Government policy must be sympathetic to the needs of
manufacturers. A leading industrialist described the attitude of government as follows: "the intention of
government is favorable; the policy is not so healthy; and the application of policy is bad. And we want
to avoid frequent policy changes."
Access to appropriate technology and labor. Technology needs upgrading in the sector, starting in saw-
milling and working downstream. Firms are prepared to invest if the policy environment is appropriate
and consistent. At the same time, they need skilled managers and labor at predictable wages.
Market-led production. Industry should be led by the needs of private-sector (particularly export)
markets. At present, much of the market is determined by the government as (a) a buyer of wood
products and (b) a major arbiter of what firms make - by the control of timber being sold into the market
and restricting the export of certain products.
3. Impediments to growth
Impediments to growth include a lack of preferred raw materials; inappropriate policies; difficulties in
obtaining technology and skilled labor; and a lack of market awareness and poor marketing skills.
Availability of preferred raw materials. The government's policy to restrict the export of logs and
sawn timber was appropriate, but other actions of the government have not enabled industry and the
economy to reap the benefits. The export restrictions signaled the industry to move downstream and add
more value in Bhutan. However, firms cannot move downstream if they cannot get single species of
timber (preferably in the right grade, size, and quantity) and cannot make what are called "semi-finished"
products. Moving downstream is difficult - Ghana, for example, which has a log ban and wood-sector
exports of US$180 million, has only one firm which is consistently exporting furniture.
At present, it is not uncommon for firms to buy lots in which one-third of the timber is good for the core
business of the firm, one-third can be used in some capacity, and one-third is unwanted. As noted earlier,
FDC sells timber in lots of mixed species for the following reason, "In whatever area we are given, we
have to harvest the marked trees. We are just the contractors. The amount harvested is target driven, and
consists of various qualities. We do not segment the species at the depot because of the cost, and what
difference would it make? The users are not experienced and do not prefer certain species - they can
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switch their taste within one month - in the wink of an eye.20 Even after the hard work in segregating,
there is no guarantee we will get the best price for the timber. What do you do about the rejects? It's
hard to get approval from the Ministry of Agriculture to get rid of timber which industry has rejected."
Table 4.6 shows the outcome of this practice, examining a typical lot bought by a typical sawmill, what it
paid, and the actual value to the firm. First, it should be pointed out that the firm wanted the lot, which
was more valuable to the firm than other lots in the auction. The highlighted areas indicate the timber in
the lot which the firm wanted, namely 302 cft out of a lot of 532 cft. The firm bought the lot for Nu67 per
cft. However, it would have paid Nu8O - Nul30 for the timber it wanted, but only values the tilmber it
does not want at Nu3O per cft. It could be argued that the frm did not lose much money in buying the lot
if the lower and higher values to the firm are offset against each other - the firm paid Nu35,644, and
estimates the actual value is Nu34,670. However, in addition, the firm has to pay up to Nu65/cft to
transport the wood to its factory, where it might get only Nu110-1 70/cft for converting what wood it can
recover from the unwanted logs into orange and apple boxes. The firm has an additional problem - its
clients do not norTmally want the costly Champ wood, and it could take up to one year to sell it. Perhaps
most importantly, obtaining a variety of species, grades, and sizes hampers specialization, which would
help the firm achieve scale economies and facilitate technology transfer and an upgrading of skills.
(Commonly, firms would pay 20-30 percent more if they could obtain timber that was more appropriate
to their core product lines).
Table 4.6: Typical Timber Lot - Price Paid by Firm and Actual Value to Firm
Species Grade Smaller lengths (3'0" - 4'11") Longer lengths (5'0" +)
Cft Value to Price Actual Cft Value to Price Actual
firm paid value to firm paid value to
Nu/cft at firm Nu/cft at firm
Nu67/cft Nu67/cft
Kaula C 32 30 2,144 960 83 93 5,561 7,719
Dabdapey C 113 30 7,571 3,390 137 93 9,179 12,741
Champ A 15 130 1,005 1,950 0
Paihely E 17 30 1,139 510 22 30 1,474 660
Bongser D 17 30 1,139 510 0
B. Kaula C 41 80 2,747 3,280 0
Katush C 0 29 30 1,943 870
Kapasy A 0 26 80 1,742 2,080
Total 235 15,745 10,600 297 19,899 24,070
Source: Firm Twelve interview
It is not unusual for the wrong species, bad quality, and wrong sizes to put firms off altogether. One of
the three biggest purchasers of auction timber stated that it might not buy an auction lot because 10
percent of the lot might be unusable. Another of the three noted that timber deteriorates the moment it is
felled, and it is crucial to process it as soon as possible to optimize its value. It observed that FDC tried to
sell the old timber first at auctions but because the new timber is not sold first, it too deteriorates before it
is sold. It reports it has not bought any "new" timber in the past two years.
The policy introduced in 1999, envisages that if there are no local buyers after two auctions, the timber
can be sold in an open, international auction. However, FDC has to obtain prior permission from the
20 Interviewed firms, on the other hand, reported wanting a continuing supply of the same species so they could
specialize.
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Ministry of Agriculture. This permission may not be forthcoming, however. The FDC notes that there
may be delays in getting the approval of the Ministry, and sometimes timber may be offered four or five
times for sale. It is not unusual for there to be gluts in the market, when open international auctions are
advisable at short notice to prevent further deterioration. For example, in May 2001, 70,000 cft of timber
was offered for sale, but only 15,000 cft sold, and there was a need to sell the timber in international open
auction. Sometimes, local firms try to buy the deteriorated mixed species, but later regret it. One of the
biggest buyers, believed it could successfully buy such material and, in December 2000, bought 35,000
cft of timber at Nu27 per cft. It paid Nu3O per cft for transport - and when the timber arrived at the
factory, it was found to be unsuitable.
Under the present policy, the private sector has to pay for everything that is sold in an auction lot -
whether they want it all or not. This results in the private sector having extra costs, in addition to the
transport costs, which they would not face if the auction system worked better. The present auction
system is burdensome for the private sector because:
* Firms cannot concentrate on core product lines, which would enable them to focus their
investment. They have to invest time and money in processing and/or selling their unwanted
timber. The diversification which is being forced upon firms is hampering them from developing
scale economies and exporting - which is crucial when the domestic market is so fragmented.
* Manufacturers have to be jacks-of-all-trades and cannot concentrate on upgrading worker skills
that are specific to the firm. If they could specialize, worker skills could more easily be
upgraded, and there would be less turnover of labor - as few firms would have a similar
specialization and there would be less opportunity to "steal" workers trained elsewhere.
* Industry is being hampered in making good quality products. For example, each species of
hardwood should have a different kiln-drying schedule so it does not warp and crack. However,
as one of the biggest firms noted, it would take it one year to buy sufficient timber of a single
species to fill the kiln under the present government policy. This is one of the reasons why
hardwood products are of such poor quality and firms are moving to conifers and boosting the
price, while the price of hardwoods is declining (Hardwoods are cheaper than conifers in Bhutan,
although internationally hardwood may be three to four times more expensive, as shown in Table
4.2.
* The market is increasingly rejecting mixed species' products. For example, Indian buyers are
insisting that the core of blockboard (a product which historically did not discriminate against
mixed species) must be in a single species. India "no longer wants" multi-colored parquet
flooring. All markets, except Bangladesh, are turning against fruit boxes made of wood - which
has been the most common product for which unwanted wood has been used. If firms cannot sell
their unwanted timber, the cost will be added to the cost of their primary products and render
them uncompetitive.
It is reported that FDC is moving towards segregating timber at two depots, and this is welcomed.
However, it will need adequate resources to achieve its aim.
Wood sector policy. The second impediment to growth is inappropriate government policy and
procedures. Table 4.5 shows that the unit value of goods increases as firms move downstream, a process
that was facilitated by the ban on the export of logs and sawn timber in January 1999. However, some 16
months later a ban was introduced on 'semi-finished" products. This has had a considerable negative
impact on firms. For example, (a) firms invested in downstream activities after January 1999, but the ban
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of semi-finished products adversely impacted the business in which they had recently invested; (b) firms
often get experience making 'semi-finished' or secondary products before they make tertiary products,
such as furniture - but the ban hampers this; and (c) the manufacture of secondary products - such as
blockboard frames - enabled firms to use their unwanted wood but this is now restricted. These examples
are developed further below.
Negating investmnents in downstream activities. The impact of the ban on semi-finished products' export
is illustrated by the experience of one the largest plywood and blockboard making firms. With the earlier
log ban, the firmn diversified into the manufacture of flush and panel doors and made considerable
investments. Later, the ban of semi-finished products was introduced and, as a consequence, the firm
cannot export the frames of doors or windows, which are considered semi-finished products, although it
can export doors and window casements. This has impacted severely on the market potential of a firm
whose pioneering activities would have opened up opportunities for other Bhutanese followers.
Gaining experience in making secondartyproducts. Making secondary products, such as picture-frame
mouldings, floor boards, tongue-and-groove paneling, is vital in the process of moving downstream.
First, the machinery may be a step up the technology ladder and new-technology skills are learned by the
firm. Second, relatively large quantities of similar products are made which acquaint the manufacturer
with scale economies. Third, skilling machine operators is comparatively easy as the work is repetitive.
Fourth, once these steps are mastered, it is easier to move on to products with more added value, such as
garden decking and furniture parts. The availability of single species is important in the making of
secondary products. For example, broomsticks (though not banned) are a secondary product. At present,
one firm that has exported them for over ten years can only get enough of the right species to produce up
to 12 containers per year, while its international competitors can produce up to 200 containers per year
per firm.
Secondaryproducts may use unwanted timber. The sale of secondary, or semi-finished products, is
important in the use of unwanted timber - for example, the processing and sale of off-cuts is one of the
reasons why Brazil is internationally competitive in the export of pine beds.2' However, in Bhutan some
firms have had to close some of their businesses because the subsidiary products they made were
considered semi-finished. In the case of a veneer exporter in East Bhutan, the larger pieces of veneer
were eligible for export, but the smaller pieces of veneer made from the off-cuts were deemed semi-
finished products. The market could not absorb the resultant price increase to the larger pieces when the
export of the smaller ones was banned, so the firm closed. A firm in Phuentsholing closed four
manufacturing units, including a veneer slicing plant, with a value of US$300,000 with the ban on semi-
finished products' export. In Bhutan, firms report that valuable species suitable for veneer use, such as
maple, are lying in the forest for up to nine months because of the low prices they would get at auction as
a result of the ban. In Ghana, the average value of sliced veneer exports is US$89 1/m3 but, some firms
prove the exception getting up to US$18,000/m3 with careful log selection and processing. Even
assuming Bhutanese firms could obtain the lower figure for the veneer, it is higher in value per m3 than
some firms are obtaining for furniture. One firm even reported that it could no longer export sawdust,
which is considered a semi-finished product, and noted (a) the damage it causes to fish if dumped in the
river; (b) the fire hazard if kept in the factory; and (c) the irritation to eyes caused by sawdust blowing
around the factory.
Government policy (on labor, joint ventures, obtaining business licenses - and changes to policy) does
not encourage the acquisition of technology necessary to move downstream, but industry is banmed from
exporting semi-finished products, which is the outcome of that policy. If technology acquisition and the
21 Biggs et al., "Africa Can Compete, " World Bank, 1996.
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marketing of semi-finished products was encouraged, firms would be more likely to move downstream
successfully. The ban on semi-finished products may have prevented some smuggling of goods out of the
country, but its unintended effects have harmed the development of the sector.
Stable and consistent policy. Several firms expressed a desire to invest in their businesses provided they
could plan ahead with certainty. They lack confidence in a stable and consistent policy in view of the
unexpected changes since 1999, during which time firms had to reorient themselves two, or more times.
There is the belief that the financial institutions lack confidence in the sector because, with the changes,
they are not clear on government's attitude to the sector.
Appropriate technology and staff. The third impediment to growth relates to obtaining appropriate
technology and staff.
Appropriate technology. The ban on the export of logs and sawn timber required firms to adopt new
technology as they sought to move downstream. Additionally, the ban on semi-finished products forced
some of them to reorient themselves twice in 18 months. Firms are fortunate in their proximity to the
Indian market - where they can undertake market research, hire consultants, and source machinery.
However, there have been problems in acquiring technology. First, firms have to identify the products
they want to make and search for the appropriate technology provider. Second, they acquire the
technology, e.g., buying new machinery, which is then commissioned by the supplier and labor trained to
use it. Third, they absorb, or internalize, the technology - using the equipment in everyday conditions
once the equipment supplier has left. There are often complications throughout this process, and Bhutan
is no exception - Table 4.7 shows that it takes up to 20 months for firms to acquire and absorb new
technology.
Table 4.7: Time Taken for Technology t be Transferred to Bhutanese Fi s (months)
Months 1-3 4-6 7-9 10-12 13-15 16-18 19-21
FIRM FOUR
Technology search x x x x x x
Technology acquisition (planned) , , )
Technology absorption (unplanned)
FIRMELEVEN
Technology search , ) ) , :X
Technology acquisition (planned) , ,
Technology absorption (unplanned) _
FIRM THIRTEEN
Technology search ) :
Technology acquisition (planned)
Technology absorption (unplanned) _ _ _ _ > ,
Source: Firm interviews
Larger firms, such as Firm Four in the table, are able to hire Indian marketing and production consultants
to undertake market research and plan the new facility; they can identify and visit foreign factories to
study different production techniques; machinery suppliers can suggest potential buyers; and, if near the
Indian border, they can access labor. However, even in the case of this firm, the facility established is a
pilot plant to test the market and uses old technology and available labor. To be internationally
competitive, the firm wants to make a leap in technology - and to use technology and labor skills which
are beyond the capacity of India to provide (as India liberalizes, firms need globally competitive
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technology to compete with third-country manufacturers on the Indian market). However, with its
experience of recent policy changes, the firm is hesitant to make the technology leap.
Smaller firms, such as Firm Eleven and Firm Thirteen, have difficulties in identifying appropriate
markets, the technology they require, and in preparing business plans and accessing funds. It is more
common with such firms for things to go wrong. In the case of both these firms, second-hand equipment
was defective, additional machinery was needed, and unexpected alterations to premises may be required.
Foreign engineers unexpectedly had to be hired by both firms to resolve their problems. In the case of
Firm Thirteen, the acquisition of technology took over twice the time planned and the cost doubled.
Meanwhile, at the time of planning, the price of timber was Nu70/cft, and within three months of starting
production the price was NuI30/cft -jeopardizing the firm's market development activities.
BOX 4.2: FIRM ELEVEN'S ATTEMIPTS TO SOURCE NEW MACHINERY
The firm was established in 1999 by a former government employee with no knowledge of the wood sector. When
it started, it obtained information on machinery from the Woodcraft Center. Recently, it decided to manufacture
mouldings for the construction industry. Learning that it needed to purchase a Weinig four-head moulder, it
obtained a price of US$120,000 from the European manufacturer. The firm could not access the finance and was
not sure whether the size of the market would justify the expenditure even if it could access finance.
When the World Bank wood-sector expert interviewed the firm and discovered this, he contacted a second-hand
machinery supplier and within 24 hours had offers of a range of suitable Weinig machines from US$9,77.5 to
US$28,750. Also he identified an independent technician who for US$500 would visit the machines to ensure they
were in good order and would suit the needs of the Bhutanese firm. The firm is now considering the purchase of
two additional different machines.
The wood sector, for optimum benefits, should upgrade its technology in primary processing (saw-
milling), and gradually upgrade downstream processes. At present, the sector is the weakest in saw-
milling with all mills working at low capacity. Since all the equipment is depreciated and premises
freehold, too many firms remain in business. None of the mills visited can get sufficient throughput to
justify new investment. Also, FDC's sawmilling activities add uncertainty. As a result, there is
considerable inefficiency and downstream firms suffer. Due to these inefficiencies, some smaller
downstream firms are investing in sawmilling equipment, thus reducing capacity in the sawmills further,
and diverting the attention of downstream firms from their core business.
Labor and management. The absence of skilled labor is a commonly expressed problem. There are,
however, some aspects which are particularly relevant to the wood sector. First, as much of the sector's
output is bought by the government in which the contract goes to the lowest bidder, there is a tendency to
hire the cheapest labor. Second, it is unrealistic for firms to skill labor if they do not have access to single
species timbers and cannot export semi-finished products. Third, skilled woodworkers from the
Woodcraft Center are too costly for many firms to hire, and there is a mismatch between the output of the
Center and the needs of firns, as described in Box 4.1.
Productivity is low in firms, even where they have reasonable machinery, because of poor management as
well as low labor skills. For example, in one of the better firms a cupboard takes one man 42 work-hours
to make, whereas a European firm, given the same specification, estimated it would be made in 5.2 work-
hours. Furniture firms and sawmills rarely have batch production so work becomes repetitive and more
efficient. Consequently, they are unable to organize labor in the most effective way. As a result of poor
management and a lack of production runs, there is little division of labor in firms (one firm held the view
that, under a division of labor if something went wrong, the manager would not know whose fault it was).
Consequently many workers are equally unskilled. If firms gained scale economies, a division of labor
53
could be introduced, training targeted at potentially competent employees, while the other workers
become low-paid helpers.
Foreign investment. Bhutanese firms have already found that they need to upgrade their technology,
management, and the labor skills if they are to compete internationally - even standard Indian technology
and skills may be inadequate. This can either be done over many years using internal resources, or the
process can be kick-started by encouraging foreign investment. Several firms report that joint-ventures
interest them - some have made initial overtures to possible partners - but believe they are not allowed by
government to pursue these. Many twilight practices are encouraged if foreign firms cannot enter into
partnerships with Bhutanese firms, and the economy suffers many disadvantages and few benefits. If the
right conditions were prevailing for foreign investment (policy consistency, flexible labor policy, and
easier entry into Bhutan) foreign firms would be interested in the potentially favorable investment
conditions in Bhutan. Two or three appropriate joint-ventures could lead to a renaissance in the wood
sector and have considerable spillover effects into the economy.
Lack of market-led firms. Firms typically serve a small hinterland of walk-in clients or bid, in a
reactive way, for govermment contracts. Relying on the government, the biggest buyer of wooden
products, as a market is no help in raising standards to those required for export. Firms cannot one day
supply goods of one quality for the local market and, another day, goods of export quality. As
government contracts go to the lowest bidder, sawmilling, kiln-drying, and joinery skills are not put at a
premium. Nor do clients seem to adequately quality-check goods to ensure they conform to
specifications. Several firms noted their wish to make better standard products but their dependence on
govermment contracts prevented this. They observed that it was better for business to supply products
which lasted a few years, rather than to make better quality ones for a slightly higher price which would
last a lifetime.
The dependence on a local market in which business goes to the lowest price and marketing skills do not
attract a premium has meant that marketing is not practiced in many firms. Firms are not able to research
markets and discover niches they could service. They cannot, for example, develop competitive
advantages such as Bhutanese-inspired designs.22 Identifying niches is important even for the exporters
of boards. One end of the Indian market is being serviced by Indian "cottage industries" while the other
end is being serviced by Southeast Asian and European imports. In such circumstances, Bhutan must
position itself in a niche of the market in which such competition is minimal. In both these areas there are
probably market niches - for example, knock-down, Bhutanese-style, low occasional tables selling on the
U.S. market, and boards with exotic face veneers selling to contract buyers in India.
4. Potential
The potential of the sector is determined by the availability and cost of its inputs; its productivity; market
demand for its products; and the ability to identify and service market demand.
Availability and cost of inputs. As noted earlier, timber costs represent 40-50 percent and labor 15-20
percent of the typical wood product. Timber is potentially available at the right price and, to a greater
extent than at present, in the species, quantity, and sizes that firms require. In the case of hardwoods,
Bhutanese prices are lower than those of international competitors - but quality has to be assured. On the
other hand, softwood (pine) prices are slightly more expensive in Bhutan than in Indonesia though on the
Indian market firms report that mixed conifers from New Zealand and Scandinavia cost Rs200 compared
n One of the firms surveyed, which was making Bhutanese-inspired furniture, was getting US$5,000 per cu.m. of timber - more
than ten times what one producer of generic-style furniture was obtaining.
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with Rs 160-190 per cft for Bhutanese timber. Labor costs, particularly machine operator costs, are
cheaper than in many other countries.
In the longer term, it will be necessary to get at least some of the forests and the management practices
certified by an organization such as the Forestry Stewardship Council (FSC); otherwise, producits will
remain locked out of third-country markets. Certification will become increasing important in realizing
the value of Bhutan's timber resource.
Productivity. Productivity is among the lowest in the region. Productivity is a function of management,
the equipment used in firms, labor skills, and scale economies. Management could be improved if firms
could access foreign managers and consultants at subsidized costs - and technology transfer mechanisms
for this are available. These are not used in Bhutan at present. Production technology'can be improved -
firms are prepared to invest in equipment with consistent policy. The knowledge of what equipment to
buy and where to buy it can be obtained by hiring foreign managers and consultants. With these
improvements, labor skills could be upgraded. Scale economies can be developed if (a) semi-finished
products can be exported and (b) firms become aware of market opportunities for volume-produced
goods.
Market demand. There is a market demand in neighboring countries for wood products, although
current market awareness and marketing skills are insufficient. Firms specializing in the construction
sector note that the Indian construction industry is 60-70 percent dependent on imported timber and is
increasingly being penetrated by imported products as a result of the opening up of Indian markets. In
Bangladesh, where the market is sizeable compared with Bhutan and international trade is U.S. dollar
based, timber is scarce, machine operators more expensive than in Bhutan, and firms are no more efficient
than those in Bhutan. Looking at individual product categories, the potential is mixed at current
performance levels as the following shows:
Particle board. There is increasing competition in India from European imports, but prospects in
Bangladesh (the donor community), are good subject to satisfactory trade agreements.
Plywood. More competition is entering the Indian market from Southeast Asian and European suppliers,
and there has been an increase in local cottage industries. Sales of typical Bhutanese exporters have
declined significantly over the past three years - reportedly, due to unfavorable government policies. One
firm reports that its plywood is twice as expensive as that of Indonesian and Malaysian firms in the Indian
market.
Face veneers. At present, Bhutan imports face veneers but Indian firms would like to establish export
firms in Bhutan, provided government regulations permit, signifying good potential for veneer
manufacture.
Blockboard. Bhutanese blockboard is within the range of competitiveness. Bhutanese prices for 19mm
blockboard are Rs385 per sqm, compared with prices in India which range from Rsl50-450 per sqm. One
firm, which set up a plant after the semi-finished products' ban, reports that its blockboard sells for
slightly more than the Indian competitors, but is of better quality which is the key to market penetration.
Market potential is being constrained, as observed earlier, by the increasing market requirement for single
species cores.
Panel doors. Bhutanese panel doors and windows are competitive in India, though potential is hampered
because the frames cannot be exported as they fall under the ban on semi-finished products' export.
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Mouldings. Demand is high for mouldings, especially in Bangladesh, where firms specializing in
mouldings have difficulty getting timber, and one leading firm has closed. However, presently exports
from Bhutan are banned.
Furniture. Many firms see their best potential in the export of knock-down furniture. In the long term,
there are prospects but currently all firms lack design and marketing skills and, almost without exception,
production skills. Knock-down furniture requires production techniques which firms are incapable of at
present.
Handicrafts. There is considerable market potential for the export of wooden handicrafts. Prospective
distribution channels for traditional products include museum shops and Buddhist-supplies' vendors,
while wooden containers have potential as packaging for food products using, for example, timber off
cuts. Design and merchandising needs to be improved, but this can happen with the introduction of
technology transfer mechanisms.
Policy and business environment. As noted elsewhere, the biggest constraint on potential is the policy
environment. There can be no meaningful development without policy improvements and policy
consistency. Once this is put right, other business environment issues are generally favorable. The trade
regime, on the whole, is conducive to exports. For example, firms which truck goods to Mumbai report
no transport problems. However, some details in the SAARC agreement - for example, particle board
exported to Bangladesh is subject to the 765 tariff- may not be favorable to the wood sector; and trans-
shipping of goods at borders is an unnecessary problem.
Conclusion. Bhutan has excellent prospects for developing its wood sector provided (a) adequate timber
is harvested and made available in single species; (b) the export of semi-finished products is allowed; (c)
conditions are favorable for firms to upgrade their technology and gain scale economies; (d) design talent
can be accessed; and (e) marketing skills improve. Nearly all firms have looked to India for exports, but
there may be more potential in Bangladesh in the short- to medium-term. Handicrafts have third-country
potential. In the long-term, it is likely that bulky products, such as panel products, will be sold in
neighboring countries, while smaller, more-downstream products will be sold in third-countries, e.g., the
United States and Japan, in addition to some regional market sales..
S. Recommendations for the Sector
The following recommendations are proposed in areas of concern to private-sector manufacturing
industry and do not consider forestry policy and policy implementation - such as the rollout of more
FMUs to increase the supply of timber, which is important but beyond the scope of this chapter.
Availability of preferred raw materials
The role of Forestry Development Corporation (FDC). The government should examine and regularize
the FDC's contradictory roles as both an agent for the Ministry of Agriculture's forestry policy and, at the
same time, an agent in the development of the manufacturing industry.
Facilitating industry's timber needs. The Ministry of Agriculture and FDC should make available,
through auction to industry, the preferred species, grades, and sizes of timber in single-species lots. This
should be supported by (a) auditing industry on a regular basis to identify the species, sizes, and grades of
timber it requires for value-adding production; (b) minimizing the time taken from felling to auction; and
56
(c) informing industry in advance of the species/grades/sizes that are likely to be made available for
auction, so that firms can do medium-term planning.23
Giving FDC the tools it needs. FDC should be empowered in its work by (a) introducing electronic
systems to help audit the needs of industry and to disseminate information on auctions to local and
international buyers; (b) providing the equipment and human resources to make its auctioning more
efficient; and (c) permitting it to speedily dispose of timber (in international open auctions or by other
means without the Ministry of Agriculture delaying the process) that does not serve the value-adding
needs of local industry..
It is suboptimal for FDC to introduce new "recommended" practices if it does not have the resources to
implement them. It is inadvisable to implement some of the recommended practices and not others.
Therefore, it may be preferable to introduce new practices in pilot areas/depots to minimize cost. Any
pilot implementation should be monitored, cost-benefit studies undertaken, practices modified as
necessary, and the pilot scheme rolled out when proven. The government should seek external funding
where necessary to implement the raw materials' recommendations.
Supportive policy towards manufacturers
Planned, phased, and consistent policy. The government should recognize that firms need to look up to
ten years ahead when planning their activities, and that financial institutions need to be sure that their
risks will not be unreasonably affected by changes in government policy. Policy changes need to be
introduced in a planned and phased manner with advance consultation with relevant parties. The
activities of all the government agencies dealing with the wood sector - whether as suppliers of timber or
as end users of timber - should be coordinated. For example, there should be coordination between the
Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Trade. The impact of construction projects and government
procurement on the manufacturing industry - the responsibility of several ministries - should be forecast
and relevant parties appraised.
Removing the semi-finished products' ban. The government should modify the ban on semi-finished
products and recognize the importance of semi-finished products as a source of income for manufacturers;
as a vehicle to introduce new technology and upgrade worker skills; and as a means to develop marketing
skills and penetrate foreign markets. The government should investigate and introduce other measures to
control the export of unprocessed and primary-processed products -such as improved monitoring of
timber movements - rather than by banning semi-finished products.
Trade agreements. Regulations in bi-lateral and regional trade agreements that hamper the export of
value-added products should be renegotiated, and the haulage of goods across borders should be
simplified to reduce delays, damage to goods, and unnecessary costs.
FDC sawmills. The government should also consider privatizing the FDC sawmills as the public sector
should be seeking to withdraw from activities which can be better undertaken by the private sector. The
FDC sawmills may, in fact, be imnpeding the inflow of private investment into sawmilling.
Government purchasing. Government should introduce measures whereby quality is given a premium in
the awarding of contracts to industry and which would encourage factory-based, rather than construction-
site-based, processing of building products. In the case of the former, independent monitors could
23 FDC believes it could make medium-term infornation available based on the Forest Management Unit (FMU) plans.
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annually rank approved contractors and award them points for quality and, for example, after-sales
service. These points could be translated into a price premium when contractors bid for government
contracts.
Dialogue between industry and government. Increased emphasis should be placed on dialogue between
government and the private sector. The establishment of a wood-sector association has been a substantial
step forward. It is recommended that the association concentrates on a few key issues for a specific
period when lobbying government - and that these are supported by all interests - too often different tiers
in industry have different priorities, are divided, and less is achieved.
Forestry certification. The forestry department should become aware of, and plan to introduce over time
the measures needed for forests to become certified by organizations such as the FSC. The prospect of
certification would be valuable in attracting FDI and would, in the longer term, assist manufacturers in
penetrating third-country markets.
Access to appropriate technology and labor
Technology transfer mechanisms/incentives. The government should encourage the private sector to
acquire technology, competent management, and skill its labor by providing and/or supporting technology
transfer incentives and mechanisms. These could include matching grant schemes; the use of retired
executive schemes; the hire of skilled foreign staff; and foreign direct investment. Eligible activities
could include production, marketing, design, management, joint-venture development, training, and
business association development. Emphasis should be on primary processing (sawmilling and kiln-
drying). Process-specific training should be fostered, especially short-term courses on individual topics to
individual firms or groups of similar firms. These mechanisms could be supported by one, or more of the
following: the World Bank (which has supported matching-grant schemes in many other countries); tax
breaks; and incentives funded by, for example, a levy on auction sales.
Immigration. Immigration regulations should be eased to facilitate the entry into Bhutan of foreign
buyers and technology providers.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE TOURISM SECTOR IN BHUTAN
1. Present Situation
Background. Tourism is a sector with important earnings potential for the Bhutanese economy. With a
pristine environment, nature parks with rare and endangered species, high mountains, excellent trekking
routes, a culture that is considered both rich and unique, as well as the natural warmth and friendliness of
the Bhutanese people - Bhutan represents a unique tourism product. However, development of the sector
has always been - and will continue to be - developed with an eye to a high-end tourism market. This
focus on low numbers of high-paying tourists is dictated by several factors. Most important is the
country's desire to ensure that Bhutan's unique and delicate cultural heritage is not overpowered by large
numbers of visitors entering the country - overwhelming and even "polluting" this nation, which has only
recently begun to cautiously open up to the outside world. The Nepali experience of reasonably
unregulated "backpacking" tourism is not a model that the Government of Bhutan wishes to pursue.
Second, facilities and services (hotels, airline services, roads) in Bhutan are limited and cannot cater to a
large number of tourists coming into the country.
Bhutanese tourism began only around 1974 when several lodges were built for foreign dignitaries who
came into Bhutan for the new King's coronation. Tourism was given a boost in 1988 when Druk Air -
the national airline - commenced its jet plane operation. Prior to this all incoming tourists had to travel
into the country by road. Until 1991, Bhutan had only one tourism operator - the Bhutan Tourism
Corporation - which was privatized in that year and the market freed up to other private-sector
competition. At the time, 35 companies applied for tourism licenses and, after the cancellation of two
licenses, 33 companies operated the sector throughout most of the 1990s. A further liberalization took
place in January 1999, when a more lenient attitude toward entry was adopted with the dropping of a prior
requirement that tour operators provide a bank guarantee of Nul 00,000 (a proviso intended to ensure that
only serious operators received a license). The market currently operates with around 75 domestic tour
operators - not all of whom are active players in the market - only a handful of which are of any real size.
(Annex Eight shows tourist arrivals by tour operator.)
Growth of Tourism in Bhutan. As a result of the above policies, as well as other factors, Bhutan
receives only a very limited number of tourists. In 2000, a record year, 7,559 tourists came into Bhutan
by air and a further 13,000 came into the country by road from India. Despite this very low number, it
represents a continuous rapid increase in tourist arrivals over the decade with an average annual rate of
increase of over 17 percent in entrants by air for the ten-year period - albeit from a very low base.
Growth rates have, however, fluctuated widely over this period varying from 4 percent in 1997 to 36
percent in 1991. Chart 5.1 shows tourist arrivals over the period 1984 - 2000, while Annex Nine shows
arrivals by year and by month.
Despite the increase in tourism most hotels remain small and underused. There are an estimated 560 hotel
rooms in the country, and this should permit 204,400 room nights to be sold per annum. By comparison,
in 1997, 5,363 tourists spent an average of 7 nights each resulting in 37,000 room nights maximum,
assuming that each tourist stayed in a separate room. Even with this unrealistic assumption, occupancy
levels were below 20 percent against an industry benchmark of 60 percent.
59
Chart 5.1
Tourist Arrivals into Bhutan
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Anecdotally, the profile of a tourist entering Bhutan has tended to be a professional or a retiree. Staff of
the Department of Tourism, however, believe that this profile is slowly changing to that of a "family"
tourist. Although relative rankings have changed over time, tourists from Europe, the United States, and
Japan (in that order) tend to be most important for Bhutan. In 2000, for example, Europeans made up 38
percent of all tourists (Germans 8.8 percent; British 7.9 percent; French 5.3 percent; Dutch 4.7 percent;
and Italians 2.1 percent); Americans made up 36 percent; and Japanese made up almost 12 percent.
Americans tend to stay for longer periods while Japanese stay for shorter periods. A table showing a
breakdown of tourist arrivals by nationality is given in Annex Seven. Repeat tourism is apparently low -
possibly a consequence of the high cost of traveling to Bhutan and the relatively low quality of tourism
service provided (one recent study states that the average hotel in Bhutan "would struggle to reach 2-star
status"). Thus, value for money is poor.
Recent developments. A recent and important development has been the approval of two new joint
ventures in the Bhutan hotel industry. In a first for the country, the foreign owners (both based out of
Singapore) will be permitted to hold a majority 60 percent shareholding in the Bhutanese operation. Of
the remaining 40 percent shareholding, a minimum of 10 percent will be sold on the local stock exchange
and the remaining shares will be sold to a local promoter. Both groups are currently involved in hotel
chains within Asia and are expected to provide a high-cost, high-quality service in a chain of hotels across
the country (in locations including Thimphu, Paro, Phunaka, Trongsa, and Bumthang). This exciting new
Foreign Direct Investment may well have a considerable impact in terms of raising international tourism
standards in Bhutan (30 recent employees who will work in the new hotels are already undergoing hotel
training in Singapore) and shaking up the local industry. The hotels are anticipated to commence
operations during the ninth plan period.
The tourism sector is overseen by a Tourism Development Committee, which is chaired by the Minister
of Trade and Industry. This multisectoral committee includes representatives of the Finance Ministry, the
Home Ministry, and representation from the private sector - reflecting the importance of the sector to the
economy. A Tourism Development Fund also exists, which is a one time $10 charge on tourists. This
Fund is managed by the Department of Tourism and is used for the development of public goods within
the industry. The Ministry also provides training facilities in, inter alia, trekking, tourist guides, and
cooking.
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The Department of Tourism within the Ministry of Trade and Industry is currently working on a draft
Tourism Policy which is anticipated to be completed in early 2002. A Tourism Master Plan is expected to
be ready in time for the Ninth Five-Year Plan. A challenge for Bhutan will be to define a balanced
national policy. This policy should allow for a modest increase in tourist numbers up to the level of total
available bedroom capacity (currently 560 rooms) - throughout the year - rather than the current annual
occupancy levels of around 20 percent. To achieve this goal, promotion campaigns will be essential to
increase the level of business, particularly during the low season.
Legal environment. As the tourism industry was only established less than 30 years ago, to date, no
formal laws have been enacted to regulate the sector. This poses some advantages in terms of flexibility.
However, over the longer term, it is desirable that a comprehensive set of laws governing tourism should
be put in place. There are many good legal precedents available from other countries, which could be
researched via the World Tourism Organization. The outline of a regulatory system does, however, exist
which could provide a partial basis for future laws.
The regulations currently in force include:
1. Trekking in Bhutan Regulations, 1996 - in which the conditions specified are reasonable and
provide a good approach to protecting the environment.
2. Bhutan Filming Regulations, 1995 - these rules are very restrictive and antipromotional in
tone. The conditions positively discourage visits by overseas film and television companies.
This is in stark contrast to most other tourist destinations, which are adopting the opposite
policy.
3. Rules for Familiarization - visits by Overseas Travel Agencies, 2000 - these rules are
restrictive and also need to be liberalized. In addition to owners, travel agency counter staff
should be encouraged to visit Bhutan. Groups of up to 20 persons, including travel writers,
should be encouraged to visit at the same time.
4. Bhutan Tour Handlers - in recent years rules for the issue of licenses have been greatly
relaxed. The result is that there is now a proliferation of tour operators relative to the volume
of business (31 operators managed between 40 and 1,322 customers each, while 45 operators
looked after between 0 and 40 clients). A case now exists for halting future license
applications and encouraging a number of the smaller tour handlers to merge, thus saving on
overheads and increasing profitability.
Employment. In common with the rest of the private sector in Bhutan, the tourism trade is not organized
or structured from the perspective of either the employers or the employees. The employment situation in
the hotel sector is shown in Table 5.1:
Table 5.1 Employment in the Tourism Sector
Type of Staff Numbers Employed
General Staff 678
Skilled Workers 612
Unskilled Workers 135
Total 1,425
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Data on other tourism activities is not available. Trade unions do not exist and hoteliers are not yet fully
organized. Nonetheless, informal discussions with hotel owners and tour handlers indicate the following:
1) the industry operates with a very low wage base (a chef earns US$0.83 per hour and a porter
earns US$0.14);
2) staff operate with very long working hours (13 hours per day, 6 days per week);
3) there is an over reliance on untrained staff;
4) there is virtually no formal training and most training takes place on the job;
5) senior staff training is confined to short-term overseas courses;
6) the establishment of more formal training facilities based in Bhutan is generally considered
highly desirable;
7) there is a reluctance on the part of many Bhutanese workers to undertake menial type work,
such as cleaning;
8) there is a consequent over reliance on Indian workers - who are prepared to work for minimal
wages and who undertake menial tasks; and
9) government policy is directed at reducing the number of such immigrant workers.
Contribution to the economy. Tourism receipts and royalty payments to the government are important
sources of revenue for the country and the government budget. Gross foreign exchange earnings from
tourism in 2000, at US$10.5 million - were 18 percent higher than the previous year - the approximate
rate of growth in gross earnings experienced from tourism over the entire decade of the 1 990s. This level
of foreign exchange earnings makes tourism Bhutan's most important source of hard currency foreign
exchange receipts from goods and services exports. (Electricity, which is a larger earner of foreign
exchange, is sold in rupees which are not considered a hard currency; and donor receipts are a
significantly larger source of hard currency resources.) These receipts, however, do not include other
important sources of hard currency earnings from tourism including the airfares to Druk Airlines and
expenditures by tourists once they are in the country (handicrafts, drinks, souvenirs, and so on). It is
estimated that the inclusion of these additional tourism receipts may almost double the amount of hard
currency earnings from this source. In other countries of a similar scale to Bhutan, tourist spending on
souvenirs commonly exceeds 10 percent of gross earnings.
The government's royalty share of these receipts were $4.1 million in 2000, purportedly making it the
fourth largest source of domestic revenue for the government after Chukka Hydro Power; the Department
of Power; and Telecommunications. Government receipts from tourism have been increasing at an even
faster rate than hard currency earnings - rising by 33 percent per annum, on average, over the nine-year
period between 1991 and 2000. The government's share in gross earnings from tourism have also been
slowly increasing and currently stand at around 40 percent of these direct earnings from the sector.
Movements in arrivals, gross earnings, and government revenue from tourism over the 1990s is shown in
Table 5.2.
It should be noted that these numbers - tourist arrivals and earnings from tourists - do not include Indian
tourists. Indians can enter Bhutan without a visa; there is little control over their entry, and it is also
difficult to collect data on or differentiate between Indians who visit Bhutan for tourism purposes and the
large number of Indians who enter Bhutan daily for other reasons (such as work). The Department of
Tourism has no data (although it estimates that the number of arrivals may be as high as 13,000 per
annum) on what the financial contribution of Indians to the tourism industry may be.
Current government policy. One of the key policy measures is the government's tourism pricing
policy. Bhutan maintains a low level of high-end tourism by imposing a high entry price. Tourists
coming into the country must spend (upfront) US$200 per day during the peak season (February, March,
April and September, October, November) and US$165 per day in the remaining "lean season" months.
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Tour operators are required to give the Royal Monetary Authority (the central bank) with 80 percent of
these funds (US$ 180 and US$132 per day per tourist), which is exchanged for its ngultrum equivalent,
the remaining 20 percent is used to pay the foreign tour operator. These funds can be charged against
meals, internal transport, accommodation, and guides. However, it does not include travel to and from
Bhutan, the cost of alcohol within Bhutan, and any shopping and personal expenses. The differential
pricing policy was reintroduced in 1999 - but the Department of Tourism feels that tourism demand is not
all that elastic in Bhutan, and hence the differential pricing policy has not induced many additional
tourists to come during the lean season and thereby iron out the intense seasonality in tourism arrivals.
Table 5.2: Tourism Arrivals, Gross Earnings, and Government Revenue, 1999 to 2000
Year Total Gross earnings Government revenue Share of government
arrivals (US$ million) (US$ million) revenue to gross earnings
(%)
1990 1,538 1.91
1991 2,106 1.99 0.31 15.65%
1992 2,748 2.97 0.98 33.10%
1993 2,984 3.23 1.13 34.99%
1994 3,971 3.97 1.39 35.00%
1995 4,765 5.83 2.04 34.98%
1996 5,138 6.52 2.32 35.64%
1997 5,363 6.55 2.48 37.80%
1998 6,203 7.98 3.02 37.83%
1999 7,158 8.88 3.46 38.96%
2000 7,559 10.50 4.10 39.05%
Source: Deparanent of Tourism, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Thimphu
This lack of elasticity, however, may also result from the small differential in price offered between the
two seasons plus the government's policy of receiving a $65 royalty from every "peak season" tourist and
$63 from every "lean season" tourist. As some tour operators are suspected of passing along packages at
prices lower than the advertised rates ($200 and $165), it is the compulsory payment (the royalty paid to
government) which may well be the more binding constraint. To this end the Department of Tourism has
recently recommended a reduction in the government royalty for "lean season" tourists from $63 to $55.
For the future, the government could consider three possible options for pricing policy:
1. No change in the present arrangements;
2. The total liberalization of the market, making access to Bhutan the same as any other
destination (visa and passport only required), as well as open choice of travel routes,
hotels and meals;
3. Compromise - modification of current arrangements.
The choice involves complex economic, cultural, and social issues - both positive and negative. It is
recommended that a special commission, including both public and private sectors and an internationally
recognized tourism expert who is nominated by the World Tourism Organization, should be established.
This commission should be given the task of researching the issue and coming up with recommendations
for decision by government. The aim should be to maintain the high-value/low-volume approach,
maximizing revenues from tourism, yet also seeking to ensure reduced seasonality to achieve these goals.
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Evolving government policy. Government policy on tourism is currently at an important phase of
evolution. The overall situation is controlled by regulations - such as Rules & Regulations for Tour
Operations, 1999 - as well as by precedent. The Department of Tourism recently prepared an important
document on the tourism sector, and, at a later date, the intention is to enact specific legislation dealing in
detail with all aspects of the tourism industry. Current government policy is defined in the Rules and
Regulations for Tour Operations, 1999, as follows:
"While tourism operations have been liberalized consistent with the overall objective of
strengthening the private sector, sustainable tourism development based on high value - low
volume shall remain the guiding principle for allfuture tourism policies. "
The tourism sector document contains a useful list of the issues that need to be tackled to put Bhutanese
tourism on a more sound footing. This report contains a situational analysis as well as areas of concern to
the Department of Tourism. It focuses on problems such as the lack of new products (new trek routes);
the extreme seasonality of tourism in Bhutan; the lack of private sector investment (especially in the east);
a lack of community participation; low and uneven standards of tourist accommodation; and a lack of
clear policy guidelines and other related legislation. In response to these shortcomings, the document
seeks to develop a vision and mission for the sector with well-defined strategies and programs for its
future development. It then focuses on institutional capacity building, skills development, the
development and maintenance of infrastructure, and information and publicity.
However, the approach adopted is somewhat abstract and lacks specificity. Following consultation with
interested parties, a suggested (more direct strategy) would be to make the report more detailed and
specific by presenting it in a new and expanded format, which would: describe necessary actions; provide
a timescale for implementation, as well as estimated costs; allocate personal responsibility for actions;
and incorporate reporting and centralized monitoring systems.
2. Costs and competitiveness
International comparisons. Bhutan does not compete for tourist business on the basis of cost. In effect
it is a special niche market of great appeal to particular clients who are seeking a unique holiday
experience. Costs are quoted below compared with costs for similar remote locations elsewhere in the
same region. These figures (obtained from travel agents) are for a seven-day visit, sharing a twin room,
inclusive of all meals, transport services, guide, etc., but excluding air fare.
Table 5.3 Comparative Cost of a Seven-Day Tourism Package to Five Countries (2001)
Location Approximate
Charge
Bhutan $1,260
Nepal $ 546
Cambodia $ 615
India $ 755
Laos $ 960
Cost structure of the industry. Despite the relatively low wage levels, reasonably cheap food costs, and
reasonably high room and food charges - most hotels in Bhutan either lose money or only just break
even. The primary reasons for this is the low occupancy rates in hotels, which averages no more than 20
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percent annually. The largest tour handlers, on the other hand appear to be quite profitable because of
their ability to operate with low overheads and a minimum level of capital investment.
Distribution of tourism revenue. The data quoted in Table 5.4, collected from various tour operators, is
indicative of the distribution of tourism revenue rather than being completely accurate, due to
assumptions that had to be made. The basis of the calculation was as follows: (a) individual purchases of
an all-inclusive Bhutan Holiday from an overseas retail travel agent, based in Bangkok; (b) high season;
(c) group size of eight persons; and (d) couples sharing a room. The total cost for a seven-day visit was
US$2,040, broken down as follows:
Table 5.4: Cost of a Seven Day Visit to Bhutan
Cost component Percent US dollars
Air ticket Druk Air (Bangkok-Paro return) 38.2 779.28
Tourguideandtransport 3.0 61.20
Meals 6.6 134.64
Hotel 13.1 267.24
Government Royalty 22.3 454.92
Bhutan Sales Tax 2.2 44.88
Tourism Development Fund 0.5 10.20
Other costs, including tour operator's profit 14.1 287.64
Total 100.0 2,040.00
The government collects a high proportion of total revenue - 24.5 percent from royalties and Bhutan sales
tax. This is in addition to 38.2 percent collected indirectly from Druk Air, the state-owned airline. In the
longer-term interests of the tourism industry, the government should be encouraged to calibrate the levy,
which it charges to ensure higher hotel occupancy throughout the year, and invest some of the funds
earned from tourism in marketing and product improvement.
Critical success factors. The competitiveness of Bhutan's tourism sector is determined by'a number of
critical success factors, which include the reputation of the country; access to the country; the
accommodation available and its standard; visitor attractions; and the development of synergies between
the various elements of private-sector development policy. An assessment of Bhutan's strengths,
weaknesses, opportunities, and threats is contained in Annex Five, and the results of a small visitor
survey, which was undertaken as part of this report, is provided in Annex Six.
Reputation of the country. Many potential tourists, even well-traveled professionals, are unaware of
Bhutan's location or its features. In addition, the reputation of a country is not only dependent on its own
efforts, but is also affected by events in countries which are in the same general region. This is confirmed
by events surrounding the 2001 World Travel Market - see Box 5.1.
The government of Bhutan, understandably, views large-scale tourism as a threat to its culture. For this
reason a generally low-key approach has been adopted to marketing - in line with the government's
policy of "low volume/high value tourism." Bhutan relies almost exclusively on the efforts of overseas
retail travel agents to create tourist business for the country. Table 5.5 shows how the various markets are
served.
Bhutanese tour handlers make contact with these agents at tourism trade fairs held annually in London
and elsewhere. Their efforts are also assisted by the Department of Tourism and the Bhutanese Tour
Operators Association, who contribute towards travel costs and the leasing of stand space. The relatively
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low occupancy rates quoted by hotel owners, approximately 70 percent in high season and 30 percent in
low season, and the possibility of routing more tourists via land entry points (due to limitations of Paro
airport), suggest that a well-organized, focused marketing campaign could increase the level of business
to near maximum current capacity.
Table 5.5: Location of Overseas Travel Agents
Number of
Location Agents
Australia I
U.S. and Canada 10
Britain 8
Germany 2
Other European 4
Source: Lonely Planet Guide
BOX 5.1: 2002 - AN APPROPRIATE YEAR FOR PUBLIC-PRIVATE SECTOR COOPERATION IN
MARKETING
This chapter highlights the importance of marketing - an area in many countries where there is often cooperation
between the government and the private sector. For example, at the World Travel Market (WTM) in London,
one of the sector's leading showcases, it is common for private-sector operators to exhibit on "national space"
which has been coordinated, if not partly funded by, the exhibitors' government. Surveyed firms lamented that
the Bhutanese government does not go along with this practice to the same level as competing countries -
particularly in view of the income the government earns from the sector.
Bhutanese private-sector firms that were represented at WTM in November 2001, considered the show a good
opportunity for the government to "fly the flag." Especially to capture market share from other countries in the
region where political events have had a negative impact on business - and where market-based tour operators
specializing in countries along the Himalayan Chain are looking for opportunities to fill gaps in their product
offering caused by unrest in their core countries.
The views of the private sector are supported by international tourism specialists at the WTM who opine that at
times of difficulty in the trade, it is essential for governments to support their private sector. They confirm that
2001 was just such an occasion with the economic downturn in Europe and the United States accentuated by
more recent political conflicts. They note the need for general image building in the context of the scanty public
perception of the region with confusion over the location of Bhutan, Kashmir, Afghanistan, and Nepal. They
cite the response in other countries, such as Ireland, where the government allocated an additional US$11.0
million for marketing, recognizing that 2002 will be a "very challenging year for tourism."
Access to Bhutan. As mentioned elsewhere, access to Bhutan, particularly for third-country visitors, is
limited. Since access by air is restricted, it is important that the tourist season is spread more evenly
throughout the year to optimize limited air travel resources. Several measures could be taken to spread
the season, such as researching patterns of tourism in similar destinations to identify how these countries
spread the market; identifying what features are present in Bhutan in the low season and promoting these
features to specialized interest groups - including ornithologists, Tibetan medicine devotees, Buddhist
devotees, and so on.
Accommodation. Standards of accommodation, as discussed further below, are generally poor -
particularly for high-priced tourism. While it is important to improve standards (as the new FDI-
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supported hotels will do), there are ways in which more basic accommodation could be made a feature of
Themed Holidays - whereby tourists traveling to different parts of the country could stay in more rustic
accommodation and eat food traditional to that area. Furthermore, if hotels have poor physical amenities,
greater effort should be made to upgrade standards of service in compensation.
Visitor attractions. The main focus of activity in Bhutan is on outdoor pursuits, such as trekking, touring,
and cultural events. However, more complementary activities are increasingly becoming available, all of
which enhance the visitor experience and greatly improve the prospects for low-season tourism. These
include museums, craft shops, historic monuments, as well as music/dance training institutions and open
air markets. Further new product development - such as developing a monastery as a tourism showcase,
establishing a one-stop Bhutan Experience Center, and so on - should be a continuing activity to increase
current tourist levels and help secure repeat visits.
Synergy. Bhutan has limited resources to develop its industry, whether the industry is tourism or
manufacturing. It is important that synergies be sought between the different elements of private-sector
development - so activities in one area leverage opportunities in another area. For example, former
tourists could become buyers of Bhutan's niche exports, wooden products could be developed as
souvenirs including packaging for agro-processed products.24
3. Impediments to Growth
While big advances have been made in developing the sector in recent years, there are several
impediments to growth such as seasonality of the market; access to Bhutan; tourism infrastructure; and
standards of accommodation. In addition, the proposed new structure of the Department of Tourism itself
could stimulate, or constrain, tourism development.
Seasonality of the market. The two main seasons are in the spring from March to May and in the
autumn from September to November. This seasonality coincides with important festivals in Paro in the
spring (March); Thimphu and Wangdi in late September/early October; and Bumthang in November.
Chart 5.2 below, which indicates tourist arrivals on a monthly basis, shows the extremely bimodal pattern
of tourist entry over the year. This pattern is further exacerbated by the advent of the monsoons over the
period June through August and the colder weather in the Himalayas from December through February.
A final contributing factor to seasonality is that Bhutanese tourism is often sold as a package in
conjunction with visits to India and Nepal ,and the tour operators in these two countries have traditionally
targeted European and North American tourists for these spring and fall periods. Hence, to some extent
Bhutan, with its limited outreach in selling its tourism services, is at the mercy of the tour operators in
these two neighboring countries.
Access to Bhutan. Access is complicated by the fact that Druk Air (the national airline) is the only
carrier flying into the country. The authorities claim that it is not their intention to exclude other carriers
from flying into Bhutan, but that there is very little interest from regional or other carriers. This is due to
the intense seasonality of passenger traffic, the need for special planes to negotiate the landing strip in
Paro, and the perceived lack of commercial viability of such a route. Currently, access has been
complicated further by the fact that Druk Air, which normally operates with two airplanes, has had one of
its planes out of commission for over a year. Hence, in September 2001, there was only one 75-seat
airplane servicing the country. This is not a problem during six months of the year - but during the
tourist season Druk Air can hardly handle the level of passenger capacity required of it. This has led to
delays and other inconveniences for tourists, which can damage Bhutan's reputation as a tourist
24 Although a specialist field, wooden handicrafts valued at US$11.5 million are sold to tourists in the Caribbean each year.
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destination. During the spring 2001 season, Druk Air chartered Buddha Air (a Nepali domestic private
airline) to fly their 19-seat aircraft into Bhutan to help relieve the pressure on Druk. Greater use of
external airlines to service the routes during the high season periods may well be one method of relieving
the access problems currently created by Druk Airlines' limited seating capacity. This may, however, be
complicated by the fact that the high season in countries such as Nepal, where the additional airline seat
capacity is most likely to originate, is also likely to coincide with the high season in Bhutan - thus
potentially limiting their ability to service additional routes over this busy period.
Chart 5.2
BHUTAN: Tourist Entry by Month (1998 to 2000)
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Druk Air intends to purchase new aircraft in the foreseeable future - with a substantial impact on the
country's holdings of foreign exchange reserves (the estimated cost of the two new aircraft is US$35
million against foreign exchange reserves of around $300 million - or over 10 percent). It is telling to
note that Druk Air, which traditionally has operated at a loss, is reported to have done better financially
over the past 12 months when it has been operating with only one, as opposed to two, aircraft. Lastly, it
is noted that Druk Air operates with what is known as the "Druk Air Paradox" in that its busiest flying
times coincide with some of the worst periods of unpredictable weather - making flying into Paro (which
can only be undertaken visually) a particularly difficult task.
Infrastructure for tourism. The quality of a country's infrastructure also has a profound effect on the
manner in which a country's economy and tourist industry develops. The following is a brief synopsis of
the main infrastructural impediments to tourism development in Bhutan.
Roads, main and secondary - the engineering challenges involved in the construction and maintenance of
Bhutan's roads are formidable, due mainly to the country's terrain. Upgrading these roads will take many
years and substantial financial resources. The courtesy and driving skills of most coach and truck drivers
assist, to some extent, in alleviating the problem. Nonetheless, poor roads and particularly land slides
can, on occasion, inconvenience tourists coming into and traveling around the country.
Aviation - currently a single airline, Druk Air, provides services to Paro International Airport. The
company operates in difficult circumstances and is constrained by the high altitude of Paro airport, the
lack of facilities for night flying, the lack of a convenient alternative airport when planes are diverted by
fog, high fuel costs in operating its two Aerospace 146 aircraft, and the necessity of reducing seating
capacity below 76, in the event of high temperatures.
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It is now being suggested that international aviation consultants, with specialist experience of flying
aircraft at high altitudes, should advise on these issues - with respect to additional airport sites, types of
aircraft as well as helicopters, landing pads, and so on.
Telecommunications - while major investment has been made in both telephone and IT facilities in recent
years, standards fall short of international requirements. The main weaknesses include a lack of direct
dial facilities from hotel bedrooms; poor signal quality with international calls; no facilities for
prospective tourists to make bookings on the Internet; and a limited mobile phone network.
Emergency services - tourists and travel agents have a general expectation that emergency services will
be readily available in most destinations. These should include modem hospitals, ambulances including
helicopters, traffic police, as well as emergency phones at selected roadway locations. Very few, if any,
of these services are currently available in Bhutan. It is recommended that a committee, representing all
of the interests involved, should be established to make specific recommendations for action in this area.
Internal transport - an internal transport service, using mainly minibuses and operated by private
individuals, is the main means of transport from towns to the more remote rural areas. This type of
transport is also used to a limited extent by tourists, particularly those who originate from India. Private
bus operators indicate that their difficulties include: the fixing of fare levels by the government at
uneconomic levels; the requirement to operate particular services, even if there are no passengers; the loss
of some services due to terrorism close to the Indian border; increasing competition from private-car
owners; and the poor road conditions.
Finance and banking - there are two banks in Bhutan, which offer a basic array of banking facilities.
However, credit cards are not in general use, and when they are used, the service fees are extremely high.
This is a major limitation particularly when making bookings on the Internet. In addition, there are no
cash-dispensing machines, which are used extensively by tourists in other countries.
Standards of accommodation. Hotel accommodation is not generally viewed as being good value for
money and improvements are required. In addition, the internal grading system for "International" hotels
is limited in scope. Grades A, B, and C exist, but the difference between each category is not large. Most
hotels would currently qualify only for two-star international grading and while bedroom sizes are
generally adequate, a number of shortcomings are apparent - (a) beds are of poor quality; (b) sanitary
fittings are substandard; (c) many staff have limited training; and (d) d6cor is frequently dull.
Management structure of the Department of Tourism. A revised institutional structure for the
Department of Tourism could also better serve the needs of the tourism sector. The following two
organizational diagrams show the existing structure and a proposed new structure for the Department of
Tourism (part of the Ministry of Trade and Industry). The latter is considered more appropriate for
present and future needs for the following reasons:
* The current organogram is complex and staff at different levels are responsible to the director,
and there is no specific provision for marketing, which is a high priority.
* The proposed structure is based on commercial models that have worked in other countries. It
embodies clarity of function and emphasizes marketing rather than regulation.
* The proposed structure would be easily adaptable if it was decided to establish a public-private
Bhutan Tourist Board.
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Organogram of the Department of Tourism
l Dl Support staffl
| Plans & Program Division l Operation Divisionl
Staffing Program Infrastructure & Hotel Nature & Adventure Tourism Information & Accounts Visa & Statistics Section
Officer Development Section Section / Tourism Development Publicity Section Section
Program 
Assistant Assistant Assistant Assistant
Program Officer Program Officer Program Officer O 
{ Accountant Tour Accountant
Pool Staff: Office Secretary, Desather, Messen , Dis ( Payment3
Pool Staff. Office Secretary, Despatcher, Messenger, Drivers (3)
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Proposed Organogram, Department of Tourism, Bhutan
Executive Board
Minister of Trade and Industry, Chairman
(Sub-committee of government policy makers)
| Director Tourism Advisory Council
Division I Division 2 Division 3 Division 4 Division 5 Division 6
Senior Senior Senior Senior Senior Executive Senior
Executive Executive Executive New Executive Finance and Executive
Markeffng 8 Sales Regulafions, Product Human Resource rTeforation Administraffon
Standards Development & Technology
Transportation Training
Tourism Innovaffon Statisfics &
Center Information
Notes:
1. Senior Management line only shown.
2. An alternative option would be to establish an entity 'Bhutan Tourist Development Board" as above but governed by an independent board (with government and
private-sector nominees).
In any new structure, the various organizations with interests in tourism and the environment
should have an advisory role. Such organizations include the Association of Bhutanese Tour
Operators, the Natural Environment Commission, the Royal Society for the Protection of Nature,
the National Commission for Cultural Affairs, the Association of Hotel Owners, and BCCI.
4. Recommendations for the Tourism Sector
The following recommendations are made to enhance tourism in Bhutan:
Strategic Recommendations
1. Devise and implement a comprehensive master plan for tourism to include product
development and marketing. This plan should focus on new marketing and sales
arrangements; use IT to the maximum extent; reduce seasonality with expanded
visitor activities; increase annual hotel occupancy of up to 70 percent; provide
tourism training; offer more dependable air access; improved road standards;
encourage more tourist traveling by road via India; and introduce new products.
2. Restructure the Department of Tourism to conform with international best practice.
3. Establish a tourism training resource, such as a training institute or a partner with a
foreign training institution, which could provide training with a Bhutanese
orientation.
4. Encourage the establishment of tourism-specific employer and employee
organizations, particularly in the hotel industry.
5. Seek the advice of an international consultant regarding Bhutan's aviation and airport
needs.
6. Seek the advice of a specialist group regarding the future operation of internal
transport, including the pricing policy.
7. Establish an advisory committee for the development of emergency services.
8. Further leverage ecotourism as a major promotional element.
9. Establish consultative machinery for all tourism-related organizations.
10. Introduce an incentive scheme to encourage the upgrading of hotels.
11. Further explore the potential of tourism related to Buddhism.
New Product Development
1. Develop an existing, or a purpose-built Dzong or monastery as an interpretive center,
including actors and audiovisual facilities, with the cooperation of the religious and
other local authorities.
2. Establish a new form of evening entertainment for tourists, including a meal, music,
folklore and dance, in an appropriate setting.
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3. Establish new visitor attractions in Phuentsholing, as a means of extending the visitor
stay beyond one overnight stay (such as the Buddhist temple in the town square; the
Kharbandi Monastery occupied by monks; and a private-sector proposal to arrange
demonstrations of paper and incense making).
4. Provide a one-stop Bhutanese Experience Center to present history, folklore music,
art, religion, scenes from religious festivals, the monarchy, and the future vision for
Bhutan.
5. Develop an international Buddhist research and conference center to promote the
Tantric of Buddhism - the dominant religion in Bhutan - the foundation of which
dates back to 800 AD. (Buddhism was originally founded in 500 BC). This code for
living and system of values still dominates nearly every aspect of life in Bhutan,
including the arts, annual festivals, literature, and the laws of the land. Buddhist
monks from Bhutan participate in exchange visits with their colleagues from other
countries, and there is a growing interest in Buddhism in the West.
6. Further develop ecotourism products along the lines suggested at the September 2001
workshop arranged by the Department of Tourism including organizational strategies
- to coordinate all relevant organizations; product development such as protecting the
habitat of Black-Necked Cranes, traditional medicine products and health centers;
expanding domestic tourism; using new marketing tools, particularly the Internet;
developing human resources in the identified areas.
7. Upgrade existing attractions on a continuing basis, including the introduction of
seven-day opening hours, the introduction of costumed guides, and so on.
Ma.keting
1. Devise and implement a comprehensive marketing and sales campaign. This should
include a new expanded data base of potential overseas retail agents, using the
Internet and specialist directories; editions of Bhutanese Travel News in hard copy
and on the Internet; the use of e-mail for regular special offers and information
dissemination; ad hoc sales teams to visit overseas agents at regular intervals;
inviting travel writers to Bhutan from key markets; and the design of tourism
literature which is consistent in terms of design, content, and quality.
2. Greatly liberalize and relax current regulations for filming in Bhutan as well as
familiarization trips by travel agents and writers.
3. Create a new and comprehensive database for tourism to measure and monitor all
aspects of the industry. Some limited work is already being done but needs
strengthening. It would be beneficial to recruit a consultant, ideally from a national
tourism organization, to design and establish a suitable monitoring system for the
industry, and train local staff to manage and update it. Relevant data would include
the numbers of tourists and their origins; revenue earned; performance trends; overall
room occupancies; aircraft load factors; return on hotel and other investments;
satisfaction levels; why Bhutan was chosen for a holiday; income levels of visitors;
age group of visitors; activities undertaken, and customer satisfaction.
4. Undertake regular, comprehensive attitudinal surveys of tourists.
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5. Introduce holiday reservation arrangements via the Internet and toll-free phone
numbers. Both options could be under the direct control of the Department of
Tourism. The system could work with toll-free numbers being handled directly or by
a call center - with general enquiries processed and literature issued. An Internet
Web site should allow potential customers to make real-time reservations, which
could then be referred to an accredited overseas travel agent (an equitable
arrangement for the distribution of business could be devised).
6. Bhutan should participate fully in international events such as the U.N. International
Year of the Mountains 2002, or the International Year of Eco-Tourism 2002. Some
of these events would enable the country to obtain technology of immediate
relevance, but also provide opportunities for funded workshops on matters of
importance to the country, such as the role of tourism in the development of
culturally distinct, high-altitude rural areas.
General
1. Introduce formal government accreditation in the tourism trade to foster good
standards of promotional literature quality, profit margins, and staff knowledge
about Bhutan.
2. Widely encourage the banking sector and vendors to adopt the use of credit cards and
to provide cash-dispensing machines in primary locations.
3. Adequately regulate and promote the rationalization of the Bhutan tour handling
industry.
4. Arrange visits and short-term placements in other countries for tourism professionals
to provide exposure to other international tourism organizations and their practices
and products.
5. Establish closer links with the World Tourism Organization (on general tourism
issues, including comparative data), UNESCO (on cultural and environmental
issues), and ICOM (on museum practice), which could greatly assist in supporting
the transfer of new technologies and methods of undertaking business.
6. Ensure the availability and awareness of a range of technology transfer mechanisms,
such as retired executive programs, matching grant schemes, and FDI. In other
countries, tourism businesses have benefited from matching-grant schemes to
undertake market promotion, to establish Web sites, to develop new products, and to
set up management information systems. In the field of hotels and craft shops,
retired executives could provide training and advice at a very modest cost. (More
information is provided on technology transfer in Chapter Eight.)
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CHAPTER SIX
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
In view of the recent improvements in Information Technology (IT), the government of Bhutan
considers IT and the knowledge-based industries that it enables to be ideal sources of future
economic growth. IT both plays to Bhutan's strengths and avoids the country's major constraints.
IT takes advantage of the disciplined, English-speaking work force and relatively developed
telecommunications network. Yet it is not limited by the mountainous terrain, extreme weather,
and geographic isolation. In addition, IT services do not impose a large burden on the country's
natural resources, which supports the government's goal of carefully preserving the natural
environment. However, Bhutan's IT sector is still in its infancy, and it is not likely that the
country will export significant IT services or knowledge-based products in the near future.
Nonetheless, rapid development of the IT sector holds enormous promise for improving
productivity and increasing competitiveness in existing private sector industries.
1. Current Situation
Computers were first introduced into Bhutan in 1984, and it is now estimated that there are over
4,000 - the majority of which are in government offices. While most surveyed private-sector
firms do have computers, they are underutilized. Until recently computers were expensive and
not widely available. Thus, a computer culture - in which young people in the work force are
comfortable using IT - has not yet developed. With the recent reduction of import duties on
computers and the efforts to make computers more accessible to students, this situation is
beginning to improve. However, the general level of computer literacy and comfort with IT
remains low. Consequently, there is limited effective use of IT services in the private sector.
About 70 percent of the sampled firms had computers and most use them for simple functions
such as word processing, basic accounting, or other office applications. Almost none of the
sample had local networks, used an automated inventory-management system, employed
computer-aided design, or made other more sophisticated use of IT. Networks that do exist are
mostly confined to government agencies. Of the firms sampled, about 62 percent had access to e-
mail; yet the majority of these enterprises said that they continue to communicate predominantly
by fax and telephone.
A mere 15 percent of the sample had Web sites, the majority of which were in the tourist
industry. One metal firm and one handicraft firm were the only non-service sector companies
with Web sites. It is noteworthy that only one-third of the companies engaged in providing IT
services had Web sites. Clearly, computer penetration and Internet access is so limited that even
most IT enterprises do not see value in establishing Web sites. All existing sites are static -
serving only to advertise - and no company reported conducting any business over the Web. A
few of the more sophisticated entrepreneurs said that they use the World Wide Web to discover
new technology and communicate with overseas vendors. However, even this activity was
extremely rare. Overall, few private-sector firms make significant use of IT, and it appears to be
employed mostly as a labor-saving technology in offices.
There is one Internet service provider (ISP) in Bhutan, the government run Druk Net, which
began operations two years ago. Druk Net provides dial-up service at 33.6 kilobytes (kBps) for
the price of a local call throughout most of Bhutan. There are 64kBps and 128kBps leased lines
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available, but few customers take advantage of them.25. Of those that are taken, most are leased
by government agencies. In many countries, financial institutions are some of the heaviest users
of leased lines to transmit data - but so far even the banks have not leased lines in Bhutan. Druk
Net estimates that it hosts 30-35 Web sites, mostly for government agencies. There has not been
a rapid increase in demand for additional Web sites, so it is unlikely this number will significantly
increase in the near future. Currently, Druk Net maintains around 800 accounts and estimates
that there are over 2,500 users.26 In mid-2001 there were only six Internet cafes in the country,
four in Thimphu and two in Phuentsholing.
When asked why they don't make more use of IT capabilities, firms indicated they did not see
enough benefits to justify the costs of further investment. Most firms in the manufacturing sector
are using old technology where computerization would not be appropriate and would add little to
productivity. Given the level of technology, there is no need for computer-controlled machines,
computer-assisted design, automated inventory-management systems, or other sophisticated
applications of IT in the manufacturing process. Since few consumers have computer or Internet
access and most business are very small, the service sector also sees little added value in IT
investment. Not only are observable benefits limited, but the costs of upgrading IT capabilities is
substantial because all hardware and expertise must be imported. Connectivity is another issue.
While dial-up service is good and relatively inexpensive, there is no data network in the country.
Thus, sending large amounts of data is problematic, which makes linking geographically
dispersed units expensive.
The most significant impediment firms face in building their IT capacity is the lack of skilled
professionals. Almost all IT professionals in the private sector must be brought from India. This
is expensive and, because of the strict immigration procedures, difficult. Recently a number of
private training institutes have been established in the major towns. However, most of these
focus on training office workers in word processing, accounting, and other basic office skills.
Few institutions offer any training on database management, programming, Web site
development, or other more advanced tasks. The majority of the students are school-leavers
paying their own way to improve their job skills. Few firms send workers for training in IT,
again indicating the lack of value most firms see in pursuing investment in IT. Almost all of the
trainers in the private institutions come from India. The Sherubste College has begun to graduate
IT students - the recently established Division of Information Technology (DIT) estimates that
this year's class will be less than 20. All of these graduates are expected to go to government
agencies and will not be available for the private sector. One local IT-training company tells of
offering a recent IT graduate a salary more than three times higher than the government.
However, the graduate rejected the offer because the private sector is risky while govermment
jobs are viewed as being secure. In addition to Sherubste College, the Royal Institute of
Management has a program that teaches students database management and provides some
programming training. But the DIT estimates that it will produce only 12-13 students this year
and again most are expected to be employed within the government. Thus, where they have an
interest in doing so, private sector firms face difficulty finding suitably trained computer
professionals who will work for them.
The regulatory and financial systems are not conducive to online business. The lack of credit
cards or other systems makes it impossible to make payments electronically and even Druk Net is
unable to accept online payments. Banks report that they do not offer any online services because
the lack of demand makes them uneconomic to develop. Even if they were to offer online
23 These are dedicated lines that allow customers to transmit data at a rate of 64 or 128 kilobytes per second (kBps).
Such lines are only needed by organizations that rely heavily on IT. The lack of demand for such lines shows that few
customers are engaged in heavy data use.
26 Page 10, Bhutan ICT Master Plan.
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transactions, foreign currency regulations would pose a major obstacle. One sector that often
leads the growth of online business is tourism. However, the requirement in Bhutan to use group
travel arranged through registered travel agents reduces the need for interactive Web sites where
tourists can make reservations and check availability. Finally the lack of laws or regulations
covering e-commerce or cyber fraud provides a disincentive to pursue online business.
Due to the lack of demand, there are only a handful of companies providing IT services in Bhutan
and most of these enterprises are training office workers in basic computer skills. There are less
than five small providers of hardware or services, and their capabilities are limited to designing
simple, static Web sites and installing basic of networks. As discussed, there is little demand for
any other services and consequently little incentive to develop more sophisticated offerings.
Currently no firms are exporting or seriously considering exporting IT services.
2. Opportunities
Given the current state of IT services what can be said about the government's desire to see the
evolution of an IT export industry? IT exports from developing countries can often be grouped
into two general categories. First, are small firms, using skilled professionals to fill niche markets
in software development, programming, Web site design, or other specialized applications. The
second category consists of bigger companies, using large numbers of less skilled workers to
carry out such operations as data entry, digital encoding, or call centers.
The competitiveness of small programming firms relies on low cost, skilled workers who can turn
out high-quality products in a short time. Often these firms subcontract for companies in
developed countries where wage rates are extremely high. For example, there is a nascent
industry in Madagascar that is designing interactive Web sites for companies in Belgium and
France. The cost of good IT professionals in Madagascar is only 10-20 percent of the cost in
France, on par with India. Also, Madagascar is one of a few low-cost countries with a good
quality, disciplined work force that speaks French. Bhutan, might seek to fill an analogous role in
the English-speaking countries.
However, achieving this goal will be difficult as there are numerous low-cost countries with an
English-speaking work force already competing in this market. Bhutan's neighbor India, is the
biggest of these and is currently the source of all of Bhutan's IT professionals. Wages paid to
Indian workers in Bhutan must be sufficiently high to attract them to Bhutan, and companies must
also deal with the immigration formalities in bringing them in. As a result, in Thimphu, Indian
instructors at some of the training institutions are receiving four times the wages they received in
Calcutta. These are skilled workers with five-to-seven years' experience who are capable of
constructing databases and simple Web sites. More complicated programming would require
more experienced workers with an even larger wage differential. As more IT workers are
produced in Bhutan, it is likely that the wage differential will narrow, but it is not likely to
disappear in the near future. Higher labor costs will likely preclude Bhutan from entering the
programming market unless the Bhutanese can establish a reputation for very high quality or
unique work. Given the artistic ability of Bhutanese designers this is not impossible, but it will
take time to turn native design talent into saleable IT services.
The wage rates of Indian workers and Bhutanese workers along the border are closer but, even
here, Bhutanese demand slightly higher wages. With time, this gap may narrow. But it is
unlikely that the wages of IT professionals, even along the border, will ever fall to a level
competitive with workers in IT clusters like Hydrabad and Bangalaore. Enterprises located in or
near these clusters benefit from easy sharing of recent technology advances, having a large pool
of skilled workers, and access to inexpensive support services from surrounding firms.
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Companies in Bhutan would have to fill unique niches to compete against these advantages.
Otherwise, firms seeking service will naturally go to the established IT clusters. One advantage
that IT entrepreneurs did point out in the survey, is Bhutan's more friendly business environment.
It takes less time to clear customs, there is less corruption, and taxes are more transparent than in
India. However, it is unlikely that this alone will offset the competitive advantage offered by the
huge pools of trained labor, established infrastructure, and the spill-over effects found in the IT
clusters in India, Malaysia, and elsewhere.
Bhutan might be able to build capacity more easily in the second category - with firms engaged
in data entry, encoding, and call centers. Even this, however, will take time to develop. Firmns in
developed countries often subcontract operations such as data entry and data management to
firms in developing countries - such as India. The major costs involved in this work consist of
labor and connectivity costs - areas in which Bhutan has no special competitive advantage vis a
vis India.
These types of firms depend upon large quantities of inexpensive, literate workers. In other
countries such as Ghana, Madagascar, and India, firms have sought recent secretarial school
graduates, given them basic computer training, and then used them to enter data or find Internet
content. Looking at the wage rates of Bhutanese office workers, both in Thimphu and
Phuentsholing, who are assumed to have an equivalent level of training, Bhutanese wages are
substantially higher than those of Indian competitors. The mean earnings of Indian office
workers in Phuentsholing are less than 30 percent the mean wages of Bhutanese office workers in
Thimphu. The wage gap is less between Bhutanese and Indians in Phuentsholing, but Indians, on
average, still earn less than half the salaries of equivalent Bhutanese workers. To be fully
competitive with labor costs in surrounding English-speaking countries, any IT industries in
Bhutan, which were established for export, would have to use Indian labor or have Bhutanese
workers with comparable skills and productivity levels who would accept wages on par with
Indian workers.
Table 6.1: Mean Earnings for Sales and Office Workers
(Nu per Month)
Phuentsholing Thimphu
Bhutanese 3,082 4,129
Indian 1,168 3,525
Source: World Bank Survey
The second major cost component for large data-entry firms is connectivity. As much as 40
percent of costs, depending on the nature of the business, can go to telecommunications
connectivity. Currently Bhutan has two 1 Mb satellite links, one to the east and one to the west.
There is no optical cable in the country. The present satellite links are enough to meet current
demand, but they will quickly become strained if numerous firms begin demanding international
links. At this time, very few organizations have leased 64 kBps lines, and Druk Net charges for
leased lines are more expensive than in neighboring countries. This cost could go down if
alternative links are brought into play as demand increases. For example, firms might be able to
share connections by leasing satellite time from Indian users.
No firms in Bhutan have their own satellite connections. It is estimated that a two-way, 64 kBps
link from INTELSAT costs around $700 a month. This is not much lower than a Druk Net leased
line, but the figure does not include the costs of hardware, maintenance, or software. If
companies target the U.S. market, they must have an additional link or access to a cable network
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because it is not possible to transmit to North America on a single bounce from Bhutan. It is
relatively easy to establish improved international connectivity to Bhutan and costs will fall as
demand increases. But it is unlikely that the costs will fall enough to become competitive with
India and other countries, where high demand creates low unit costs for connectivity.
Table 6.2: Monthly Fees for Leased Lines
Country Type of Connection Cost
Bhutan 64 kBps $600
Bhutan 128 kBps $1,500
Nepal 64 kBps $2,800
Nepal 128 kBps $4,500
India 64 kBps $476
India 128 kBps $734
Madagascar 28.8 kBps $800
France 512 kBps $20
Source: World Bank interviews
For Bhutan to be competitive at exporting IT services, it will have to overcome cost
disadvantages in labor and connectivity. For small-scale, high-value operations, such as Web
design to take off, the supply of skilled labor must increase. Firms will have to serve niche
markets where their skill, design quality, or service standards compensate for higher costs. For
relatively large operations such as data entry to be successful, they will have to initially operate
on the border where there are larger pools of inexpensive, semi-skilled labor.
No matter what type of IT service industry develops, it will face many of the same infrastructure
constraints as other industries. For example, expensive transportation is still an important
impediment to the IT sector. Firms must be able to import parts and hardware cheaply and
quickly. Since there is not a large IT sector, maintenance personnel and other experts will also
need to be brought in periodically. Some firms ship data by tapes or other digital storage devices
when they have very large amounts or when their network fails. Irregular air cargo service in
Bhutan makes this problematic. However, entrepreneurs in the survey did report that Bhutan has
important competitive advantages over its neighbors in terms of the business environment. There
is a regular and consistent power supply, there is no labor unrest, and the government
bureaucracy appears to be both more efficient and less corrupt. Yet it is questionable whether
these advantages are sufficient to overcome the lower labor costs, less expensive connectivity,
more efficient shipping, and the spill-over effects of large IT clusters found in India, Singapore,
and other competing countries.
3. The Way Forward
In view of the challenges to establishing an IT export industry in Bhutan, it is more feasible to
focus initially on developing IT services to support the domestic private sector. More extensive
use of IT could increase competitiveness in many ways ranging from improving productivity in
the manufacturing sector to making marketing more effective in the service industry. Building
the infrastructure, training the workers, and creating the institutional structure necessary to
support the domestic private sector could also set the stage for possible future exports of IT
services.
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The government of Bhutan has already started this process by first concentrating on the expansion
of IT services within government agencies. Most of the country's investment in hardware,
software, and training is done by the public sector. All government agencies are pushing to
quickly automate and to provide more services online. It is hoped that this will not only help the
government provide better services, but will also provide incentives for IT service providers to
expand and for the private sector to automate and invest more in IT. However, in its desire to
rapidly expand the use of new technology, the government is monopolizing almost all of the
available skilled labor, leaving few well-trained IT professionals to work in the private sector.
Any attempt to foster the IT sector in support of the domestic private sector must address several
key issues including:
(a) Human Resources Development. The most important issue is the development of a
domestic supply of skilled IT professionals. This not only requires nurturing institutions
that train workers but also creating a computer culture where technology is accessible and
a part of everyday life. Making computers available to schools, putting more government
services online and subsidizing Internet services are important steps toward creating such
a culture. However, it is also vital to recognize that it takes time to build a reservoir of
experienced IT workers. Training alone can't make up for years of practical experience.
The only way to develop a supply of talented indigenous workers is to bring in
experienced guest workers to train and work with locals over an extended period of time.
Currently private-sector firms find it difficult to obtain work permits, and once they do
receive them they are not confident that they will be renewed. If firms are going to make
large investments in new technologies, they must be confident that they can easily bring
in and keep the skilled IT workers needed to support the investment.
(b) Payments System and Institutional Development. Creating the institutions and
regulations that support online business and other uses of IT is an important step in
building the IT service sector. Online financial services are one such area of potential
development. In this regard, the payments system must be improved so that firms can
conduct business online. It is necessary to expand the acceptance of credit cards, create
online access to bank accounts, and revise foreign exchange controls so that they don't
interfere with online business activity. It is also important to carefully examine the legal
environment and laws covering such issues as online fraud, unauthorized access, and
confidentiality. The need for legal and regulatory reform has already been clearly
identified in the RGOB's Information Technology Master Plan.
(c) Data Network Substantial work needs to be done to improve the infrastructure. The
voice network is good and dial-up access is available from most areas. However,
transmitting large volumes of data is still difficult. As suggested in the ITMaster Plan, it
is necessary to build a data network that will overlay the voice network. This will make
it easier to build networks that span the country. This, in turn, will significantly improve
the management system for shippers, helping to alleviate the delays and high costs caused
by the rugged terrain and poor transportation network.
(d) Foreign Direct Investment. Many of the issues discussed above can be addressed by joint
ventures. Foreign investors who bring with them the latest production techniques will
expect to have up-to-date IT services. The demand they create will spur the development
of the sector. Any services that are not available, they will create. For example, large
multinationals will bring with them skilled professionals capable of training workers and
they will have sufficient capital to buy the necessary hardware to improve bandwidth and
solve connectivity issues. As Bhutan is both new to the IT field and geographically
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isolated, one of the biggest challenges faced in developing an export market is making
market contacts and finding buyers. Foreign partners, who already have such contacts,
could help overcome this problem. Foreign investors might be lured to Bhutan to take
advantage of the political stability and absence of labor unrest. However, the lack of
transparency and difficulty getting joint ventures approved currently makes Bhutan less
attractive as an investment destination. To improve the IT service sector, it is necessary
to attract foreign investment.
4. Conclusion
The IT sector is still in its infancy in Bhutan. While it promises opportunities it has had a late
start and must overcome many challenges to become internationally competitive. Today few
private sector enterprises make effective use of the technology that they have. More extensive
use of IT services offers the chance to improve both private sector competitiveness and the
delivery of government services. It appears that Bhutan will have to overcome many steep
challenges if it is going to develop an export market for IT services. However, if it concentrates
on developing a computer culture and supporting growth of the IT sector that supports the
domestic market and government, it could set the stage for future service exports.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
1. The Need for Foreign Direct Investment in Bhutan's Private Sector
Development
Since the 1980s, the Royal Government has embarked on a program to gradually liberalize trade,
industrial, and financial policies, to encourage and facilitate the development of the private sector in
Bhutan. An important element of the liberalization process has been the development of national
policies, together with transparent and streamlined rules and procedures. Policy rationalization in
different sectors is continuing, and the current development of a Foreign Investment Policy is one of
the components of the on-going policy reforms.
Beyond traditional trading activities, there is no real history of entrepreneurial activities by the
private sector. Hence, the foundations for building a more active sector which contributes strongly
to overall economic growth are largely absent. Key factors such as management skills and market
linkages - on which exports can be developed - are in short supply. Thus, a "bootstraps" approach
to private sector development, while not necessarily destined for failure, seems likely to achieve
only limited and slow progress towards achievement of the desired development benefits.
In a generic sense, foreign direct investment (FDI) can be expected to have characteristics that are
complementary to the principal deficiencies within the indigenous private sector in Bhutan.
While a shortage of capital may not be a limiting factor in the current economic climate, foreign
capital which is attracted to investment opportunities in the Kingdom is likely to embody
important factors such as technology, management skills, and familiarity with and links into
export markets.
Thus, by attracting productive FDI, the Royal Government will create opportunities for economic
development within the Kingdom to be accelerated, with concomitant benefits - such as
employment generation, increased incomes, and increased welfare through expanded choice for
consumers. By these means, increased levels of foreign investment are expected to contribute to
an increase in Gross National Happiness, through the creation of additional economic benefits, in
ways which are consistent with the kingdom's goal of preserving its environmental and cultural
heritage.
The Royal Government's private-sector development strategy has identified four specific sectors
which it considers to have significant potential for development along internationally competitive
lines. If attraction of FDI is to be an important element of the overall private-sector strategy, then
it will also need to contribute to development within the nominated sectors: agricultural
processing, wood and wood-based industries, tourism, and information technology.
Agricultural processing. Of the three areas of potential development in Bhutan - import
substitution, smaller niche export markets, and large-scale processing of imported raw materials
for export - it is clear that FDI (or, at least, some major form of foreign involvement) could be an
important catalyst in promoting success in two. While import substitution (sales into the local
market) may not, in the short term, require the products offered to be of international quality, it is
clear that producing for the export market will.
82
Indeed, the characteristics of the products that can be generated within Bhutan and sold into niche
markets internationally are likely to be high-value per unit weight (to overcome high transport
costs), superior quality (and quality control) and packaging, so that premium prices can be secured.
Achieving these standards will require international best practice at all stages of the production
process: harvesting, post-harvest handling, processing, storage, distribution, and so on. It is
unlikely that this knowledge is currently within Bhutan or could be acquired and applied
successfully without significant foreign involvement. At the same time, knowledge of the markets
in which such products can be sold and the manner in which these markets can be accessed will also
need to be introduced.
The proposal for export processing of imported agricultural raw materials in the border areas
close to India will also need substantial foreign inputs. The scale of production envisaged for these
operations is well beyond any current experience within the indigenous private sector. Success will
inevitably be built on high turnover, low margin operations (the hallmark of export processing
operations wherever they are located), suggesting that management effectiveness is likely to be a
major factor affecting profitability. Another FDI-related dimension is that the proposal for this type
of activity is firmly focused on the Indian market, which means that the companies most readily
placed to profit from such initiatives will be those already established in the Indian market, who will
see an investment in Bhutan as a lower-cost alternative for servicing their existing markets.
Wood and wood-based industries. In this sector also, there is likely to be a direct correlation
between the level of technology and the profitability of the enterprise - at least in relation to the
more processed products. While the strong demand for wood from India may well mean that
traditional extraction and production processes can continue to be profitable, the outputs from
wood-based industries are much more akin to manufacturing products than commodities; hence the
need for international-level inputs of technology, management, and marketing skills. Given the real
concern which the Royal Government has shown for adding-value to forest resources prior to their
export and the sentiment that this can only be achieved by progressing through a series of
technology-based steps, it seems reasonable to expect that the government's longer-term objectives
for this sector will only be met if significant foreign involvement can be induced. Encouraging
investment by experienced foreign companies - either into joint ventures or independently - would
seem an attractive strategy to meet this goal.
Tourism. In this sector, where investment in capital development and the establishment of services
offer so many opportunities, there are many potential dimensions for FDI. At the same time, there
are cultural and environment sensitivities which do not occur to the same extent in most other
sectors. Assuming that the government continues to follow its policy of attracting low-
volume/high-value tourism, then increased benefits will come from attracting more visitors at the
current price level and providing improved tourism products that will attract a higher value
clientele. While the former may well be feasible through adjustments to government policy,
improved marketing, and so on, the latter - upgrading products for a higher value market - will,
almost certainly, require the introduction of foreign capital and expertise. Indeed, the government's
recent decision to permit two majority foreign-owned hotels to invest in Bhutan is an implicit
recognition of this fact.
Information technology. As noted in earlier sections of this report, the IT sector in Bhutan is
currently at an embryonic stage. The two main opportunities for growth that have been identified -
upgrading the use of IT within the private sector to create efficiencies (for example, through e-
business Internet activity by tour operators and hotels) and a more attractive investment
environment; and the possibility of some small-scale exports of IT-based services (such as key-
stroking and call centers) - will, in each case, be dependent on substantial inputs of foreign
expertise. This is most likely to come from foreign investment. Increasing the extent to which
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economic activity in Bhutan is IT based (or IT assisted) will be achieved by increasing the
awareness of the cost-benefit relationships which are available from increased use of IT and
upgrading skill levels and support services. It is in the latter area, in particular, that FDI would
seem likely to play a major role, if an increase in the use of IT within the economy is to occur at an
accelerated pace.
While the opportunities for exports of IT-based services are undoubtedly limited, Bhutan does have
a resource which, while far from unique, is also not widely prevalent and is increasingly highly
prized. This resource, a key ingredient in IT industries, is a young, well-educated, English-speaking
work force. While India will always be a major competitor within the same time zone, the strength
of Indian IT skills need not be seen as an insurmountable barrier to any similar investment taking
place in Bhutan. However, within such a competitive environment, attracting FDI into this aspect
of the IT sector in Bhutan would seem essential for its development. In this context, success in this
field will not only depend on the attractiveness of the operating environment which is offered but
very largely on the skill with which the country promotes its opportunities. These factors are likely
to be more important than the scale of the activity which is possible relative to the Indian IT sector.
2. Current Constraints to FDI in Bhutan
Clearly, a major constraint to the attraction of foreign investment to Bhutan at present is the
absence of a legislative framework within which such investment can take place. However, as
the government is well aware of this deficiency and has already begun the process of establishing
the legislation, regulation, and administrative systems which will be necessary, this constraint is
not discussed in this section. (The following section describes the changes which are proposed
and the likely impact on private sector activity.) Instead, this section focuses on aspects of the
general business environment which will not be affected by the proposed law on investment but
which would be seen as important constraints by potential foreign investors. The list of
constraints is, by no means, comprehensive, and most of these issues have already been raised in
earlier chapters of this report as being constraints to private-sector development in general.
Instead, the following discussion seeks to demonstrate how certain aspects of the general business
environment will assume relatively more importance for potential foreign investors and will, as a
result, be deserving of more attention if the government is to succeed in attracting the levels of
FDI to which it aspires.
Perhaps the most important area is taxation, where numerous facets of the current system will be
seen as substantial impediments by foreign investors, particularly those who would be interested
in investing in export-oriented enterprises. It is worth noting that the apparent unsuitability of the
existing tax structure for foreign invested enterprises is not surprising, as it has been developed to
serve the interests of a government taxing a private sector that is overwhelming dominated by
small enterprises, focused on the domestic market, and predominately involved in small-scale
production and service industries, including trading. The characteristics of the foreign invested
enterprises (FIEs) likely to be attracted to Bhutan will be substantially different. A selection - in
no order of importance - of the aspects of the current tax system likely to be seen as impediments
includes:
(a) Limits on the levels of individual salaries which can be claimed as deductions in
business tax returns. While there seems to be no logical reason for any limit to be
imposed, given the fact that personal income tax is now being levied on salaries, the
current level of Nu6O,OOO is only a small percentage of the salaries which international
investors would expect to pay their senior managers. Paying tax against the excess over
this limit would greatly reduce the profitability of the investment. (It is understood that
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exceptions can be made to this policy - but only on a case-by-case exception basis from
the Ministry of Finance.)
(b) A second limitation on business expense deductions which will act as a deterrent is the
limitations imposed on costs incurredfor activities such as market development,
advertising, and quality controL While the impact of these costs will vary between
companies producing for the local and export markets (for example, advertising may well
be more important for companies trying to break into the local market), they would all be
seen as normal business expenses by foreign companies, in some cases constituting a
significant proportion of total costs and, in all cases, being at levels which companies
could not easily absorb and remain competitive.
(c) Taxaton of assumed capital gains created through asset revaluation. This existing
provision will act as a deterrent in two ways:
i) Foreign investors can be expected to maintain accounting standards that are
much more closely aligned with international norms than is the current practice
in Bhutan. In doing so, they are more likely to use updated asset values,
particularly in circumstances where they are seeking to borrow to finance
expansion or other capital expenditure. Paying capital gains tax on the assumed
capital gain would be a major impediment.
ii) Most citizen investors wishing to participate in a joint venture with a foreign
company are likely to offer land and fixed assets, such as buildings, at current
market values, as their equity contribution. Having to pay capital gains tax on
any assumed capital gain will be a severe penalty, which could be expected to
deter many potential candidates from forming joint ventures. The impact on the
level of FDI would come from the fact that, without local partners, fewer foreign
investors will be willing (or, as joint ventures are mandated, able) to invest;
(d) Tax deducted at source. While this tax can be used as an offset against annual corporate
tax liabilities, this provision is not of any benefit for companies that are making losses -
in these cases, such tax payments only serve to heighten the losses. The significance for
FDI is that foreign investors, particularly those in manufacturing, typically expect to
make losses in the early years of operation, as they gear up to full production, develop
markets, identify lower-cost supply alternatives - and cope with unexpected start-up
expenses. This start-up scenario is considerably different from the common experience
of citizen investments, which would generally start with less capital invested and expect
to be profit making within a shorter time span.
A further tax-related matter is the non-existence of double taxation agreements with the
countries from which the majority of investment is likely to come. Without such agreements in
place, investment in Bhutan will be significantly less attractive to foreign companies. It is worth
noting that, if the government envisages moving to a corporate tax rate, which is lower than that
operating in India, negotiating a tax-sparing agreement with India may be advantageous, as this
would allow Indian companies (which could well be the major investors in Bhutan) to benefit
from the lower tax rates, even if India moves to a system of taxation of worldwide income.
Indeed, the negotiation of such agreements should be attempted with any developed country from
which significant amounts of investment are expected and whose corporate tax rate is higher than
that which will apply in Bhutan. Such agreements are particularly important if any form of
investment incentive is introduced to lower the effective rate for investors. Without them, the
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provision of the incentive merely transfers revenue from Bhutan to the government of the source
country of the investment.
The current regulations covering accessibility of foreign exchange for imports are also likely to
be a factor affecting the attractiveness of Bhutan as an investment location. These regulations
provide that foreign exchange is only automatically available if the enterprise has earned the
currency required - Indian rupees or hard currency - through exporting. As India is likely to be
the dominant market for exports from Bhutan, those foreign investors expecting to use imports
from hard currency areas will see this system as an impediment.
Banking sector services and skills will have a number of effects, particularly on exporters.
However, the current situation of interest rate inflexibility can be considered likely to affect a
wider range of investors - at least to the extent that they would wish to borrow locally - for
example, for their working capital requirements.
Finally, as is the case in a very large number of developing countries around the world, where
land ownership is a sensitive national issue, access to land by foreign investors could also serve
as an impediment in Bhutan.
3. Essential Elements of the Currently Proposed FDI regime
Recognizing the potential benefits from FDI, the Royal Govermnent has developed, over the last
two years, a policy for opening up the economy to this potentially important form of investment.
The process of developing the policy has been relatively slow, as formally allowing foreign
investment for the first time has been accepted by the government as an important issue which
needs to be examined closely and structured in a way which ensures that important characteristics of
the current economic and social environment are not threatened.
The outcome of this preparation process to date is a statement of proposed Foreign Investment
Policy, which is currently being discussed by members of the government, prior to draft legislation
being prepared for submission to the National Assembly when it next meets in July 2002. The draft
policy is understandably cautious and has been prepared with an explicit acknowledgment that
additional changes and modifications will be made once the government has gained greater
experience. There is also an explicit understanding among those responsible in the preparation of
the policy statement that it is far better to err on the side of caution - and accept the risk that the
inflow of FDI may be smaller than hoped for - than to have foreign investment take place in Bhutan
in the early years of the new policy and create outcomes which will be regretted.
The policy states that the broad objectives of encouraging foreign investment in the country are
to:
* broaden employment and training opportunities for the people;
* benefit from technology and skills transfer; and
* broaden the revenue base and enhance foreign currency earnings.
These are modest and sensible goals for a first entry into a complex and competitive market, and
should also prove to be mutually consistent and supportive.
While much of the detail that will define the operation of the policy will only be available after
the regulations and procedures have been developed, some of the more important elements of the
proposed policy regime are already clear. These are as follows:
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(a) Definition ofa foreign investment - at 20 percent, the trigger point is double the
international norm, which will mean that foreign investors will be able to take significant
financial interests in Bhutanese companies without becoming subject to the new law;
(b) Commitment to the use of a simple, transparent, and automatic registration system - in
adopting this stance, the government has moved directly to international best practice, a
stance which will be welcomed by those investors with an interest in investing in Bhutan;
(c) Minimizing the competition for citizen investors at the smaUl and micro level - with a
very limited history of modern entrepreneurial activity, the private sector in Bhutan is not
currently in a position to compete effectively with entrepreneurs from surrounding
countries - particularly in trading, services and simple manufacturing for the domestic
market;
(d) Adoption ofpositive lists of sectors open to FDI- by choosing this option, the
government has limited FDI to sectors in which it believes Bhutan has potential
competitive advantage and in which such investment would be beneficial;
(e) Mandatory joint ventures - the maximum foreign equity in an FIE will be 70 percent;
(f) Non-equityforeign involvement - rather than approval being automatic (against defined
criteria) as with the equity investments, approval of these arrangements will be
considered by application to the Board of Investment;
(g) Equal treatment - foreign investors will be accorded the same treatment as local
investors engaged in the same business in the application of relevant laws, regulations,
and procedures;
(h) Remittance ofprofit/dividends - allowed only to the extent that net foreign exchange
earnings in the currency concerned are available;
(i) Taxation - as for other private sector companies in Bhutan; worldwide income
provisions will not apply;
a) Imports - subject to the requirement that the foreign investor provide the necessary
foreign exchange, all industrial plant, machinery, spares, and raw materials will be
exempted from sales tax and customs duty; and
(k) Employment - FIEs will receive an automatic entitlement to a designated number of
work permits, according to the size of the investment; additional expatriate employment
approved where shortages of appropriately skilled Bhutanese can be demonstrated,
however, these positions will have to be converted to local jobs via a training program.
The proposed foreign investment policy is an admirable attempt to develop a compromise
between the more liberal conditions which would make Bhutan a more attractive location for FDI
and the understandable concern regarding the possible negative effects on the economy and
culture of either inappropriate investment projects or excessive levels of such investment,
particularly in some key sectors. As a compromise, there is, of course, a cost, in that various
elements of the policy will have negative effects on the attractiveness of Bhutan as an investment
location, so that some of the benefits listed as objectives may not be realized, in part or in full.
The following section discusses the negative impact of some of the policy choices which have
been made. These comments are not intended as criticisms, rather explanations of the costs
involved, so that there is full awareness within government of the implications of the choices
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which have been made - and of the opportunities for positive changes to be made to the law once
some confidence in this area has been acquired. In some cases, the policy choices would appear
to directly limit the attractiveness of FDI in the nominated priority sectors.
Three policy choices will have a major impact on the extent to which FDI becomes an important
contributor to private sector development in the Kingdom. These are the choice of a positive list
approach to defining allowable sectors for investment, rather than a negative list, opting for
mandatory local equity in each FEE; and, possibly to a lesser extent, the stipulation of minimum
project size.
The decision to define a positive list of sectors for investment will incur costs at two levels. First,
it is not possible to anticipate all the possible projects which private sector entrepreneurs might
identify as attractive, many of which would be in sectors and industries which would be non-
contentious. Indeed, it is the innovation of the private sector, in aggregate terms, that provides the
dynamism which produces economic growth. To the extent that some of these non-contentious
projects will fall outside the positive list, so Bhutan will be denied investment it would have been
happy to accept. While it is possible that the minimum project size requirement may prevent many
of these projects, even if they were allowable under a negative list approach, it is important to be
aware of this constraint. (One implication from this policy inter-relationship may be that moving
from a positive to negative list approach may need to be accompanied by a reduction in the
minimum equity provisions to generate a significant impact - which may well be feasible once
greater confidence in the FDI process has been acquired through experience.)
The second cost will be administrative, in that interpretation of the inclusiveness of nominated
sectors on the positive list will constantly be an issue for the approval of proposed investments -
particularly as the proposed list is defined in relatively broad terns, for example, "light industries,
including electronic industries" and "engineering and power intensive industries."
The mandatory requirement for local equity of 30 percent seems likely to be the most costly
impediment to FDI, particularly when combined with the minimum project size requirement.
Again, there are two dimensions to this cost. The first is that it is a well-established fact that the
majority of foreign investment which takes place around the world is in the form of 100 percent
foreign-owned projects. This is because most investors have a strong preference for this form of
investment. While some favor joint ventures in some circumstances and others will agree to seek
a local partner when this is the only option available to them, there are a significant number who
will not invest in joint ventures. Thus the adoption of mandatory local equity provisions has the
effect of limiting the population of potential investors interested in investing in a country.
The second dimension of the cost is that, at this stage of its private sector development, it is
unlikely that Bhutan can offer more than a handful of local companies, which have the technical
and managerial capacity to be viewed as acceptable (let alone attractive) joint venture partners.
Add to this the financial obligations - a minimum of 30 percent of projects which must be at least
$1.0 million in manufacturing and $0.5 million in services - and the field of potential partners is
narrowed even further. Thus, even those foreign investors willing to consider ajoint venture may
have great difficulty identifying partners with whom they would be willing to enter a joint
venture agreement. Projects well above the minimum size will be even harder to structure, unless
the government steps in as the local equity partner, which would seem counterproductive to a
private-sector development strategy.
Allied to the issue of the availability of local joint venture partners is the question of the
developmental impact. There is plenty of evidence from numerous developing countries in all
regions that the imposition of mandatory local equity requirements for FDI, in economies where
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the private sector is not well developed, results in the emergence of a limited number of large,
powerful, multi-sector conglomerates. This is entirely understandable: forced into joint ventures,
foreign investors will seek to link themselves with those companies which offer the best prospects
for continuing success. Often, these will not be companies with interests in the same sector
which can bring relevant industrial experience but, rather, companies which have the
management capacity and financial strength to contribute productively to the relationship - with
capacity to provide further equity funds for future expansion often an important consideration.
Thus the same companies (or individuals) appear time and again as partners in new FIEs, which
severely limits the private-sector development benefits that this well-intentioned policy was
expected to produce. Stated in its starkest terms, a mandatory local equity provision can easily
lead to a small number of relatively affluent businessmen benefiting substantially while much
larger numbers of potential employees are without work as a result of foreign investors, who
would otherwise have invested, baulking at the joint venture requirement
Mention has already been made of the combined impact of other policy choices (positive lists and
mandatory local equity) and minimum project size, however, there will be other impacts arising
from this stipulation. One of these is the limitation of the "osmosis effect" - the absorption of
improved business practices by the domestic private sector through its day-to-day interaction with
the foreign private sector. The extent to which this occurs will be largely determined by the number
of FIEs created, rather than their size or value, so that limiting foreign investors to what are fairly
large investments relative to the existing Bhutanese economy, will also limit the extent of these
benefits.
More specifically, the fact that the nominated minimum project sizes are relatively large is likely to
result in a range of small projects which would be beneficial to the economy and non-threatening to
the local private sector being ineligible. In fact, this circumstance is quite probable in two of the
nominated priority sectors - agroprocessing and IT. In agribusiness, the export of high-value
products to niche markets could be an area of considerable potential. Earlier in this chapter, it was
argued that this kind of development is only likely to occur through the introduction of FDI yet,
almost by definition, such projects are likely to be relatively small and would certainly be so in their
start-up phase. A similar argument has been made for the expansion of IT use within the local
economy - i.e., that this is likely to be accelerated by the introduction of specialist IT service
providers. These are also likely to be small in capital investment terms, as they are technology,
rather than capital, intensive, with human resources, rather than equipment, being the major input.
While it could be expected that the large majority of FDI which will be attracted to Bhutan will be
export oriented, there will be some which will be aimed at domestic sales - some of which, as
explained above, will be closely aligned with the government's priority development sectors. The
limitation on the remittance of profits and dividends to the net earnings of the type of foreign
exchange required for the remittance will be a major impediment to such investment taking place.
Specific instances of this impact in priority sectors will be on IT services for the domestic economy
and agroprocessing for the domestic market, with the latter perhaps even worse affected if there is
any requirement for imported inputs. Even where the sales focus is on export markets, to the extent
that non-Indian investors wish to sell into the Indian market, they will find themselves potentially
short of the hard currency needed to effect remittances.
One last comment is on training of nationals and the localization provisions of the proposed
investment policy. While it is not clear from the wording of the draft policy statement as to how
this policy will be implemented, it is to be hoped that the choice will be for market forces to be
allowed to play a major role, rather than localization to be effected by way of regulation. Given the
low levels of training which are currently carried out within the private sector in Bhutan, there is a
good case for some form of fiscal incentive being introduced, to encourage companies to train staff
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and so accelerate the rate at which localization can take place, without impacting negatively on the
operational efficiencies of the FIEs.
4. Remaining Issues to be Addressed
In early October 2001, the final draft of the foreign investment policy was submitted by the
Minister of Trade and Industry to the government for consideration. Once formally accepted as
an appropriate basis from which to develop draft legislation, this process can commence, so that
the legislation can be submitted for consideration by the Assembly when it next meets, in July
2002. The necessary regulations can be prepared on a concurrent basis, so that these will be
ready - subject to any adjustment necessary as a result of modifications to the legislation made by
the Assembly - as soon as the legislation is approved. However, despite the expected availability
of both the legislation and regulations by the end of the summer parliamentary session, Bhutan
will not be in a position to start operating its foreign investment system at that time. Before this
can take place, procedures will need to be developed (including those for monitoring the FDI
activity which takes place), responsibilities for the administration of the system assigned, and
relevant staff trained.
Once the administrative system is established and operational, two other important components of
Bhutan's overall strategy for attracting and benefiting from FDI will need to be addressed. The
first is the creation of some form of investment promotion capacity. While an efficient system to
implement the policy adopted will be a major advantage - if the opportunities created by the
introduction of the new policy are to be effectively exploited - it will need to be complemented
by a range of promotional activities. Bhutan is virtually unknown as a potential location for
foreign investment, so that some targeted publicity of the decision to allow FDI - and the
opportunities which are available - would be beneficial. At the same time, prospective investors
will benefit from facilitation services provided by the government as they seek to gather the
information they require to decide whether an investment is feasible, obtain the registrations,
approvals, and licenses they need once they decide to invest and start up their investment.
Creating some form of investment promotion agency will require decisions about the institutional
position of the agency within government, the mandate it should be given and the functions it
should adopt, recruitment and training of staff, and a range of other capacity-building measures.
The second ongoing requirement will be for monitoring and reviewing of the system and its
impact. Quantitative data on the sources, sectoral interests, and scale of intended operations of all
investors - both prospective and actual - will provide information that will play an important role
in the reviews of the FDI regime which the Government will need to periodically conduct.
Another important part of these reviews will be qualitative information on the attractiveness of
Bhutan as an investment location, which the investment promotion agency should be able to
collect, based on its frequent contacts with the foreign investor community.
Arrangements are already being developed under which the Royal Government will obtain
external assistance for the process of converting the investment policy statement into draft
legislation and supporting regulations. It is proposed that the Foreign Investment Advisory
Service (FIAS) will provide some of the assistance required and that the process will be jointly
funded by FIAS and UNDP (with the latter funds being drawn down from an existing project
being administered by the Ministry of Trade and Industry). Following the approval of the
legislation by the Assembly and the promulgation of the regulations, a second phase of external
assistance from FIAS is planned. This project would comprise a number of components,
covering the outstanding tasks described above and be expected to be implemented over a period
of at least 18 months to two years. The government is currently seeking the necessary
cofinancing for this project.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES
1. Introduction
Bhutan's increased focus on private-sector development and employment creation is coming at a
time of considerable regional and global change. One of the most important developments has
been the gradual move to reduce and simplify tariff and non-tariff barriers in India. Bhutan's
free-trade agreement with India provides it with privileged access to Indian markets, which in
turn have been protected by high tariff barriers. As tariffs and other trade restrictions fall in
India, Bhutanese exporters will have to become more efficient if they are to grow and prosper in
the face stiff competition from low-cost producers from around the world.
As a small, land-locked country, Bhutan's main areas of comparative advantage have been four
fold: relatively unrestricted access to the large Indian market for imports and exports; low
electricity prices; access to low cost and stable labor; and a competent, committed, and non-
corrupt government. In addition, Bhutan's unique development path with a major focus on the
environment, as well as its geographic location, provides it with the potential to produce niche-
market goods, which are based upon location (such as tourism, some agricultural products,
Himalayan herbs, and medicines) or environmental advantages (organically produced goods and
environmentally and sustainably managed forests). Developing policies in support of private-
sector-led growth that build upon these comparative advantages will be the challenge for the
NFYDP and may, indeed, necessitate a different approach to private-sector development in
different parts of the nation.
Against these considerable advantages, Bhutan's private sector faces equally imposing obstacles.
Chief among these has been the relatively late opening up of the domestic economy to the outside
world. The almost exclusive reliance upon agricultural production prior to that date means that
there is a lack of well-developed entrepreneurial skills in Bhutan outside of some basic areas such
as agriculture and trading. Available economic evidence suggests a strong linkage between
external interactions - particularly through exports, imports, and Foreign Direct Investment - and
economic growth. Unfortunately, the closed nature of the Bhutanese economy until recently, has
precluded most of these potentially beneficial interactions. A second serious challenge for the
private sector is geographic barriers and their impact upon transportation infrastructure. Road
links are not robust and are frequently disrupted by either landslides or political disruptions in
India (several parts of Bhutan are only accessible through India as internal road linkages do not
exist) and air linkages are also adversely impacted by weather, equipment breakdowns, and
landing and takeoff restrictions at Paro International Airport. A third issue is a government which
has had only limited involvement in supporting the private sector and is consequently "new to the
game." This is exacerbated by the fact that the private sector is "even newer" to the game of
private-sector-led growth. As the government is relatively well run, efficient, and effective, it has
a general perception that the private sector is less well organized, less effective, and likely to be
more corrupt that the public sector. In short, the government has developed somewhat of a
patronizing attitude toward the private sector that it strongly wishes to support.
This chapter examines some of these concerns in greater detail by reviewing a set of cross-cutting
issues that impact all sectors. It uses survey data to investigate the problems and seeks to identify
policy measures that will help Bhutanese industry become globally competitive and help
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strengthen the private sector so that it can eventually replace the government as the main
economic engine of growth.
2. The Biggest Business Problems for the Private Sector
In ranking their biggest business problems - a lack of skilled labor was overwhelmingly cited as
the most significant issue of concern by the survey respondents. This was followed by
bureaucratic burdens/governance issues, a lack of demand, credit and finance, and infrastructure -
in descending order of importance. The rankings were substantially the same for all sectors and
regions.
Table 8.1 presents the survey results. The first column gives the number of times that a particular
problem was ranked as the main constraint, and the second column gives a weighted ranking.
The weighted rankings, however, do not alter the relative importance of the number-one ranked
issues of concern.
Table 8.1: Three Biggest Business Problems
No. of Times
Problems Cited as Number 1 Problem Weighted
Skilled Labor 20 0.51
Bureaucratic Burden 16 0.38
Lack of Demand 17 0.36
Credit and Finance 16 0.30
Infrastructure 8 0.20
Business Support Services 1 0.06
Import Regime 0 0.05
FOREX Regulations 1 0.03
NOTE:
1/ The weighting was calculated by providing a "number one" problem with a weight of 3; a
"number 2" problem with a weight of 2; and a 'number three" problem with a weight of 1.
2/ In this table, various groupings of "like" attributes have been classified together. Hence,
for example, all issues related to government regulations - labor law, tax policy, obtaining
land, and so on, are grouped together as "Bureaucratic Burden". Lack of demand and
competition from imports have also been grouped together.
Whereas most of the above issues are self explanatory, the issue of "lack of demand" is somewhat
nebulous. Firms frequently complain that they cannot complete with imports that foreign
producers dump onto the domestic market - or that the local market is too small for their
production base. Often, however, the underlying problem is the inability of these firms to
compete on a cost-competitive basis. The fact that there are significant imports illustrates that
there is consumer demand, not to mention the fact that India (which Bhutanese producers can sell
into without restriction) is one of the largest consumer markets in the world. The reality is that
many Bhutanese firms have difficulty competing in terms of price, quality, delivery, and
marketing and therefore are unable to win market share.
3. Labor Issues
One of the ironies of Bhutan is that there is increasing government concern over employment
issues when, by some estimates, around 50 percent of the formal sector work force consists of
non-nationals - mainly Indians. These low-cost workers have accepted jobs that many employers
feel Bhutanese workers will not undertake including menial and backbreaking work in factories,
on construction sites, and in road building. This, in turn, has resulted in the second irony of
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employment in Bhutan: despite the desire to employ more Bhutanese workers the government is
concerned about increasing mechanization rather than promoting labor-intensive methods of
production. The bountiful supply of low-cost, unskilled Indian labor has resulted in the adoption
of labor-intensive technologies in Bhutan. However, there is a general perception that, as a result,
production quality has suffered and firms are hiring less expensive non-nationals in lieu of local
workers or more appropriate capital equipment. Consequently, the government advocates
mechanization as a way to improve production quality and break the reliance on non-national
labor.
However, the government, in its attempts to spur job creation and mobilize the private sector to
absorb the growing Bhutanese work force, must take care not to handicap the competitiveness of
the budding, but fragile, industrial sector. Arbitrarily cutting off the supply of inexpensive and
skilled non-national labor or forcing the adoption of inappropriate technology to reduce the
employment of unskilled non-nationals could render Bhutanese industry non-competitive, reduce
growth, and actually lead to a loss ofjobs. Instead, the key to success lies in developing the
country's human resource base and its overall productivity to levels, which will make Bhutanese
industry globally competitive. The focus must be on education, training, and acquiring improved
technology to raise productivity levels, increase international competitiveness, and create job
opportunities for the expanding Bhutanese work force.
Bhutanese industry is labor intensive - as efficiency demands in an environment with low-cost
labor and high-cost capital - hence, keeping labor costs down in relation to productivity is critical
to maintaining competitiveness. Bhutan's future, by dint of geography, is intimately linked with
that of India. A long, unpoliced border and a free-trade agreement further strengthen these ties by
permitting the reasonably free movement of goods and labor between the two countries. Thus,
except in exceptional circumstances, wage and productivity levels cannot be too far out of line
with those in India. With the increasing implementation of WTO requirements Bhutan will also
have to match the productivity levels of other low-cost producers. If wages in Bhutan remain at
levels higher than in neighboring countries, then companies in the same industry can only survive
if labor productivity is correspondingly higher, to cover this wage differential. As the cost of
capital is no cheaper in Bhutan than elsewhere - and possibly even more expensive than in India
- Bhutanese industry also needs to take care that its efforts to raise labor productivity do not
result in the adoption of high-cost, inefficient, capital-intensive modes of production.
Labor Stability. The Bhutanese labor market has two very valuable attributes. Principle among
these is a total absence of labor unrest. Disruptive union activity does not exist, and no
companies in the sample recorded any work days lost as a result of strikes (although some work
days were lost due to non-national workers attending festival celebrations in India). This unique
feature means that Bhutan has access to cheap, non-national, labor without the unrest which is
prevalent in other countries of the region. Labor force stability, in combination with low wage
rates, is a considerable strength - and comparative advantage - relative to its South Asian
neighbors.
Labor Flexibility. A second advantage is that the labor law allows for almost complete
flexibility in labor markets. Although the government ostensibly regulates the employment
conditions of all Bhutanese citizens,27 labor regulations are largely undeveloped and employers
can easily hire, fire, and set wages without any influence from organized labor. Hence, for
example, no company in the sample experienced problems in firing poor performers - either
national or non-national. Employers "lay off" workers at will, and since they do not have any job
27 Royal Govemment of Bhutan, Rules and Regulations on Employment of Bhutanese Nationals in the Private Sector,
December 1997.
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security to lose, workers "leave" theirjobs when other demands (rice planting, harvesting, or
even general discontent with their job) loom large. This has both benefits and costs in terms of
labor force stability - for the national work force - as it also creates an unwelcomed element of
"mobility" into the labor market.
Wages. Flexibility is further increased by the absence of an official Wages Policy. Currently
the minimum wage law only applies to the National Work Force - those who work for the
government or on government contracted projects - and not the private sector. While some
companies follow the government lead, they are not obliged to do so. Most manufacturing firms,
especially those relying on non-national labor, do not pay the government minimum wage. This
lack of a formal policy provides considerable flexibility to the private sector. Wages tend to be
very sticky (i.e., they do not move often or easily), and there is little union agitation (currently)
for salary increases. The disadvantage of this policy, however, is that wages tend to go for long
periods of time without adjustment and then are suddenly adjusted by large increments. So, for
example, in 2001, the government announced an increase in the minimum wage rate from Nu5O0
per day to Nu 00 per day - an effective 100 percent increase in salaries. As a wage leader in the
economy, some private sector firms have followed the public sector's lead.
Wage levels vary considerably between regions and nationalities. The survey confirms, for
example, that private-sector wages tend to be higher in regions away from the border. It appears
that Bhutanese workers of all skill levels have high reservation wages (the minimum wage that
will induce them to work) and generally demand more compensation than Indians. Consequently,
many of the industrial activities, especially those concentrated along the border areas where there
is free movement of labor, rely upon low-cost, non-national workers to produce competitive
products for sale into the Indian market. Table 8.2 provides data on the average wage of Indian
and Bhutanese workers in the surveyed manufacturing firms in the two main towns. It relies only
on manufacturing firms because the work force is more homogenous than in the service sector
and is therefore more comparable. The table illustrates that Bhutanese workers in all categories
and all regions, receive higher pay than their Indian counterparts. At the lower end of the scale,
several surveyed firns in the border towns, were paying unskilled non-national women as low as
Rs25 per day and non-national men Rs3O per day. Such rates are extremely low by both regional
and international standards.
Table 8.2: Average Monthly Salary By Region and Ethnicity
Non-
Production Production All
Thimphu Bhutanese 4,823 13,811 6,112
Indian 3,905 8,839 5,609
Phuentsholing Bhutanese 4,176 9,000 5,718
Indian 2,393 6,369 3,048
Given the high level of labor mobility, especially in the border areas, the only sustainable way for
Bhutanese workers to be paid more than non-nationals is if they are more productive. A cursory
comparison of firms with large shares of non-national workers compared with those with a high
proportion of Bhutanese workers reveals that the firms with mostly Bhutanese workers have a
higher average value-added per worker. In Table 8.3, the average value-added per worker in
manufacturing firms with more than 80 percent Indian workers is almost 28 percent less than the
average for firms with less than 20 percent Indian workers. Yet, anecdotal evidence and
interviews would suggest that Bhutanese workers are less productive than their Indian
counterparts. This is not, however, contradictory. Since Bhutanese workers have a higher
94
reservation wage, they tend to only accept employment in firms with high value-added per
worker that come with higher pay. It is likely that most Bhutanese are found in capital intensive
industries or those demanding higher levels of skill. On the other hand, there are few skilled
Bhutanese workers and most firms, particularly manufacturing firms, are labor intensive with low
wages, which leads to a high percentage of Indian workers.
Table 83: Mean Value-Added Per Worker Per Year (US$)
Manufacturing Service
All Firms 2,892 4,950
Less than 20% Indian 3,411 5,841
200/o-80% Indian 2,450 5,645
More than 80% Indian 2,645 398
Unskilled Workers. The government has been concerned for some time over the relatively large
share of non-nationals in the total formal labor force and has instructed firms to reduce levels of
non-national employment. This has been difficult to enforce in border areas where day laborers
are free to walk across the uncontrolled border, undetected, and unrecorded. These non-nationals,
however, are not allowed to travel beyond the border areas without special permission.
Consequently, as reflected in the sample, non-national employment in firms in Thimphu is
significantly lower than non-national employment in Phuentsholing. Table 8.4 gives information
on the percentage of the sample's production and non-production labor force, where production
workers are assumed to generally be less skilled than non-production workers.28 Bhutanese
account for 64 percent of the entire sample's work force but 71 percent of the non-production
workers. Indians make up a greater percentage of the work force in the border area in both
categories. Companies in Thimphu, appear to use Indians with skills that they cannot find in
Bhutan and for jobs that locals will not undertake. However, on the border they are used in all
categories and their lower wages seem to be the determining factor.
Table 8.4: Percentage of Indian and Bhutanese Workers in Sample by Type
Type Thimphu Phuentsholing Full Sample
Bhutanese Indian Bhutanese Indian Bhutanese Indian
Non-Production 89 11 63 37 71 29
Production 76 24 57 43 63 37
All Workers 79 21 59 41 64 36
The exception to this rule is construction companies - which are largely involved in building sites
and in road construction projects.29. These companies are provided with generous allocations of
non-national work permits - even in central Bhutan - and this, in turn, has spawned "construction
companies" which are more interested in securing work permits for non-nationals than in actually
undertalking construction projects.
In justifying their appetite for non-national workers, many firms assert that Bhutanese workers (a)
are high cost; (b) are less productive than their non-national counterparts (thereby making them
doubly expensive); (c) are unreliable and disappear during rice planting and harvesting seasons;
28 Non-production workers include managers, owners, technicians, and professionals. General production workers,
office workers, and service workers are grouped into the production category.
2 Construction companies use highly labor intensive techniques and few Bhutanese are willing to engage in such
strenuous work for such low wages.
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(d) do not have a good work ethic and will leave ajob suddenly and without notice if they feel
slighted or affronted by their employer's actions; and (e) are unprepared to undertake dirty,
repetitive, or menial work. The government counters these accusations by arguing that Bhutanese
workers will never develop a good work ethic and increased productivity unless they are exposed
to a workplace environment. Consequently, the government is increasingly insisting that private
companies reduce their non-national work force (one company surveyed in Thimphu had been
told to reduce its non-nationals by 25 percent by end December 2001 and a further 25 percent by
end June 2002).
If non-national workers are replaced, higher costs and reduced productivity - in combination with
a weaker overall work ethic - mean that Bhutanese companies will be placed at a competitive
disadvantage. Hence, the natural desire to increasingly "Bhutan-ize" the labor force will need to
be sensitively calibrated against the desire to generate a larger and stronger private sector as - at
least for the short term, these two objectives are likely to be in conflict.
Skilled Workers. When asked their biggest business problem, firms in the survey
overwhelmingly cited a lack of skilled labor in Bhutan. This was true for all sectors and
geographic locations. Until recently, virtually all Bhutanese with a full secondary or tertiary
education were absorbed into the public sector. Only over the past several years have a growing
number of graduates been unable to find employment in the civil service, their preferred
employment option due to its benefits and job security. As a result, an increasing number of
Grade 10 leavers, and even graduates, are seeking employment in the private sector. However,
companies complain that the best school-leavers still go to the government, and those that come
to them have little experience, yet demand high benefits. In addition, managers report that there
is a mismatch between skills needed by industry and those provided by most schools and training
institutions. An increasing number of school-leavers entering the market cannot find jobs, yet
industry still feels its biggest single problem is a shortage of skilled and experienced labor.
As most private sector industries are reasonably young, skills tend to be weakest in the area of
management. Bhutanese entrepreneurs overwhelmingly have a civil service or government
background. Including the civil service, NGOs, the royal family, and the military, almost 48
percent of the sample were working for the public sector immediately prior to establishing their
business. Less than 30 percent came from another private-sector business. These "public sector
managers" often do not know their industry well and don't know how to identify and hire
technically skilled and professional support staff. Without seasoned managers, firms fail to
properly manage their business, find the proper technology, train their workers, or even hire the
required skills. It is often a case that managers "don't know what they don't know." Many
managers in the survey group did not recognize the management failures that were evident to the
sectoral specialists involved in the survey.
Developing a cadre of Bhutanese managers, school-leavers, and graduates with necessary skills
will take time and require nurturing. Thus, in areas where skill shortages exist among the
Bhutanese workforce, the government should provide for the liberal recruitment of skilled non-
national workers. Several areas were immediately evident including: accounting, auditing,
information technology, human resource management, marketing, packaging, and so on.
Leveraging the skill sets of workers from neighboring countries in these areas should assist the
further development of industry in Bhutan. IT is a particular case in point where South India has
been extremely successful in developing a vibrant export sector, an activity that the government
of Bhutan now wishes to actively pursue. Liberal work permit schemes for skilled non-nationals
will be necessary to provide the skills required by the private sector. Access to relatively low-
cost and highly skilled Indian workers provides Bhutan with an important cost advantage, which
it should seek to leverage.
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Training. Despite the fact that managers reported a lack of skilled workers as their single biggest
business problem, the survey found that, apart from the largest companies, very few private-
sector firms provided significant formal training for their workers. In fact only about 39 percent
of surveyed firmns reported doing any training (Table 8.5). Less than 3 percent of the sample's
entire work force received any training over the past year, and the average ratio of training-cost-
to-sales is an extremely small 1.4 percent. Service firms were more likely to provide training and
train a slightly larger percentage of their work force. This is expected since service firms,
especially tour operators, cannot easily hire skilled non-nationals. Given the growing body of
evidence linking worker training with firm growth and productivity, the lack of training in Bhutan
is an important shortcoming that needs to be addressed.
Table 8.5: Percentage of Firms Training and Training-to-Sales Expenditure
Manufacturing Service Full Sample
Percentage of firms Training 28 52 39
Average Training/Sales 1.1 2.0 1.4
Percentage of Work Force Trained 1.8 4.7 3.0
Almost 30 percent of the firms who do not conduct significant formal training, cited a lack of
government incentives as a reason (Table 8.6). Many firms labor under the misconception that
worker-training costs are only a tax deductible expense up to 2 percent of total profits (as are
entertainment and some other allowable expense deductions). For small firms, and firms which
are only breaking even or making a small amount of profit, this provides no incentive to allocate
scarce resources to training. According to the Department of Revenue and Customs in the
Ministry of Finance, however, this is not the case and training allowances are permitted on a case-
by-case basis and are granted reasonably liberally.
Another major reason cited by managers for not training is that Bhutanese workers are
excessively mobile and can "move on" or "out" at a moments notice. In addition, since Indian
workers are supposed to be phased out, there is also an automatic bias in the system against
training them, which in many firms constitutes a high component of the total labor force.
The reason most often given by firms for not training was that training was not needed. Almost
all companies use mature Indian technology, and it is less expensive to hire trained workers from
the large available pool on the border than to train their own staff. In fact, some managers
indicated that they stay with older Indian technology, rather than upgrading, specifically because
it simplifies the task of finding trained workers and undertaking maintenance. Not training also
reduces the cost of worker turn over. However, the reliance on old technology, in combination
with low levels of training, augers ill for raising labor productivity and improving international
competitiveness. A final reason why managers don't see a need for training was apparent to the
sector specialist participating in the survey - often the managers themselves are technically
unskilled and do not know or fully understand the need for skills upgrading.
Given the pressing need to encourage worker training and the current misperception of what is
allowable, it is highly desirable that the policy on training be made as explicit and automatic as
possible. To this end, the Department of Revenue and Customs needs to move away from the
current case-by-case determination of allowable training expenses and devise an explicit
allowance which is freely available to all companies, without exception. The work of the
National Technical Training Authority (NTTA), which is examining ways to structure incentives
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that will make it more attractive for firms to train in an environment where Bhutanese workers are
highly mobile, will also be important.
Table 8.6: Major Reasons for not Training (% of firms responding)
Reason Percentage
No Need 64
Lack of Govermment Incentives 30
Worker Turnover 26
Cannot Afford it 25
Lack of Training by Chambers, Associations, etc 17
Percentage of the 66 firms saying they do not train.
New Labor Regulations are currently being prepared and are expected to be implemented soon.
The new regulations will extend the minimum wage to cover the private sector, set working
hours, and define overtime benefits. While it is important to ensure fairness and equity in the
workplace, one of Bhutan's comparative advantages is an absence of excessive labor regulations,
which plague many other regional countries. Developing an appropriate balance between fairness
and a desire to regulate with only a "light touch" will be important in assisting Bhutan retain its
labor market flexibility and competitive edge.
Within this context several key issues need to be considered particularly carefully. Since public
sector wages are already higher than market wages and significantly above what non-nationals
accept, the extension of the minimum wage threatens to impose an unmanageable burden on a
nascent private sector. On the other hand, developing a wage policy that provides smaller, more
frequent, and preferably automatic salary increases to the public sector - and making it very clear
that this only applies to public sector wages - would go a long way to ensuring that wages do not
lag too far behind other prices in the economy. It would also help shield the economy, and
possibly the private sector, from sudden sharp shocks in salary levels.
Policies. In designing policies to spur employment opportunities, the government must be careful
not to cripple the small and still relatively fragile, private sector. Advantages arising from labor
stability, labor flexibility, and low cost, need to be carefully calibrated against the desire to
protect workers' rights and gradually increase the share of Bhutanese workers in the formal labor
force. Flexibility in wage setting, hire and fire procedures, labor force stability, and the ability to
pick up missing skills from India, all afford Bhutan considerable advantages vis a vis other
countries in the region. Given other disadvantages faced by the private sector in Bhutan, these
advantages should not be sacrificed to the detriment of the young private sector.
A key to private sector development is raising worker productivity. This will improve the
competitiveness of Bhutanese goods even at existing wage levels. However, labor, employment,
and wages policy need to:
* Ensure that private-sector firms have access to the skills they require - including liberal
access to skilled non-nationals in the absence of adequately skilled or experienced
Bhutanese workers;
* Ensure that firms are not arbitrarily cut off from low cost Indian unskilled labor;
* Make sure that firms do not mechanize inappropriately in ways which increase the
capital-labor ratio beyond what is optimal in an effort to raise worker productivity. This
will merely reduce profits and make firms less competitive vis-a-vis countries that are
using more appropriate technology;
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* Ensure that productivity gains are achieved by transferring appropriate technologies -
through better management techniques, increased levels of worker training, and the
careful introduction of appropriate equipment;
* Promote productivity gains by moving up the value chain and producing new products.
For exarnple, in services such as IT, accounting, design, tourism, and in niche markets,
which typically have higher value added per worker but require higher skill levels;
* Permit the continued application of a flexible wages policy as well as reasonable latitude
in the ability to hire and fire.
It is critical that Bhutan invest in improving the quality of its work force. Since individual firms
will not be able to capture the full benefits of training, the government must be prepared to offset
some of the associated costs.30. Readily available tax incentives, matching grants schemes that
share the costs of training or acquiring technology, and direct subsidies for training are all ways
that should be considered. In addition it is necessary to align the educational and vocational
training programs with the needs of private industry and to invest further resources in secondary
and higher education.
4. Technology Issues
To enter world market and successfully compete with imports, Bhutanese firms must dramatically
improve their productivity. Not only must they seek to upgrade their human capital but they must
also adopt appropriate new technology. The advantages offered by preferential access to Indian
markets, in combination with high Indian tariffs and the natural protection provided by Bhutan's
remote location, have led to little domestic competition and created few incentives for firms to
seek productivity improvements. Investment is low and is mainly directed at increasing
production or replacing worn machinery with existing, mostly Indian, technology. Very few
resources are devoted to improving production processes or introducing new products. This, in
combination with a lack of worker training, has led to low productivity and makes most
Bhutanese products uncompetitive both globally and within the South Asia region.
Long experience in many countries has shown that learning mechanisms, which help firms obtain
information on the most productive practices and improve their technical capabilities, are key
determinants of productivity growth.3 '. Such mechanisms include exporting, foreign investment,
foreign consultants, worker training, and external support services. Unfortunately, most of these
mechanisms are either poorly developed or completely lacking in Bhutan. Non-electricity exports
are extremely low, few firms train, and foreign direct investrnent has been almost totally absent (as a
result of conscious government policy). This lack of learning mechanisms is exacerbated by the fact
that most businessmen are inexperienced and many are not familiar with the technical aspects of their
business. They either don't recognize the importance of technical innovation or do not know how to
go about making technical changes.
In the area of technology, it is important that Bhutanese companies look beyond India - the main
source of its current technology. In the past, it has been easier and cheaper for enterprises to look
across the border to obtain tried-and-true production methods supported by a ready pool of trained
30 There are large spill-over effects from firm level training that cause the net social benefits to be greater than the
private benefits captured by firms. Thus, there is suboptimal investment and the government should provide some
supporL The spillovers include: trained workers leaving and taking their skills to other firms; training by one firm
provides a demonstration effect to others; firms often provide training to suppliers and customers; firm training often
raises the quality of products and this provides benefits to its customers.
3' Biggs, T., M. Shah and P. Srivastava (1995). Technological Capabilities and Learning in African Enterprises.
World Bank Technical Paper No. 288., Washington, DC
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labor. This may not, however, always be the most efficient technology for Bhutan. With Indian
trade baniers falling, Bhutan will have to compete globally and this will require adopting
international best practices. This may mean that Bhutanese companies have to leapfrog Indian
technologies and take up more developed third-country technologies. Although this may be more
expensive and difficult, it will help ensure competitiveness in world markets. Strengthening the
private sector in Bhutan requires improving productivity and that necessitates dramatically enhancing
the learning mechanisms that allow firms to improve productivity.
Key technology areas. Technology is a general term and covers a wide variety of issues. The
areas that are most relevant to Bhutan include management knowledge; market knowledge;
production technology; design and product development; information technology; and
management and quality systems.
(a) Management knowledge. Management is weak in firms - owners commonly lack
technical qualifications or relevant prior experience. Owners and managers need to be
more aware of appropriate "best practice" before they can effectively transfer new
technologies to their firms. In other developing countries, many managers develop skills
and knowledge of best practices by working for foreign companies or attending technical
courses abroad. However, in Bhutan this practice is rare. Less than 13 percent of the
managers in the sample ever worked for a foreign company, almost all in India. This
compares with Nepal, where a similar survey found that over 51 percent of managers
reported working outside the country. While over 60 percent of managers in the sample
studied outside of Bhutan, most went for non-technical basic education with no direct
relationship to their business (frequently in their forner civil service capacity).
(b) Market knowledge. As a result of Bhutan's past isolation - and the government's market
dominance - firms lack an awareness of marketing and are unfamiliar with marketing
tools. The identification and penetration of market niches is also made difficult as the
relevant skills are not present in Bhutan and Indian expertise may be inappropriate.
(c) Production technology. Productivity and quality in Bhutan are not up to international
standards as a result of weak management, old equipment, insufficient maintenance, and
bad operator skills. If inputs are no cheaper and/or better quality than India's, firms need
to leapfrog Indian technology and use globally competitive know-how. Production
management needs improving so managers can optimize existing resources and any
future investment.
(d) Design and product development. Innovative products are seen as a way forward to
address niche markets in the agroprocessing, wood, and tourism sectors. Firms need to
develop product policy - procedures to balance market needs with suppliers' resources -
followed by market-driven, product-specific briefs and new product development.
(e) Information technology. Firms are struggling to introduce IT, which is essential in areas
such as financial management, technology searches, 32 and in developing market links.
(f) Management and quality systems. Product consistency is lacking in many firms. Firms
would, for example, benefit from ISO 9000 and HACCP to respectively guide
organizations towards improved performance and ensure food quality. 3
32 To demonstrate the power of IT in gaining market information, 500,000 documents were accessed in a very short
period of time when a search engine was asked for information on aromatherapy - one of the niche products identified
in Chapter Three on agroprocessing.
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Difficulties in technology transfer. Firms experience difficulties in searching for, acquiring,
and absorbing technology. Some managers reported that it can take up to two years to reach a
point where the firm is reaping the full benefits of a new technology. Due to the costs and
difficulties in making technological changes, firms in Bhutan often forgo upgrading and rely on
familiar technologies from India. While this lowers costs, it results in enterprises staying with old
technology that rapidly becomes uncompetitive.
Searchingfor technology. Large fimns generally use their equipment suppliers and buyers to
identify sources of technology, but many recognize they need more advanced technology which
they cannot easily identify. Often small companies are using guesswork to estimate their
technology and provider needs - frequently leading to costly mistakes.
Acquiring technology. Although time-consuming, acquiring technology is less problematic, if
companies use reliable suppliers who commission the equipment and provide operator training.
However, with used equipment, firms often find the equipment is incorrect and/or defective.
Hiring consultants is also problematic as many of them may be inappropriate unless
recommended by a supplier or buyer.
Absorbing technology. Absorbing, or internalizing, technology presents a significant problem.
Once production technology is acquired, it frequently has to be adapted to meet specific orders
from customers. Some firms said that such absorption problems can add one-third to overall
technology transfer costs. Maintenance and spare parts add further difficulties. With information
technology, for example, the interviews revealed that three-quarters of the firms experienced
difficulties in adequately training staff, in obtaining back-up service, or in developing and
customizing software.
Learning mechanisms. To help overcome these problems, it is essential that efforts be made to
create an information-rich environment of training opportunities (from both institutional or private
sources) and information sources that address specific business problems in addition to fostering the
availability of networks of specialized consultants. Some possible learning mechanisms include:
Government and Development Agencies. In many countries there is a network of institutions
often supported by the government or donor agencies, which provide sources of training,
technical information, recommendations on consultants, and other ways for firms to obtain
information and assistance in finding and absorbing new technologies. The institutions are
funded and managed in a wide variety of ways, but all seek to build partnerships with the private
sector. There appears to be few similar institutions in Bhutan. For example, firms could benefit
from the voluntary services of retired executives from developed countries, particularly to obtain
management technologies and to catalyze other technology transfer.
Business Associations. Business associations can play a key role in helping small enterprises
identify and obtain technology. They do this by sharing information among peers and helping
form cooperative agreements between firms. Often individual firms need outside help to
overcome coordination problems and form cooperative agreements between competitor
enterprises. Associations also serve to lobby the government to help establish institutions to
33 ISO 9000 is primarily concemed with 'quality managemenf' of all the features of a product (or service) which are
required by the customer. ISO 9000 is concemed about the way an organization goes about its work and not directly
the result of this work. Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) is a proactive process control system by
which food quality is ensured. It is mandatory in some countries and includes hazard analysis, identifying critical
control points (CCP), establishing critical limits for each CCP, monitoring CCP requirements, and using the data
gathered to effectively control processes.
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promote technology transfer. In Bhutan, associations are at a rudimentary stage of development
and the perception is that information does not flow between firms.
Exports. Exporting brings many benefits including technology transfer since firms often learn
about new technologies in the process of exporting. To be competitive in export markets, firms
are forced to undertake market research and to work closely with their buyers. Often, buyers will
work closely with their producers to help them design products, improve quality, and assure a
consistent supply.
Foreign Consultants and Matching-Grant schemes (MGS). Another important learning
mechanism is consultants and equipment suppliers. Unfortunately, there are few consultants with
technical knowledge in Bhutan and very few equipment suppliers with a permanent presence. So
there are not many places for firms to find new technologies. Bringing in consultants is usually
prohibitively expensive for a small enterprise. MGSs are popular donor-sponsored programs,
which foster technology transfers by sharing such costs. Firms implement approved projects and
about half the costs are reimbursed. The schemes are generally run by international contractors
who may hire sector specialists to advise firms on business planning, on sources of technology,
and on project implementation. All Bhutan's main trading partners have implemented or are
implementing MGSs.
BOX 8.1: MATCHING GRANT SCHEMES
Matching-Grant Schemes (MGS) are a common mechanism (funded by organizations such as the EU
and the World Bank) that allow firms to access international technology at a subsidized cost. (The
subsidies exclude the cost of hardware). The schemes consist of a technology fund, which is usually
managed by an international contractor, responsible to a steering committee generally representing
government and the private sector. The schemes may last 3 to 5 years. Contractors are usually selected
by international tender.
Capable firms, or groups of firms, which want to obtain technology, submit a project detailing the
relevant technology, the provider of the technology, and the cost of its acquisition. Usually firms have
to submit a business plan to show how the project fits into the overall business development of the
company. In assessing projects, contractors should ensure that the firm would not have undertaken the
project without the fund, and that there will be some form of spillover from the project into the wider
economy, eg. other fums will copy the assisted firm.
Once approved, the firm implements the project and, on completion, recoups part of the cost (typically
50 percent) from the fund. The schemes' contractors may be required to hire staff familiar with the
sector(s) being assisted. These personnel advise firms on business planning, on sources of technology,
and may advise during project implementation. Activities eligible for support could include production
assistance; marketing; product design; management development; training, joint-venture partner
searches, business association development; and other necessary technologies.
5. Financial Sector Issues
As is common in many developing countries, Bhutan's immature financial system adds to the
cost of doing business and handicaps investment. While the banks' high liquidity position
demonstrate that they are efficient at mobilizing savings, the survey results indicate that they are
less successful at transforming these funds into productive loans. Firms reported finance as their
fourth biggest business problem. Most of the complaints centered around the high cost of
borrowing and the lack of access to credit, which restrict investment and force companies to rely
on internally generated funds to finance the majority of new investments.
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Cost of Borrowing. A major concern cited by surveyed firms was the very high level of nominal
and real interest rates. Most lending is within the range of 13 to 16 percent - when consumer
prices have been increasing at between 3 and 6 percent over the past two to three years -
implying real interest rates of 7 to 10 percent. In addition, there has been very little change in
these lending rates for most of the 1 990s, and the banks appear to use a sectoral matrix of lending
to determine rates rather than an individual assessment of a particular borrower's risk profile.
The banks justify the high interest rates by pointing to their high liquidity position, which has left
a large share of total bank funds underutilized. This has increased interest rate spreads and the
upper limits on lending rates. High interest rates are also blamed on the relatively high level of -
non-performing assets (interviews suggest this is around 15 percent) in the banking system, which
has further increased banking costs. The Royal Monetary Authority now allows banks to
redeposit large excess fund balances with banks in India (currently between 30 to 40 percent of
their assets are in these almost risk-less foreign deposits), earning reasonable rates of retumn,
thereby helping to reduce the overall level of non-income-earning assets on the balance sheets of
the banks. Developing alternative remunerative outlets for commercial banking funds will assist
in narrowing spreads and bringing down the high fees on banking transactions. However,
providing risk-less forms of investment in India also reduces the incentives for banks to find ways
to increase riskier private-sector lending within Bhutan.
Many bank customers informed the survey team that interest rates are determined for the
commercial banks by the Royal Monetary Authority when, in fact, the RMA deregulated interest
rates some time ago. It is important that the RMA actively publicize the fact that banks are free
to determine their own lending rates and that customers are free to negotiate rates unimpeded by
any restrictions from the central monetary authorities. This may assist in injecting some much
needed competition into the banking system.
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that banks in Bhutan set interest rates based upon sector of
lending, although it was difficult to obtain hard evidence on this. Many underdeveloped banking
systems determine interest rates based upon a matrix of "sectors" and "terms" rather than on the
underlying risk profile of the actual borrower. Training bank credit officers to properly assess
risk is an important step in moving the banks away from more simplistic and less relevant criteria
in determining interest rates, as well as helping in make interest rates more market determined.
As well as being high, interest rates are also extremely inflexible, with little variation in rates
based upon changing economic circumstances. This lack of market orientation is driven by lack
of competition in the banking system along with a lack of innovation and creativity throughout
the sector more generally. Issues of innovation, creativity, and market orientation are likely to be
best addressed by increased competition for both depositor funds and for lending opportunities.
Frequently, the best forms of financial-sector competition in small, underdeveloped banking
systems come from non-bank sources. Leasing companies, insurance companies, venture capital,
and private debt instruments, among others, can all provide effective and efficient competition for
the banks.
Collateral. Collateral requirements, which remain high despite claims to the contrary, also add
to the cost of funds (see Table 8.7). In interviews, banks stated that as a general rule they demand
that project finance be secured by property worth only 33 percent of value of the loan. In
addition, they accept machinery and other equipment purchased by the loan as security.
However, interviews revealed that firms actually face considerably higher collateral requirements
from the banks and that machinery is often not acceptable. More than half of the sampled firms'
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outstanding commercial bank loans required more than 100 percent collateral and for the
development lenders the median collateral requirement was 116 percent.
Table 8.7: Interest Rates and Collateral Ratios
Interest Rates Collateral Ratio
Bank Loans
Mean 13.4 86.2
Median 13.0 100
Development Institutions*
Mean 13.7 116
Median 13.5 150
Overdrafts
Mean 14.4
Median 15.0
Nepal
Mean 14.3 190
* BDFC and RICB
Access. Despite the banking system's high liquidity, the survey results show that, in addition to
cost, access to credit is also a major problem. Almost 43 percent of firms claimed to be credit
constrained, i.e., wanting to borrow more at current interest rates. Close to 30 percent of firms
had neither short-term nor long-term bank credit, and 8 percent had been rejected for a bank loan.
More than one-quarter of the firms had never bothered to apply for a loan, with the majority
saying that they either did not need credit or they did not believe that they would receive a loan,
so never asked.34 The median number of banks that firns reported dealing with is only two and
40 percent of the sample used only one bank - or none. The lack of multiple bank usage
reinforces the point of a shallow financial system.
Table 8.8: Percentage of Credit-Constrained Firms
Manufacturing Service Full Sample Nepal
Credit Constrained 40 46.5 42.5 32.3
No Bank Credit 25 33.33 28.5 26
Never Applied 25 29 26.5 20
Rejected for a Loan 9 5.5 7.5 5
More than 2 Banks 11 7.5 9.5
Companies in the service sector were more likely to be credit constrained than manufacturing
companies. This may reflect the fact that service companies generally have fewer physical assets
to pledge for collateral than manufacturing companies - or the fact that lenders are less
comfortable assessing the risks of service providers such as tour operators, transportation firms,
34 When firms say that they do not need credit it is hard to disentangle their lack of desire for credit from the effect of
the high cost. Although firms are specifically asked if it is a matter of not wanting credit or it being too expensive,
many managers say they do not want credit when they mean that they do not want credit at the current cost and security
requirements. Many entrepreneurs said that they could afford to borrow but do not believe in taking on debt
However, this can be seen as a reflection of immaturity of the financial system - as well as of the private sector.
Entrepreneurs are scared to take on debt or have not been adequately educated on how to manage debt.
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and computer-training schools. The service sector's difficulty obtaining credit is also reflected by
the fact that fewer service companies than manufacturing companies have bank credit.
Information and Enforcement. Banks base their reluctance to lend on two factors. The first is
the lack of available information and mechanisms to collect information that makes lenders
unable to identify enough profitable projects in a risky environment. Consequently, they prefer to
earn good returns in relatively risk-less deposits in Indian Banks. Most firms do not keep
accurate and transparent financial accounts, an issue discussed further below, and there are no
credit-rating agencies or other institutions geared to providing information on borrowers. In such
a small, thin market, where few firms are diversified, the market is particularly vulnerable to
shocks of any kind, and it is difficult to make earnings predictions. In addition, because of the
lack of information and inadequately trained loan officers banks are unable to adequately monitor
the use of borrowed funds.
The second impediment to increased lending is the inability to enforce contracts. Although the
legal code is improving rapidly and many new laws have been passed, financial institutions still
find it difficult to enforce agreements or seize collateral. The laws may be adequate, but they are
not enforced. For example, banks reported that it is against the criminal code to pass checks with
insufficient funds; however, no one has ever tried to enforce this law. Consequently banks report
that even government agencies are hesitant to take checks. Courts are extremely slow and
inefficient, and it is almost impossible to seize the assets of borrowers who default unless the
property is directly attached to the loan. Thus all loans demand high levels of collateral,
specifically tied to a loan, so that it can be seized to offset the cost of long, drawn out court
proceedings. The fact that the courts are considered a very inefficient way to resolve disputes is
evidenced by the fact that only around 5 percent of firms in the survey reported hiring a lawyer or
threatening to take a client to court for nonpayment. Improving and streamlining the legal system
would help improve access to capital and probably also lower its cost. In addition it would
facilitate trade by helping increase the amount of trade credit firms are willing to extend.
Table 8.9: Nonpayment
% of Firms Reporting Nonpayment in the last year 31
Average Times of nonpayment 10.4
% of Firms Hiring Lawyers 6.0
% Going to Court 5.3
Efficiency and Fees. The payments system and other banking services are relatively inefficient
and costly, leading to a high proportion of business being conducted on a cash basis. This raises
the cost of doing business for all sectors but particularly for the tourist sector and firms
attempting to export to third countries. The payments system and check clearing is
extraordinarily slow - discouraging firms from accepting checks or other noncash forms of
payment. One study suggests that clearing can take as much as 19 days between Paro and
Thimphu.35 There are a myriad of fees that banks charge which also contributes to the cost of
using banks and the formal financial system. For example, one bank levies a fee of 0.25 percent
to move money from Thimphu to its branch in Phuentsholing, and it can take several days to
move the funds. In most countries such a service is free. As the private sector grows, especially
as foreign investors come to Bhutan and exports increase, the inefficiency of the payments system
and banking services will become a severe impediment to doing business.
35 Financial Sector Vision Concept Note, World Bank 2000
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Absence of Innovative Financial Instruments. As indicated, the existing banking system
provides very few innovative lending instruments. The survey team only came across one
example of factoring services in which the Royal Insurance Corporation of Bhutan (RICB)
provided loans to one private-sector entity based upon work orders. However, this practice did
not appear to be common. Other missing services include venture capital (or risk capital) for
start-up enterprises; leasing finance; private debt markets; ATM outlets; electronic banking; or
even credit or debit card facilities. Two of these - leasing and private debt markets - are
discussed further below.
Leasing. Leasing is a potentially powerful, yet relatively simple financial service, which is
increasingly offered in the developing world. Such financing has several important advantages
for small and medium-scale enterprises. Most important, the leased equipment (truck, bus, car,
machinery, etc.) belongs to the finance company throughout the period of the lease.
Consequently, repossession in the case of nonpayment of the lease is extremely simple and no
long legal process is required. Indeed, the leased equipment most often forms the collateral for
the underlying transaction thereby negating the need for the "borrower" to provide large amounts
of security against the loan. These two advantages are particularly powerful in environments
such as Bhutan's. In addition, in many countries, leasing offers a tax advantage over borrowing
because the cost of a lease can be written off as a tax-deductible operational expense.
Many countries have effectively established leasing companies which, in addition to providing
new and important financial instruments to the private sector, have provided effective
competition to the existing commercial banking sector. The Royal Monetary Authority (RMA)
should actively examine the establishment of private leasing companies to support such activities
in Bhutan.
Private Debt Markets and Inter-Company Borrowings. Another potentially effective method of
providing more competition for the banking system is to intermediate funds flows outside of the
banking system through the development of private debt markets. In many countries, good name
companies with sound financials, will issue their own debt into the domestic market. Like a
government debt market, this provides funding directly to an enterprise without channeling funds
through the banking system. Commercial banks receive fewer deposits as a result (thereby
reducing their potential over liquidity) and savers and borrowers can both gain from higher rates
(for savers) and lower rates (for borrowers) as the intermediation mechanisms squeezes interest
margins more effectively than intermediating through a commercial bank.
The main concern when developing such new markets is that the issuer of the debt must be of
sufficiently good standing and in reasonable financial condition, so that the risk is acceptable;
particularly for unsophisticated depositors who will (at least initially) be unfamiliar with properly
assessing the risks and rewards of investing in these new instruments. In addition, given the very
small number of sufficiently large good-name firms, the market for such issues is bound to be
small in the first instance, although the demand for such instruments may well be high.
Nonetheless, given the potential benefits that could accrue for both investors and borrowers, the
RMA should seriously examine the development of such markets in Bhutan.
Other Issues in the Financial Sector. In addition to the above, the following four issues
emerged from the survey as areas of concern for the private sector with respect to the financial
sector:
(a) Inversion of Interest Rates on Term Lending. In virtually all enterprises surveyed, the
interest rates on short-term lending were higher than the interest rates on long-term
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lending (See Table 8.7). In most countries, the risk of longer-term lending is considered
to be higher than that for short-term lending and the rates on the former are generally
higher than on the latter. It would be useful for the RMA and the AsDB to examine why
rates are inverted in Bhutan.
(b) Debit Cards. To the extent that credit card payments are possible at all in Bhutan, the
charges on such transactions tend to be extremely high (7 to 8 percent in the case of some
hotels). This, most importantly, impacts the tourism industry where foreigners from
Europe, Japan, and North America mainly use "plastic money" to effect their transactions
rather than cash or even traveler's checks. Making credit card facilities more accessible
throughout Bhutan, as well as examining ways of reducing their costs, is likely to have a
beneficial impact upon the efficiency of payment mechanisms in the country generally
and in tourism and related industries, such as handicrafts, in particular.
(c) Debt-Equity Mix in Private Sector Companies. Many companies are not skilled at
determining the most appropriate debt-to-equity mix within their business operations.
Many companies undertook no borrowing whatsoever, apparently because they had an
aversion to debt of any kind rather than any inability to borrow from the banking system.
Other companies had significantly over-leveraged themselves to the banks and were
experiencing financial problems as a result. Better training in securing the best mix of
finance in their business undertakings would be a useful tool for many entrepreneurs.
(d) Royal Monetary Authority. The survey team encountered several issues where the
RMA became the scapegoat for the actions of other parties. These included: (i) the
general perception that it is the RMA that sets interest rates - by sector and level - for the
banks; and (ii) the fact that the RMA is seen to be stopping the use of "hard currency" to
purchase raw materials for the export of goods to "non-hard currency" India. It may be
useful to explain, in both cases (and there may be other examples) what the role of the
central bank is vis-a-vis the Ministry of Finance and the commercial banks.
The survey team strongly feels that the existing policy prohibiting the use of hard
currency to purchase intermediate inputs for final products sold into India needs to be
reviewed. The reasons for this are three fold: (i) the demand for such funding is likely to
be relatively small; (ii) Bhutan has considerable reserves of foreign exchange (even after
deducting the financing for the two new Druk Air planes and medium-term debt servicing
needs); and (iii) the Indian market is well known and the easiest, for novice private-sector
entrepreneurs to penetrate. Creating barriers for entry into this market serves as a
significant impediment in permitting them to "grow into" the more difficult and less well
known non-Indian export markets.
Investment. The lack of credit and its high costs directly contributes to the low level of
investment in the Bhutanese private sector. Over one-quarter of the surveyed firms made no
investments during the last three years, though service firms were more likely to invest than
manufacturing firms. The median equipment-investment-to-capital ratio was .05, which is higher
than Nepal and some developing countries but low by international standards. But at 5 percent,
the investment rate is still well below the 10 percent average rate of depreciation found in many
developing countries. This suggests that most companies are running down their capital stock
faster than they are replacing it. The average age of machinery in the manufacturing sector was
6-10 years but only 1-5 years in the service sector. This, however, masks a wide variation. In
almost 44 percent of manufacturing firms, the average equipment age is more than 11 years old.
Clearly there is a need for increased investment if Bhutanese industry is going to improve its
productivity and competitiveness.
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Table 8.10: Percentage of Firms that Invested Over the Last Three Years (1999 to 2001)
Manufacturing Services Full Nepal Manufacturing
Sample 1999
% who Invested 71 78 74
Avg. Capacity Utilization 60 50 58.3 58
Avg. Age of Machinery 6-10 1-5 6-10
Median I/K* .05 .21 .09 .014
* Investment in 2000/value of Capital Stock
The low level of investment has many causes. Firms primarily cite the perceived lack of demand.
With the average firm operating at only 58 percent capacity utilization, they see little cause to
expand. But firms still need to invest to improve their productivity and competitiveness, and the
high costs and poor availability of finance make this difficult. Despite the banking sector's high
level of liquidity, most new investment is financed out of internally generated funds such as
retained earnings, borrowing from friends and families, and personal savings (see Table 8.11).
This puts companies in a doubly difficult position. Firms have to delay investing until they have
accumulated sufficient internal capital to cover costs. As their equipment ages, it is difficult to
maintain competitiveness, which in turn makes it hard to raise sales and build up capital to
replace old equipment. On average, banks fnanced less than 25 percent of the sample firms'
most recent equipment investment.36 However, this is still more than in Nepal where a recent
survey found that the banks funded less than 20 percent of equipment investment.
Table 8.11: How Investment is Financed - Average Percentage of Financing for the Most
Recent Investment
Manufacturing Services Full Sample
Retained Earnings 49 37 44
Personal savings 16 23 19
Borrow from Relatives 4 4 4
Bank Loans 24 24 24
Bank Over Drafts 1 6 3
Equity 0 0 0
Other 6 6 6
Conclusion. Bhutan has made important strides in developing its financial sector. However, it is
still far below what is needed to make Bhutan internationally competitive. The weakness in the
financial system will become an even more important constraint as the private sector grows and
especially as foreign investors enter Bhutan and local firms attempt to break into world markets.
Nonetheless, it is clear that the cost and efficiency of banking services needs to be improved and
encouraging competition and innovation in financial instruments will certainly help. The results
of the Asian Development Bank-funded financial-sector study will be important - as will the role
of the Royal Monetary Authority - in helping to create more effective financial markets and
financial instruments in Bhutan.
36 The study focuses on equipment investment only because the vast majority of recent investment expenditures is for
equipment. Investment in buildings was insignificant.
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6. Land Issues
Even though land is not always easy to obtain, access to land did not emerge as a major issue in
the survey. The government has established industrial estates in Phuentsholing, Thimphu,
Gelephu, and Samdrup Jongkhar. The best developed of these is the one at Phuentsholing which
comprises 58 acres of fully serviced sites developed in 1979. With 25 industries in the
Phuentsholing site, it is fully occupied and there is no more space for additional establishments.
The government does, however, wish to construct additional new sites in the Phuentsholing area
close to the Indian border. The Thimphu industrial site is currently under construction 26 kms
outside of the city center. Known as the Jemina Industrial estate, the incomplete site currently
hosts two industries (a hollow-block manufacturing firm and a handmade paper industry).
Additional serviced land for industrial development in Thimphu exists in the Changzamtog
Service Center, which was established for service industries. The government is currently trying
to relocate some of these industries further outside of Thimphu.
To facilitate industrial development and overcome space and infrastructure constraints, during the
Ninth Five-Year Plan, the Royal Government has identified and approved the following five
industrial sites:
* Singhi Gaon for the Southwestern Region - a new site 16 kms west from Phuentsholing
on an already surveyed 267-acre site;
* Chuwabari for the South Central Region - at Geylegphug, the 300-acre site is 15 kms
outside of the town;
* Samdrup Jonghar for the Southeastern Region - a 3 1-acre site near to Samdrup
Jonghar;
* Bodima for the Northeastern Region - at a location 22 kms away from Mongar;
* Tingtibi for the Central Region - 21 kms away from Shemgang on the central highway.
Traditionally the rates charged at these industrial estates have been very low - providing an
effective subsidy for industrial investors - but often with an eye to trying to direct industry away
from preferred sites close to border areas in the south. This policy was motivated by the
difficulty of controlling the use of non-Bhutanese workers in the border areas and a desire to
diversify employment opportunities. There does, however, appear to be a recent change of policy
with the government now discussing the potential of developing industrial estates near to Indian
border areas - particularly around Phuentsholing and Gelephu.
7. Taxation/Auditing and Accounting Issues
In accordance with the Revenue Tax Laws of the Royal Government of Bhutan, every private
sector enterprise (around 6,000) is required to prepare annual accounts and every registered
company (around 125) is required to produce externally audited financial statements. The main
purpose of this requirement from the public sector's point of view is to ensure that proper tax
assessments can be made. Despite the legal requirement, the accounting and auditing tradition in
Bhutan is extremely weak and many companies do not keep any accounts. Others keep two sets
of accounts; one for the tax authorities and one for management. The lack of transparent
accounts and poor accounting standards is an important impediment to growth in several ways.
First, the lack of good information discourages lending or investing by making it difficult to
evaluate company financial strength. Second, and more importantly, firms are not using
accounting as a management tool to improve their competitiveness. It is difficult to lower costs,
or be cost effective, if you don't know what your costs are.
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Absence of Accounting Data. In many surveyed companies, books of accounts, as required by
the Revenue Tax Policy, were not maintained. Indeed, accounting is seen as a "necessary evil"
undertaken for the tax authorities rather than as a management tool. As a result, the very purpose
of accounting and internal control -providing managers information so they can make decisions
- is largely unrecognized and perceived as being unimportant. For example, there appears to be
very little day-to-day collection of accounting information - with most vouchers and receipts
being maintained until the end of the year when the accounts are compiled for the tax authorities.
In addition to a lack of up-to-date financial data, in many cases firms do not maintain stock
registers and fixed-asset registers, so it is not even possible to monitor the quantitative movement
of materials used. Similarly, it is very difficult to obtain information on the acquisition and
location of fixed assets; books of primary records, and general and party ledgers are not always
kept in accordance with accounting principles and standards. Most of the companies do not
prepare periodic (half-yearly/ quarterly/ monthly) trial balances, profit and loss accounts or
balance-sheet information.
To fill the gap in accurate company accounts, personnel from the Revenue Department are
deputed to conduct audits in most enterprises every two or three years (although the actual
frequency of audits appears to vary widely). In many cases these audits result in a demand for
additional tax payments because firms are often unclear on what constitutes an allowable
deductible expense for taxation purposes. Areas of confusion, in this respect, include: limitations
on write-off of staff expenses (tax deductions for salary payments had been allowable to only
Nu2O,000 per month but this was recently increased to Nu6O,000); ad hoc arrangements with
respect to the write-off of training expenses in firms; sales promotion and advertising are limited
to 2 percent of total profits; and limitations on the write-off of substantial repairs, which do not
create any new asset. The limits on tax allowances and inflexible or ad hoc application of rules
by the tax authorities can have a perverse impact on the development of the private sector. They
can actually discourage companies from desirable actions such as hiring skilled workers or
training existing staff. The rules on tax-deductible expenses need to be reviewed to ensure that
they are reasonably liberal (within prudent fiscal constraints), and they should also be made
transparent and easily applicable.
Over time it is important to develop much better accounting systems within the private sector
supported by well-qualified accountants and auditors. In particular, a greater emphasis on
internal auditing functions will help firms develop better financial control. In addition to
assisting the tax authorities, establishing better financial records, information, and control within
private sector enterprises will help firms control their costs and obtain financing. These moves
will require the "auditing net" to gradually expand and encompass increasingly more - and by
necessity - smaller firms. To support these goals, the government needs to devote more
resources to developing auditing and accounting skills; the NTTA has already made a good start
on this by establishing accounting training courses. Emphasis will also need to be placed on
standardizing accounting information.
Box 8.2 provides some of the main observations and conclusions regarding accounting and
auditing issues in Bhutan - in many cases with specific relevance to taxation.
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BOX 8.2: ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING ISSUES
1. Accounting for the Private Sector - accounting skills are weak in Bhutan, and the use of a formalized
accounting systems as a modem management tool is missing in most private sector companies. To help improve
standards, existing license holders performing accounting jobs should attach a responsibility statement with the
accounts stating that the financial statements have been prepared by them in accordance with the books and
vouchers maintained by the entrepreneurs and that they are in accordance with the accepted principles of
accounting. Proper training should also be provided to Bhutanese students in accountancy and computers.
2. Auditing - private sector unincorporated entities are not audited. Indeed, well-trained audit
professionals are not available in Bhutan and these skills are currently provided by Indian chartered accountants.
Good young Bhutanese accountants should be sent to India or abroad to obtain their audit qualifications.
3. Quantitative Information - All private sector accounts should incorporate quantitative information
regarding sales, purchases, production, and stocks so that there can be a verification of the financial statements
and more reliance can be placed on them. This requires the maintenance of Stock Books.
4. Cash Transactions - very large cash transactions take place resulting in unrecorded dealings and under
reporting of income. Suitable legislation should be put in place to disallow cash transactions over a threshold
limit.
5. Delay in Assessment - tax assessments should take place annually and not with the three-to-four year
gap which currently occurs. This would increase the objectivity of the exercise as well as help the private sector
better plan their yearly tax liabilities.
6. Asset Revaluations - currently gains from asset revaluation are taxed at normal rates despite the fact
that no cash accruals arise from the exercise. With the advent of potential new joint ventures with foreigners
more accurate valuation of fixed assets will be important in terms of determining the equity contribution of
possible Bhutanese partners. More appropriate tax treatment of revalued assets is also important for insurance
purposes.
7. Substantial repairs and renovation expenses - these are considered capital expenditures and are not
allowed as admissible expenses. This provision acts as an impediment to maintaining assets in a proper way.
Tax authorities should allow such expenses either in the year in which they are incurred or as a deferred revenue
expenditure to be amortized over a period of time.
8. Tax Deduction at Source (TDS) for loss-making firms this should be reimbursed on a priority basis to
help improve the cash flow positions of such companies.
9. Tax Deductible Expenses for sales promotion, advertising, training, entertainment and salaries should
be revised and made more transparent and automatic so as to remove negative effects that current limitations
impose.
10. Double Taxation Agreements. Bhutan should consider the establishment of double tax agreements
with neighboring countries.
11. Installation of Modern Techniques - internal audit and cost accounting systems are more or less
absent in the private sector and should be installed.
12. Fixed Asset Register - a register showing the details of a firm's fixed assets is not available in most
private sector companies. Such registries should be established to assist in ascertaining the location, user, and
age of the fixed assets used in the business.
8. Infrastructure
In stark contrast to most developing countries, in Bhutan infrastructure is generally not perceived
to be an important constraint. Power provision, for example, is regular in most urban centers and
industrial sites, with few outages or brown-outs compared with neighboring countries.37 It should
be noted, however, that most of the surveys took place in larger urban areas or in specific
industrial sites on the border: In more remote and rural areas (particularly in the east), it is
understood that electricity supply is a considerable issue. Water provision was also reasonably
reliable in the surveyed areas. Telecommunications, waste disposal, and postal services were also
perceived to be operating well. This stands as no small monument to the government's
considerable efforts to support infrastructure development - although continuous improvements
need to be made to support an ever-growing, and increasingly demanding, private sector.
Transport. The only exception to the generally positive attitude towards infrastructure was with
regard to transport. Here the complaints were considerable, both with respect to road and air
transport. Over 33 percent of the sample cited transportation services as their biggest
infrastructure problem (power was next with less than 21 percent). Expensive and unreliable
transportation facilities, both air and road, emerged as the biggest single infrastructure problem in
the sample - significantly reducing Bhutan's cost competitiveness. The costs are so high that in
some industries they serve to completely overwhelm the advantage of having abundant natural
resources.
Road Transport The private sector's complaints over road transportation tended to be less
critical than with regard to air transport. To a great degree this can be attributed to the fact that,
despite the relatively poor condition of the roads, they are considerably improved compared to the
recent past. Indeed, investment in roads has been a major undertaking of the government over the
recent plan periods and will assume added importance and urgency under the Ninth Five-Year
Plan.
Nonetheless, the road network greatly influences the location of industry in Bhutan. Firms that
may be competitive in the border regions (because, for example, they export to India) may not be
competitive in locations in the center of the country. The problems of Bhutan Agro Processing,
just outside of Thimphu, compared with Bhutan Fruits in Samtse is a case in point. Indeed, most
enterprises require either raw materials to come in from or finished products to be sent out to
India, or both. The current road network creates a considerable cost disadvantage for producing
goods anywhere except along the border. During the monsoon season, landslides, which in
August 2000 cut Thimphu off from Phuentsholing for a three-week period, cause considerable
disruptions to private sector activities and have a particularly pernicious effect in terms of
maintaining external markets.
The physical characteristics of the country pose such a considerable constraint on road transport
that Bhutan is faced with a choice or either investing extremely heavily in roads (including
widening existing roads and shortening roads where possible) or focusing the development of
industries that have a heavy transport component solely along the border areas. This would imply
that only niche, less transport-reliant industries could be developed profitably in the center of the
country.
37 There was also a difference between Phuentsholing and Thimphu/Paro with respect to power. On the border, firms
said that, on average, they lost power five times a month while in Thimphu is was less than one time a month. Almost
one-third of firms in Phuentsholing had back up generators compared to only 17 percent in the center.
112
Air Transport. A major target of criticism by many companies was Druk Air and the efficiency
of Paro International Airport. Concerns included: the uncertainties and unreliability of the airline
itself; the vagaries of weather which impede flying in and out of the airport; the very high cost of
air transport services; the constraints posed by the airfield and the type of aircraft used by Druk
Air; and the lack of reliable air cargo facilities particularly from Bangkok. These limitations
impact many aspects of private sector activity from the entry of foreign tourists into the country
to the urgent need to ship raw materials in and fnished products out of the country. The cost and
unreliability of air transport is one of the major impediments faced by firms trying to penetrate
markets beyond India and is also a major constraint to the development of service industries such
as IT and niche export markets (such as fresh mushrooms).
The authorities are well aware of Paro Airport's limitations, the restrictions on the types of
aircraft that can be used in Bhutan, and the uncertainties these problems impose on shipping
goods and people. Several serious alternative airport sites are currently under consideration.
Development of an international airport at Gelephu has long been one option for the government,
although this has more recently been discounted as a result of the unrest that has occurred in the
border state of Assam. Consequently, other less desirable alternatives are currently under
consideration. In the meantime, until the airport facilities can be improved, it is critical to push
efforts to upgrade service at the existing airport.
These long-term solutions for upgrading or alternative modalities are, however, exactly that -
long term. The exigencies posed by the rising number of unemployed school leavers means that
the development of the private sector cannot wait for the building of a new airport or even the
development/upgrading of the existing road infrastructure in Bhutan. Consequently, for the short-
to medium-term future, industries which have a high transport component are-only likely to be
profitably developed along the border areas with India. This implies that the development plan
for the center of Bhutan will probably, by necessity, have to focus more on the development of
niche-type industries, where reliable and cheap transport facilities are not so crucial.
This does not mean, in the interim, that alternative options should not be actively pursued.
Indeed, given the difficult physical terrain of Bhutan, the Ministry of Transport should be
"thinking outside of the box" and actively reviewing all possible transport alternatives such as
using private charter airlines from India and Nepal to bring tourists into Bhutan, seeking to
develop helicopter services to ferry goods and passengers into and around Bhutan, and so on.
A Note on Electricity Prices. As indicated above, cheap, reliable electricity is one of Bhutan's
major comparative advantages over other countries in the South Asia region. Table 8.12, shows
electricity prices in Bhutan are less than half the cost of its closest competitor in the South Asia
region and only one-fifth the cost of some other important regional locations. This is one area of
considerable comparative advantage and several industries, such as Bhutan Carbide and
Chemicals and Bhutan Ferro Alloys were established in Bhutan on this basis. Currently, the cost
in Bhutan is subsidized; with power purchased from Chukka at NuO.3 per kw hour (produced at
around NuO.25), transmission and distribution costs of around Nu 1.0 per kw hour, and an urban
sales price of NuO.8 (Nu 0.5 in rural areas). However, the survey team learned that in 2002 the
Government intends to establish the Bhutan Power Corporation, which will be a commercial
entity responsible for power transmission and distribution. Given its commercial orientation, the
current subsidy in the electricity price will disappear over time. Although this will still leave
Bhutan's electricity prices well below regional levels, it will certainly reduce the profitability of
existing power-intensive industries in Bhutan and is likely to impact the development of new
power-intensive private sector activities.
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Table 8.12: Comparative Electricity Prices in the South Asia Region
for Industrial Usage, (prices in U.S. cents per kw hour)
Price per kw
hour
Bhutan 1.7
India
Delhi 7.7
West Bengal 7.2
Assam 7.6
Maharashtra 4.2
Uttar Pradesh 8.8
Bihar 5.6
Gujarat 9.1
Pakistan 6.2
Bangladesh 6.1
Nepal 8.2
SriLanka 6.1
SOURCE: For India, Annual Report on the State Electricity Boards,
Other countries, World Bank.
9. The Regulatory Environment
One of Bhutan's most important competitive advantages is its good governance and the friendly
business environment that this creates. The government is genuinely concerned with proper
administration and officials are seen as being honest and helpful. This is in stark contrast to some
of its neighbors, where political instability, labor unrest, corruption, and bureaucratic burdens
loom large. The good business environment and political stability will be attractive to investors,
particularly foreign investors, seeking to serve South Asia.
However, during the survey it became apparent that Bhutan is at a critical point of change and
could easily surrender this considerable advantage. Until recently, many government activities
have operated on a case-by-case basis. Many important decisions - issuing a business license,
determining allowable tax deductions, issuing permits for foreign workers, sanctioning a
particular FDI application, and so on - have been made on a case-by-case basis. Laws and
regulations are not clearly publicized or consistently implemented. Until now, this system has
served Bhutan reasonably well. Nonetheless, as the economy grows this system will increasingly
act as an impediment. The discretion that it allows could open the door to corruption and
certainly to the appearance of favoritism. Bhutan must take steps to improve transparency,
implement laws on a consistent and open basis, and guard against the corruption and bureaucratic
burden that imposes such high costs on its closest neighbors. The survey reveals that currently
most managers see the government as a benign helping hand, in contrast to other South Asian
countries. That could well change in the future unless the system is made substantially more
transparent. Several of the key issues are discussed below:
(a) Creating a Level Playing Field. An excessively large amount of private sector activity
appears to be undertaken on a "case-by-case" basis. Many businessmen and women
talked about "relationship dealing," knowing an individual and thereby being able to get
the right approval, the proper agreements, and the quick government sign off. For the
most part, these activities reflect the small nature of the Bhutanese economy and indeed
Bhutanese society and are not an indication of corruption. However, there is a thin line
between relationship dealing and what could become corrupt practices. Developing a
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very transparent and level policy environment is therefore critical in avoiding the
development of bad practices in the future.
(b) Consistency of Government Policy. A related issue is the consistency of government
policy. This takes two forms: (a) consistency of government policy between different
players in the sector, and (b) consistency of government policy over time. There was
ample evidence from the survey that different players are treated differently. Some
companies had little difficulty receiving work permits or access to land, while other
companies in the same line of work did experience difficulties. With respect to the latter
issue, some firms complained that abrupt changes in government policy towards labor,
taxation, licensing, and the export of wood products, disrupted their plans and retarded
their development. Although some of these complaints are certainly attributable to "sour
grapes," it is important that the government strive, as much as possible, to ensure policy
consistency over time as well as between different players operating in the sector.
Investors and entrepreneurs are forced to deal with high levels of uncertainty from the
world market, the weather, and other factors beyond their control. The added uncertainty
of government policy changes will serve to further increase risk and reduce investment.
The survey results indicate that government needs to make a greater effort to become
more open and consistent. In the survey managers were asked to rank the predictability
of government policies on a scale of 1-5, where 1 is completely predictable and 5 is
completely unpredictable. More than 26 percent rated government as a 4 or 5. In
addition, a large share of the private sector finds government policies difficult to predict.
More than 55 percent of the sample said that they expected the government to make
changes in regulations that are important to their business without taking into account the
views of their business (see Table 8.13).
(c) Access to Clear and Concise Information on Government Policy. To reinforce the
fact that the government does have a consistent regulatory environment within which
firms operate, it is important that information is written down and is easily available.
Indeed, operating with government Web pages may well provide the dual benefits of
providing information to private sector players while extending both the public and
private sector's use of information technology as a tool for doing businesses. Hence,
publishing exact policy guidelines on the government's policy with respect to the
employment of non-nationals, licensing policy in the south of Bhutan, writing off training
as a taxable expense, the precise schedule for the Bhutan Sales Tax, and so on would
greatly improve some of the information gaps that currently seem to exist.
Table 8.13: Government Unpredictability
Percentage of Finns
in Full Sample
Rating the govemment as unpredictable 26.3
(4 or 5 on a scale of 1- 5)
Expecting regulatory changes that will not 55.8
take into account their views.
Saying they view government as an opponent 17.0
(4 or 5 on a scale of 1-5)
(d) Licensing. One specific area of regulatory confusion appears to be the government's
policy on licensing new business activities in the south of the country, particularly in
Phuentsholing. Most companies spoke of not being able to license a new company at all,
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others spoke of long delays, while yet others understood that the government's policy on
the licensing of new businesses in the south was being reversed with a push to encourage
new activities. Given the issues of transport and labor costs discussed above, some types
of industries will only be profitable in the border areas. Policy on this therefore requires
clarification.
BOX 8.3: THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT - LAW AND JUSTICE
"Considerable progress has been made in the development of our legal system. The traditional system,
Buddhist in inspiration and based upon the laws promulgated by the Zhabdrung and, codified during the
period of the First Temporal Ruler of Bhutan, the Desi Umdze Tenzin Drugyel, and subsequently modified,
well served the needs of the society. Justice was sought through structures of mediation; different hierarchy
of officialdom rendered judgments. These laws were formalized in the Thrimzhung Chhenmno, the
"Supreme Law", which is a comprehensive code of the categories of criminal offences and the appropriate
penalties that were approved by the National Assembly in 1957.
The creation of the modern judiciary began in 1960 when Thrimpons (udges) were appointed in certain
Dzongkhags. The High Court was created in 1968, and in 1985 His Majesty appointed the first Chief Justice,
who is both the administrative head of the Judiciary and presides over certain kinds of cases. Under the High
Court there are dzongkhag courts and dungkhag courts. At the village level, disputes are mediated by the
gup and the chimi, who is the people's representative in the National Assembly.
In recent years, progress has been made in training legal staff, lawyers, jabmis (lay legal representatives well-
versed in the law), mediators and otherjudicial or quasi-judicial personnel. Modern computer-based
technology is being applied to the system and procedures for the courts are being developed and clarified.
The development of a modern legal and justice system will pose many challenges to the Royal Government.
Amongst these will be the strengthening of physical infrastructure and office automation., the expansion of
legal services and the integration of a modern system with Buddhist thought.
Laws enacted by the National Assembly and administered by the executive organs of the Royal Government
have now become the primary instrument for the creation of the legal framework required for development.
The National Assembly has passed several laws to established regularity and predictability in various fields
of the economy and the market. It is expected that The Industrial Property Act, The Copyright Act, The
Commercial Sale of Goods Act and The Cooperatives Act will be among those passed at the next session.
As the reach of law encompasses more and more aspects of life, laws passed by the National Assembly have
become the means for setting norms of expected behavior, its regulation, the consequences of violating those
norms, as well as establishing the rights of individuals in various situations and relationships. The first piece
of legislation passed by the National Assembly after His Majesty came to the throne in 1974 was The
Wildlife Act. Other laws that may be included in this category are, The Motor Vehicle Act, The Land Act,
The Marriage Act and amendments covering rape and child support, The Inheritance Act, The Loan Act, The
National Security Act and The Nature Conservation and Forest Act.
Laws have been enacted that establish or regulate the proceedings of State organs, such as The National
Assembly Act, The Chathrim for the Council of Ministers, The Police Act and The Financial Act."
"Development Towards Gross National Happiness," Seventh Round Table Meeting, 7-9 November 2000,
Thimphu, Bhutan, pages 96 to 97.
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10. The Trade Regime
In terms of the trade regime, two main issues emerged from the survey. The first is the
movement of most countries, but specifically India, to lower tariff rates under the World Trade
Organization (WTO), and the second is the lack of export incentives given to Bhutanese firms.
Liberalization of Trade in India. There is a growing concern among some exporting businesses
over the increasing liberalization of trade in India and the impact that this will have on Bhutan.
This gradual movement towards a lower tariff structure in India will reduce the benefits of
Bhutan's preferential access. Without the protection of India's high tariff structure Bhutan will
have to become more cost efficient if it is to retain these markets. Already some companies are
complaining about Chinese producers "dumping" cheap goods in India as tariff rates come down.
Although there is some expectation that the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers in India is
likely to take time, the dominant role of India in Bhutan's import and export trade means that
Bhutan will be forced to become more cost efficient and competitive. Table 8.14 shows that, in
1999, around three-quarters of Bhutan's imports were from India and around 95 percent of its
exports went to India.
These are events over which Bhutan has little control. It must therefore seek to adapt or gradually
be excluded from these markets. Rather than see this as a threat, however, the private sector
should see it as a challenge to adjust and become internationally competitive. This could have
further benefits of helping gain access to markets beyond India. This will mean that the private
sector will have to increasingly focus on areas of competitive advantage, while the public sector
should seek to ensure that business costs are not increased by unnecessary interventions.
Table 8.14: Bhutan's Trade with India and the Rest of the World, 1996 to 1999
Total Indian Indian Total Indian Indian Total Indian
Year Imports Imports Share Exports Exports Share Balance Balance
1999 7,834.88 5,845.28 74.6 4,987.96 4,711.23 94.5 -2,846.92 -1,134.05
1998 5,516.37 3,620.94 65.6 4,455.62 4,175.64 93.7 -1,060.75 554.70
1997 4,977.94 3,453.59 69.4 4,274.18 4,041.94 94.6 -703.76 588.35
1996 4,525.19 2,896.16 64.0 3,553.77 3,226.98 90.8 -971.42 330.82
SOURCE: Ministy of Trde and Industry
Export Incentives. In contrast to most countries in the region and indeed around the world, the
Royal Government offers no incentives to exporting firms. This is possibly due to the historically
very low level of export trade. Recently, electricity exports have taken off and now dominate
export trade . But this trade is all conducted under government-to-government deals with India,
so no incentives are needed. Non-electricity exporting firms therefore complained about the lack
of incentives, which puts them at a disadvantage exporting vis-a-vis competitors in countries that
offer incentives. The most important of these is a lack of duty exemption or duty drawback on
imported raw materials for use in export processes. As most imported raw materials originate
from India, these goods are subjected to Indian excise duties, which are reimbursed to the
government of Bhutan under the existing trade agreement between the two countries. These
rebated taxes and duties are not, however, reimbursed to the Bhutanese firm which produces for
export.
The Committee for Private Sector Development is currently looking into implementing a package
of incentives to stimulate development of the private sector with proposals for tax exemptions and
tax holidays among other possible enticements. The committee should, however, carefully weigh
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the costs of such incentives against the likely benefits. It is further understood that the
Government is examining the introduction of dry port facilities in Phuentsholing so that goods
destined for Bhutan can be consigned directly there, rather than through the port of Calcutta. The
development of such facilities requires further investigation but it could address the concerns of
some of the surveyed firms that customs clearing charges are inflated by the mandated use of
Bhutanese customs clearing agents in Calcutta.
The adoption of some form of incentive package for export industries is important. Within this
package the Committee should seriously consider the provision of duty exemption on imported
raw materials for use in the production of exported final products. The government should also
encourage banks to provide both pre-shipment and post-shipment finance in support of export
activities. Establishment of dry port facilities in Phuentsholing could also assist exporting
industries. Another incentive, which could encourage the growth of exports to India, is the
relaxation of the current restriction on the use of hard currency to import raw materials for the
production of final goods destined for India. Overall, the survey found that virtually no financial
incentives were provided to exporting companies. Such incentives, in conjunction with other
policy changes (with respect to FDI, for example), could provide important support to the growth
of export industries in Bhutan.
11. Institutional Issues
Several important institutional issues, which warrant further discussion, also emerged from the
survey.
Dominance of the Government within the Economy. Government has historically been,
remains, and very likely will continue to be for the foreseeable future, the dominant economic
force in Bhutan. Consequently, the private sector is heavily dependent upon government tenders
and government activity for its markets.38 This is particularly true of the construction industry,
which has been one of the fastest-growing private sector activities. However, relying on the
government is not a sustainable approach. Government demand is capable of supporting only a
limited private sector and focusing on government contracts discourages firms from seeking ways
to become internationally competitive. While the government's significance is unlikely to change
rapidly, it is important that over time the private sector be permitted to play an increasingly
important role, with private-to-private relationships replacing private-to-public relationships as
the dominant model.
The government has been particularly laudable in establishing the visionary development path
that Bhutan is now negotiating, but there does appear to be an element of paternalism in its
relationship with the private sector. This is reflected in a "we know better than them" attitude or
feelings that "the government is less corrupt than the private sector." While these sentiments may
well be true, they are likely to impede rather than support private sector activity. Indeed, the
Government has been trying to step back from private sector involvement and to provide space
for private sector operators to work - the privatization and corporatization plans of the RGoB are
but one important case in point. However, there may be a need for the government to accept an
even slightly lower level of service (at least initially) and to expand and speed up the withdrawal
of ownership and control so that the private sector will have enough space to grow and flourish.
38 With respect to government tenders, some firms that rely upon government tenders for their operations complained
that the RGoB placed too much emphasis on price over quality. They allege that this emphasis tended to have an
adverse impact upon Bhutanese producers and to benefit Indian producers. The government, however, contends this
allegation.
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One way to support a better public understanding of private-sector constraints may be to set up a
system of "internship" type programs for public-sector employees in key ministries and public
corporations (industry, finance, banking) to work for a two- to three-year period in private-sector
companies either inside or outside of Bhutan. Such an interchange would help develop a better
understanding of the constraints faced by the private sector. This might also have the advantage
of encouraging younger public servants to leave the public sector in pursuit of productive private-
sector lives. Alternatively, given the fact that a large majority of private sector operators came
from the public sector in the first place, it may be possible to consider reverse "intemships" of
key successful private sector operators back into the public sector for shorter periods. This might
assist in providing a greater voice for private sector concerns in public sector policy making.
Bhutan Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The role of lobby groups in support of private
sector interests is vital for the development of the sector. The private sector must have a voice in
prioritizing needs and designing policy. For example, the lack of export incentives, inattention to
training, and possible provisions in the proposed labor law are all issues that could be addressed
by a strong private-sector representative. Most importantly, a strong private-sector voice is
needed to help promote the continuation of good governance and to ensure that the government
implements policies in a consistent and transparent manner. Lobby groups will be a key factor in
helping ensure that, as Bhutan grows, bureaucratic burdens do not become the crippling problem
that they have become in other developing countries.
Consequently, the Bhutan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BCCI) and associated sectoral
associations (e.g., the Wood Association) are key. Several survey participants expressed the view
that the BCCI is not sufficiently proactive in pursuing private sector goals or in lobbying for
private sector interests with the government. There was also a feeling that the Chamber is more
supportive of commercial and trading interests than of industrial interests and that it is more
interested in the concerns of the business community in Thimphu than in other parts of the
county. The latter point appears to be borne out by the fact that the Chamber has held only two
meetings in Phuentsholing over the past two years, despite it being the second biggest city in
Bhutan and the largest industrial base in the country.
The government was instrumental in establishing the BCCI and has done much to support its
development; a member of BCCI sits in the Assembly/Parliament. The onus for stronger
representation, therefore, lies squarely with the BCCI and its private-sector members themselves.
Possible ways to strengthen BCCI include: greater interaction with other regional chambers of
commerce and the recruitment of an external private-sector representative to work with the
Chamber for several years. Such alternatives need to be actively pursued if the BCCI is to fulfill
its true potential as a successful lobbyist on behalf of private sector interests.
Central Coordination for Private Sector Activities. A common problem for governments
dealing with private sector issues is that there is no one ministry or part of government designated
to deal with the private sector. By their very nature private-sector activities are multifaceted.
While the Ministry of Trade and Industry is the closest body within the Bhutanese government
performing this role, its mandate does not cover the full range of activities that impact the sector.
Many firms expressed considerable gratitude to the Ministry of Trade and Industry for its whole-
hearted support, but expressed concern when dealing with "the other" parts of government.
As private sector activity deals with a full range of public institutions - including the Ministries
of Trade and Industry, Finance, Home Affairs, Transport and Communications, Education,
Agriculture as well as state corporations such as Electricity, Druk Air, Posts, and
Telecommunications - there is a need to have a central coordinating body which addresses all the
needs of the sector. The Committee for Private Sector Development has been an important step
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in this process. However, this committee, composed of high ranking and busy government
officials, cannot be expected to devote the time and resources necessary to address many of the
detailed private-sector concerns. Therefore, the establishment of an inter-ministerial working
group to support this committee in coordinating private-sector activities between the various
components of the government is highly desirable.
12. Benchmarking Bhutan
The private sector survey in Bhutan demonstrates that many basic business environment problems
are perceived to be less severe in Bhutan than they are in other South Asian countries. The
following three tables present comparative findings from the World Business Environment
Survey (WBES) conducted by the World Bank in 1999-2000 - providing a benchmark for the
Bhutanese results. While the questions asked in the Bhutan Enterprise Survey were not exactly
the same, some categories are comparable. Part of the Bhutan's better overall ranking can be
explained by a reluctance of Bhutanese managers to criticize the government. Nonetheless, this
does not explain all the difference, and it was clear to the interview teams that private-sector
firms in Bhutan perceive the government as being more supportive than in most other countries.
The business environment in Bhutan is seen as being more transparent and more supportive of
industry than in other countries of the region (Table 8. 15). Only 17 percent of firms in the
Bhutan sample rated laws and regulations as moderately or highly unpredictable. This contrasts
sharply with South Asia generally, where 56 percent of surveyed enterprises reported laws as
unpredictable. In this category Bhutan fares better than any region in the WBES. The next best
group is the newly industrialized countries of East Asia and even here almost 30 percent of the
sample rates laws as unpredictable. Likewise, less than 20 percent of the Bhutanese sample
perceived the government as unhelpful while 39 percent of the South Asian firms in the WBES
gave government helpfulness a low score.
Table 8.15: Predictability of Laws and Regulations
% firms rating 5 or 6 4 or 5
Predictability Helpfulness of
of Laws national
Government
Africa 0.74 0.33
MENA 0.52 0.13
East Asia 0.29 0.11
NIC/China
East Asia Dev 0.59 0.14
South Asia 0.56 0.39
BHUTAN 0.17 0.17
Explanations:
Column A: To what degree do you agree with the statement, "Interpretations of regulations affecting my firm are consistent
and predictable"? I-fu11y agree; 6=never agree
Column B: I=very helpfiul; 5=never helpful
These are only perceptions and it is hard to make cross-country comparisons as different
countries have different frames of reference. What may be perceived as a negligible problem in
one country might be considered a serious burden in another where the business environment is
better overall. Nonetheless, such comparisons give some indications of regional and country
differences. Currently Bhutan's business environment is seen as relatively supportive and
transparent. However, many decisions are made in an ad hoc fashion. Managers expressed the
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concern that the government needed to become more systematic in its approach to the private
sector - as the economy grows and becomes more diverse - to avoid corruption becoming the
problem that it has become in neighboring countries. The poor ratings of the rest of South Asia in
the WBES demonstrate the dangers that Bhutan could face.
Most managers in the sample felt that laws were predictable and viewed the government as
generally being helpful. This is reflected in the rankings that firms gave to issues related to
government regulation. Table 8.16 gives the percentage of firms reporting various government
regulations as significant problems. In all categories fewer Bhutanese firms report government
regulation as significant problems than do respondents in any other region. Firms in South Asian
have the worst perception of government regulations. The lack of regulatory interference
enhances Bhutan's competitiveness and helps inspire confidence in investors. It is something that
the government should strive to maintain.
Table 8.16: Regulatory Constraints
Percent of firms that rate 3 or 4 (moderate of major obstacle)
Business Customs/ Labor Foreign Environment Tax High taxes
Registration Trade Exchange/ Administra
Regulation Currency tion &
Regulation
Africa 0.26 0.49 0.38 0.36 0.22 0.59 0.76
MENA 0.26 0.44 0.33 0.26 0.24 0.51 0.54
East Asia 0.22 0.20 0.27 0.18 0.17 0.21 0.39
NIC/China
East Asia Dev 0.28 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.29 0.55 0.74
South Asia 0.39 0.57 0.61 0.39 0.44 0.52 0.72
BHUTAN 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.09
Table 8.17 provides rankings for the provision of government services. As expected, a higher
percentage of firms in Bhutan reported roads as a constraint than any other service. Roads were
followed by water and then power. In all categories, a smaller percentage of firms in Bhutan
rated government services as a moderate or major constraint than in South Asia in general.
Bhutan's rankings are more in line with what is reported by East Asian developing countries.
Table 8.17: Firm's Perceptions of the Quality of Public Services
Percent of firms that rate a 4,5,6 (1=very good; 6very poor)
Customs Public Works/ Postal Telephone Power Water Police
Roads Service
Africa 0.38 0.53 0.32 0.35 0.39 0.43 0.57
MENA 0.14 0.20 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.14 0.14
East Asia 0.08 0.14 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.12
NIC/China
East Asia Dev 0.32 0.41 0.09 0.15 0.19 0.25 0.37
South Asia 0.40 0.59 0.22 0.25 0.45 0.39 0.49
BHUTAN 0.15 0.40 0.09 0.08 0.23 0.30 0.18
13. Alternate Development Tracks
There is a clear difference between the opportunities and business environment in the "border
regions" and the "center," which calls for differing approaches to development. The center of
Bhutan faces considerably more disadvantages in terms of labor costs, access to raw materials,
markets for final products and transport costs. Consequently, it is more feasible to develop labor
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and raw material intensive industries in the southern region than in central Bhutan where labor
costs are appreciably higher and both inward (raw material) and outward (finished product)
transportation costs significantly increase the cost of production for anything other than the local
market. Industries in the border regions could take full advantage of Bhutan's considerably
cheaper power costs and more stable labor relationships to tap the large available pool of cheap
labor. Industry could use the border regions of Bhutan as a base to export to the region. The
further development of heavier type industries may also initially prove easier than the private
sector development strategy that would need to be developed for the center of the country.
Central Bhutan should alternatively consider focusing more on the development of services to
support labor-intensive industry in the south - and on niche-type industries. Industrial
development on the border will create a demand for a large support-services sector. There will be
a need for managers, accounting services, IT services, maintenance services, and so on. Service-
sector jobs typically demand a higher level of skill than most manufacturing jobs but also provide
higher value-added per worker and thus, higher wages. The service sector could potentially
provide an important source of well-paid employment, but it will require a significant investment
in human resources if it is to be developed.
The central region also has potential to grow niche industries that do not have a high raw material
input (particularly from outside of Bhutan) and do not produce heavy finished products that incur
high transportation costs in export. Niche industries should, to the extent possible, build upon the
agro processing base of the country - shitake mushrooms, wasabi, medicinal herbs, and so on.
For niche industries to be successful, however, quality production will be critical. Hence it is
imperative for Bhutan to establish standards and quality along with consistent production if it is
to break into these types of niche markets. In this regard, it is important that Bhutan build upon
certain advantages that provide a marketing niche, in particular, seeking to obtain certification for
its "organic" status and "sustainably managed forests." The pursuit of such standards
certification should be undertaken quickly.
In addition, central Bhutan should actively promote the development of nontraditional, niche-type
industries. This grouping could gradually include the development of IT-based industries (while
recognizing that this will be slow initially) and handicrafts as well as other industries that are not
heavily transport reliant or dependent upon low-cost labor as an input. The development of
nontraditional niche markets would be enhanced by closer interaction with international markets
and the strengthening of investment and trading linkages, which promote technological transfers
to Bhutanese companies.
One excellent example of such an activity is provided by Yangphel Handicrafts, which has
developed an export industry based upon fishing flies (see Box 8.4). This industry is particularly
instructive as it is completely nontraditional, it is based on an association with a foreign
businessman, it employs a very large number of women who appear to have a "natural aptitude"
in producing high quality flies, and it is a light-weight product that can be easily exported at low
cost. A second possible example is provided in Box 8.S.
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BOX 8.4 - YANGPHEL HANDICRAFTS
An Example of the Development of a Non-Traditional Niche Industry
The Bhutanese owner of this company originally developed the idea of producing fishing flies (a
completely non-traditional product for Bhutan) through an association with an American partner from
Montana who had been trying to develop fly-fishing tourism in Bhutan. The American partner expressed
an interest in developing an export business based upon fly production for fly-fishing. This was
considered an ideal industry as the product was light weight, could be handmade in Bhutan, and could be
easily exported by air to foreign markets. The business was started with two American experts coming to
Bhutan in September 1989 to work with and train 12 Bhutanese workers. The Bhutanese workers - most
of whom are women - appear to be particularly adept at producing high quality flies.
Competition in the industry comes from China and Southeast Asia as well as from Africa and South
America. Workers in Bhutan were relatively highly paid and so they could not compete on the basis of
price - but did appear to have a quality advantage over other competing markets. A producer in the
factory can produce 120 to 200 simple flies per day or between 12 to 20 complicated flies per day. Retail
prices in the United States and the United Kingdom (the two principal export markets) range between
US$1.50 and US$3.50 each. The company mainly employs women - out of 50 employees, only ten are
men - and workers are paid on a piece-rate basis which seems to suit women workers with children
particularly well.
The main impediment to the development of the company has been a lack of duty concessions on raw
material imports - which, in combination with Bhutan sales tax, amounted to 30 percent. These duties
reduced the competitiveness of the Bhutanese export and seriously hindered the company's relationship
with their foreign buyers who initially wished to source the bulk of their business from Bhutan. Problems
with Druk Air have also proved to be a challenge for the company as production turn around has to be
quick to be competitive (whereas it takes 3 days to get raw material to Bangkok from the United States of
the United Kingdom, it takes an average of one month to bring this material from Bangkok to Paro). The
company has been greatly assisted by the Government's decision to grant duty exemption - no BST and
no import duty - since July 2001.
However, the development of nontraditional export markets faces significant challenges.
Bhutanese entrepreneurs have few contacts with the outside world and finding markets, buyers,
and specifications for products are huge hurdles. Few buyers travel to Bhutan and, given the
difficulty traveling to the country, this is not likely to appreciably improve in the near future.
There are no sources of pre-shipment or post-shipment finance available. Letters of credit,
transferring money, and other financial services are inefficient, expensive, and probably beyond
the reach of small enterprises. The unreliable transportation system makes importing, raw
materials expensive. More important, the unreliable transportation system, particularly air
shipment makes it nearly impossible for exporting frms to adhere to strict production and
shipment schedules. As noted earlier, the lack of export incentives puts potential exporters at a
competitive disadvantage. Finally, the further development of such industries is constrained by a
lack of learning mechanisms that makes technological transfers slow and difficult. Many of these
problems could be ameliorated through foreign investment or matching-grant schemes.
Naturally, in both central and southern Bhutan, the development of industries based upon the
local availability of high-quality raw materials should also be encouraged. Examples of these
include the further development and expansion of wood-based industries, the development of
mining opportunities throughout the country, and the further growth of tourism. The first of these
activities - and agroprocessing - will, however, continue to be impacted by high transportation
costs to bring both raw materials and finished products to market.
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14. Privatization
A final issue relates to the government's privatization policy. As government gradually extracts
itself from the productive sectors of the economy and increasingly focuses on the social sectors
and other sectors where the market fails to provide requisite services, the private sector will be
able to play a larger and more dominant role. Good progress has been made in privatization over
the past decade, with the sale of shares in several important corporations to the private sector and
the corporatization of some state-owned enterprises. It will be important to continue, and
possibly accelerate, this process during the next Five-Year Plan - preferably within the
framework of a more precise and transparent privatization structure. This could include selling
the remaining minority stake holdings that the government still retains in some companies as well
as commencing the privatization process of additional companies and corporations. In addition,
the government should be seeking strategic partners to take over purely productive activities and
increasingly investigate private-sector involvement in traditionally public-sector areas such as the
social services (health and education) to the maximum extent.
BOX 8.5: INCENSE PRODUCTION - A POSSIBLE NICHE MARKET?
In the course of the survey, the team met with a company hand-producing traditional incense using a closely
guarded Tibetan formula. Its case illustrates the problems faced by potential exporters of niche products.
This is an established enterprise with a well-known product in the local market. The potential to export
incense has been growing in the Western world along with an increasing Buddhist population and the
popularity of all things Eastern. There would certainly be a strong demand for hand-made incense in the
high-end market. However, in discussions with the owner it was clear that without extensive assistance this
small enterprise would not be able to access the export market.
The first issue is that the owner has absolutely no contacts abroad or any idea of how to find buyers. From,
Bhutan this is a nearly impossible task, even in the days of Internet and good telephones. Unlike, India and
other countries, there is not a large Bhutanese community living overseas that could provide potential
contacts. There are also almost no buyers who travel to Bhutan, because of the cost and the lack of possible
producers. A second issue is that the owner knows nothing of the foreign market and would not know how
to package or design his product. For this information, he would have to rely on buyers. But attracting
buyers for a poorly designed or packaged product is difficult.
If the owner were to get an order, the local packaging technology would not be adequate and importing
packaging on such a small scale would be expensive. Given the unreliable transportation system, the
company would not be able to absolutely guarantee delivery dates. The transportation of raw materials
within Bhutan could be delayed and trucking or flying out the final product is also dependent upon the
vagaries of weather and available transportation.
The biggest problem, after finding a buyer, would be obtaining financing to support the manufacturing
process and shipment. Even if the company obtained an order, given the poor information systems and
enforcement mechanisms in Bhutan, it is unlikely that any lending institutions would be willing to incur the
administrative costs, or take the risk, of providing a small working-capital loan, even with substantial
security. This is especially true, because depositing funds into Indian banks is an almost riskless alternative.
It is unlikely that foreign buyers would risk making pre payments to finance production due to the
difficulties of communicating and the inefficient legal system.
Thus, while there is almost certainly a market for niche products such as incense, the small Bhutanese
manufacturers are not positioned to enter them. Matching grant schemes that subsidize technology transfer,
improved travel facilities, additional financial instruments along with increased competition in the financial
sector, and less restriction on FDI (allowing foreign partners), are all ways to help small producers take
advantage of Bhutan's unique culture and natural resources.
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CHAPTER NINE
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Cross-Cutting Issues and Conclusions
To absorb the rapidly expanding pool of educated labor and raise living standards for the general
population, the private sector must gradually replace government as the engine of economic
growth in Bhutan. The government is capable of providing suitable employment for only a
limited number of people and the private sector must increasingly be relied upon to supply
increased investment, production, and employment opportunities. However, for the private sector
to grow substantially and expand into new markets, Bhutanese industry must become much more
competitive by cutting costs, improving quality, accessing improved technologies, and raising
productivity. In light of the dramatic changes wrought by trade liberalization and the gradual loss
of preferential trade access to India, industry must become more competitive just to maintain
existing markets.
The high ranking that survey respondents accorded to "lack of demand and competition" as one
of their biggest business problems - indicates a lack of competitiveness within Bhutanese
industry. Although Bhutan may have relatively low consumer purchasing power, it is next door -
and still has preferential access - to one of the world's largest consumer markets. In addition, the
domestic demand for consumer imports is growing rapidly. That Bhutanese firms cannot
successfully tap these markets means that they are not competitive producers. RGoB's challenge
therefore is to provide an environment in which industry can become internationally competitive.
The following represent some of the main cross-cutting areas of concern emerging from the
survey.
Governance and Regulations
As a result of the relatively recent development of the private sector in Bhutan, much of the
business which has been conducted - by both the public and the private sectors - has not been
undertaken on a systematic basis. Hence, books of accounts are not maintained, external audits
do not take place regularly, FDI applications are approved on a case-by-case basis, tax
concessions sometimes appear to be granted in a non-transparent manner, and so on. This
situation has largely grown out of the closed nature of the economy and the smallness of existing
business networks. While Bhutan has not particularly suffered from such ad hoc business
arrangements, as firms venture into new and more complicated areas of business, they need to
increasingly operate in a more rules-based, rather than a relationship-based system. And so does
the Government. Business information systems need to be well known and understood both by
the users of the regulations and by those who apply and enforce the regulations.
In the survey there is evidence of concern in this area - with over a quarter of the interviewed
firms portraying the government as being unpredictable. Clear and transparent regulations and
their consistent interpretation are crucial to enable firms to concentrate on their businesses. In
addition, regulations should take account of the legitimate needs of industry. However, firms do
not appear to believe that this is happening as over half of them expect regulatory changes to be
implemented which would not take account of their needs. In this regard, it is important that the
Chamber of Commerce and other industry associations (which are only in embryonic form at the
current time) should play a more proactive role in lobbying government on issues of interest to
the private sector. Support to assist them in more effectively representing the views of industry
and in providing services to members should be given a high priority.
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There is a perception that Bhutan now stands at an important crossroads. It can systematize
government regulations and business practices in a structured, phased, and consistent manner or it
can continue with ad hoc and opaque operating methods which will take the country down the
path of increased rent seeking - as witnessed in much of the rest of South Asia. Taking a firm
stand on these issues is important in terms of avoiding the corrupt practices of other countries in
the developing world as well as assisting in building a strong and vibrant private sector.
Uncertainty is anathema to the private sector and the more the rules of the game are clearly laid
out and transparently and consistently applied, the greater the chance that the private sector will
be able to operate in an effective manner.
Regulations that emeeged in the survey as issues include, inter alia:
1. Labor regulations including minimum wage regulations; the employment of non-
nationals; the proposed new labor regulations; and incentives to encourage firms to
invest in training.
2. Taxation regulations including tax deduction at source; tax-deductible expenses;
double taxation agreements; asset revaluations; and annual tax assessments.
3. Information technology regulations to support online business and other uses of IT,
encompassing issues such as on-line fraud, unauthorized access and confidentiality.
4. Wood-sector regulations including the ban on semi-finished products and Articles in
the regional trade agreements which prevent access of wood products into
Bangladesh.
5. Regional regulations which lead to the unreasonable trans-shipping of goods from
one haulier to another at border crossings.
6. Business start-up/development regulations including the ban on business licenses in
Phuentsholing.
7. Visas, which are not available on arrival, particularly for foreign technicians and
buyers who often need to make unplanned visits.
8. Approvals for foreign direct investment which is currently carried out on a case-by-
case basis.
In moving to an increasingly rules-based system of private-sector management and regulation it is
important, however, that the government not overburden the private sector with a plethora of
bureaucracy and red tape. It is not uncommon in developing countries for the officers
implementing new regulations, which are intended to help private-sector development, to actually
impede development. Without a proper understanding of clear rules and regulations, there is an
opportunity for variations in interpretation, bureaucratic impediments, and corruption to develop.
South Asia is replete with examples of government bureaucracy and regulations resulting in long
delays and significant rent seeking by public-sector officials. Establishing an appropriate balance
between an insufficiently rules-based system and too much bureaucracy will be an important
challenge.
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Labor, Skills, and Employment
A growing number of Bhutanese workers are now entering the work force. Bhutanese workers
with higher education still find it relatively easy to secure employment, however, school leavers
who do not complete high school and do not proceed onto tertiary education are increasingly
fnding it more difficult to getjobs. These workers have high expectations in terms of wages and
type of work to be undertaken with a strong inclination not to be engaged in menial, difficult,
dirty, or labor intensive-type occupations. These "mid-level" workers with some education - but
with no tertiary qualifications - represent the group of individuals among whom future
unemployment is likely to be most pronounced in Bhutan. Approximately 65,000 school-leavers
(without a tertiary education) are expected to come onto the work force over the next nine years.
On the other hand, the private-sector labor market in Bhutan is characterized by a large number of
relatively low-cost Indian workers - both skilled and unskilled - working at menial jobs that the
Bhutanese shun and high-level, skilled occupations where adequate skills have not yet been
developed within the domestic work force. Non-nationals are thought to account for around one-
half of all formal-sector employment and possibly around 60 to 80 percent of all formal private-
sector employment. 39 Salaries for unskilled, non-national workers are some of the lowest in the
world, and salaries for skilled workers also compare very favorably with commensurate wage
levels in other countries.
The labor market is also noteworthy for an almost complete absence of labor unrest - with no
strikes, agitation, or other disruptive worker activity being reported by the survey respondents.
Labor markets are also extremely flexible; firms can hire and fire at will - and workers can leave
with virtually no notice. Although skills are generally in short supply, the private sector
undertakes very little training to raise the skill level of its work force.
Faced with a growing unemployment problem, the government understandably wishes to reduce
the numbers of non-national workers employed in Bhutan. However, the target group of
Bhutanese school-leavers who are most likely to be seeking employment over the next decade are
unlikely to either want to undertake the menial work performed at the low-skill-end of the work
spectrum - or to be able to do the skilled work at the high end of the spectrum. Meanwhile, the
private sector requires a comprehensive range of skills if the wheels of industry are to keep
turning and the private sector is to grow.
Hence, for Bhutan to become increasing competitive in a fast globalizing world, it will need to
retain the cost advantages conferred by its access to low-cost, non-national labor and
simultaneously increase the productivity of its Bhutanese workers so that Bhutan can produce
cost-competitive products for sale both domestically and into export markets. Indeed, increasing
Bhutanese productivity is key to gradually replacing non-national workers - rather than pursuing
government-mandated regulations to arbitrarily reduce the level of the non-national work force.
Ways of increasing worker productivity are discussed in greater detail below.
Consequently, non-nationals are currently needed in the work force - if the private sector is to
develop a competitive edge - and it is recommended that any reduction in their numbers should
be very carefully based upon productivity enhancements in the local work force rather than by
other measures. An increasing number of Bhutanese, it is believed, will be absorbed by industry,
not by replacing Indian workers, but by changing the structure of industry.
39 Although non-national employment was only 36 percent in the surveyed firms this, in part, reflects the fact that there
was a bias against interviewing large numbers of construction firms which dominate the fonnal list of registered
companies. These firms typically have very high levels of non-national employment - frequently above 90 percent.
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In addition, while the adoption of appropriate technologies (as discussed below) is one of the
ways to enhance worker productivity, it is important that the private sector not be forced to
abandon more appropriate labor-intensive production methods for overly capital-intensive
methods of production. In an environment in which labor is relatively cheap and capital is
comparatively expensive (certainly in comparison with the region), it makes little sense to pursue
an overly capital-intensive strategy of private-sector development. Such a strategy also mitigates
against increasing employment - a key initial objective of private-sector employment.
Training. Two very important ways in which worker productivity can be enhanced are by
increased worker training and by adopting more appropriate technologies. Currently, however,
very few firms engage in training and most firms rely on old Indian technology. Hence, worker
training and the introduction of new technologies could substantially improve productivity within
Bhutanese industry. Even more important than worker training is management training. Few
entrepreneurs in Bhutan are experienced, and they themselves do not know the latest techniques
or understand the training needs of their firms.
Managers say they do not train because they believe (a) there is no need to train them; (b) there
are no government incentives for training; (c) trained workers will leave; (d) training cannot be
afforded; and (e) there is a lack of training providers. Companies also do not train because a
large share of their work force is Indian and the Bhutanese workforce is considered to be "too
mobile" (hence training benefits are not recouped easily). As firms increasingly specialize to
penetrate niche markets and to gain economies of scale, they will require workers who have a
general work ethic plus specialist, firm-specific skills. Individual firms, or groups of firms, will
have to provide many of these specialist skills through a mix of formal and on-the-job training.
Efforts must also be made to closely align the education system with the needs of the private
sector and for the government to share the costs of training by providing carefully designed
incentive programs.
Finance
Bhutan's financial sector can be, at best, described as rudimentary. This has made it difficult for
the private sector to get access to the funds it requires for investment; almost 43 percent of firms
claimed to be credit constrained. The underdeveloped financial system also results in a
substantially higher cost of doing business because of inefficient service, high service fees, and
most importantly, high interest rates relative to competitor countries. With two banks and two
non-banks - all dominated by the state - there is little competition or innovation in the system.
High levels of liquidity have further exacerbated these problems and have perpetuated a lack of
creativity within the sector. A 2001 study by the Asian Development Bank of Bhutan's financial
sector will hopefully provide some policy directions for the way forward in this sector. Some of
the main complaints of the private sector concerning the financial sector are discussed below.
Lack of Access/IDemand Interestingly, around 40 percent of survey respondents did not have
access to bank finance. This is particularly high. In part it can be attributed to the
unsophisticated nature of the private sector and its unwillingness to take on debt to leverage its
productive potential to the fullest. However, without debt it is extremely hard for companies to
grow. It is also attributable to the extremely conservative nature of the banking system in
Bhutan, and its inability to reach out and support the private sector in developing bankable
projects. Although some welcomed signs of innovations were evident - these were, unfortunately
- few and far between.
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Uncompetitive Banking System. The four interlinked financial institutions in Bhutan are
characterized by high levels of liquidity, operation in a non-competitive market, and a lack of
creativity and innovation. Even simple and well-accepted innovations such as the introduction of
ATM machines and the wide use of credit cards have not yet taken place in Bhutan. This lack of
competition is also reflected in high and inflexible interest rates, regardless of prevailing
economic conditions. The banks do reasonably well without competing on margins and without
trying to woo a new, and possibly more difficult, customer base. Increasing competition, possibly
from the growth in non-bank sources of finance (such as leasing companies, venture-capital
companies, finance companies), should be an important objective for the immediate future.
Lack of Financial Instruments. Along with the unsophisticated nature of the banking system,
there is a concomitant lack of adequate financing instruments to meet the needs of a growing
private sector. Hence, for example, leasing finance is almost totally absent in Bhutan, despite its
excellent attributes, which make it ideally suited to support smaller- and medium-scale type
business activities. Similarly, only one example of factoring (provision of credit against bills
receivabletinvoices) was found, despite the fact that it can also offer particular advantages to
companies that require important injections of working capital to meet immediate production
demands. Similarly, venture (risk) capital is hardly evident in the market - although some of the
entrepreneurial skills-development programs have provided new start-up companies access to
finance which has come close to being venture capital. Lastly, the high cost and the low-
penetration rate of credit cards is an impediment to increased sales, faster and more convenient
transactions, ventures into e-commerce, and has been an important drawback to some aspects of
tourist industry development. Developing new and innovative instruments tailored to meet
private-sector demands will be an important challenge for the banking system over the medium
term.
Payment Systems. In common with the general lack of sophistication of the financial system,
payment systems are slow and cumbersome. The private sector reports that it takes over a week
to transfer funds within the same bank between Thimphu and Paro (and even longer for more
remote regions in the country). Quick access to funds for payments purposes through ATM
machines is not possible in Bhutan as such facilities do not yet exist. Use of credit cards as a
method of payment is either not available or exceedingly costly when it is available. This lack of
robust payments systems slows down the operation of the private sector and adds to its lack of
competitiveness vis a vis other world producers. This weak payment system will also impede the
growth of e-commerce and e-business in Bhutan since such systems rely upon use of credit cards
and other electronic means of payment - systems which have not been developed at all in Bhutan.
Competitiveness and Technology
Firms' complaints about lack of demand reflect their lack of competitiveness and inability to win
market share. This lack of competitiveness is not just a matter of high price and cost, but also of
other factors including: the inability of firms to adhere to shipping schedules, maintain quality, or
produce up-to-date designs. These failings can often be solved if firms adopt appropriate
technologies (where technology is broadly defined and includes not only production techniques
but management systems, quality control systems, design procedures, etc.). In some cases, for
Bhutan to become internationally competitive, it is necessary for companies to look beyond the
Indian technologies that they have traditionally relied on and adopt intemational best practices.
Unfortunately, the learning mechanisms that companies use to acquire new technologies are
extremely weak and if Bhutanese industry is going to grow, it is vital to strengthen them.
A product's competitiveness depends upon a mixture of price, quality, and delivery. It has been
noted earlier that firms, in all sectors, are often not price competitive. While price is not the only
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factor, it tends to be a major factor in initial market penetration. Bhutanese firms are not price
competitive for a number of reasons - low productivity, lack of economies of scale, inadequate
infrastructure, expensive capital, and geographic isolation - all of which serve to increase costs
relative to competitors. As noted in the sector reviews, output per worker in some agroprocessing
companies is only 9 percent of U.S. levels and in furniture making, productivity is among the
lowest in the region. In addition to high costs, Bhutanese industry also suffers in non-price areas
such as quality and delivery. 40 Firms, have not developed the capability to assure quality or
produce popular designs. The poor infrastructure and inefficient payments system make it hard to
meet delivery schedules.
Management Capability. A main constraint on increasing productivity and competitiveness is
that many managers are technically unqualified and inexperienced. A very high share of
Bhutanese entrepreneurs formerly worked in government and have not been able to build up
extensive experience. Almost no entrepreneurs have worked in industry outside of Bhutan or for
foreign-owned firms. Thus, they are unfamiliar with best practices or the requirements of
international trade and they have difficulty transferring relevant technology into their firms. Even
when firms have no immediate aims to export, this exposure is crucial. In an increasingly
liberalized world, firms must compete against growing imports, and they have to know the
competition in order to defend their markets. Managers also frequently have difficulty in
choosing appropriate production and marketing personnel as well as employees with other
required skills. Thus, improving management capabilities and adopting better management
techniques is a key element in any attempt to improve competitiveness.
Equipment and Processes Used Many companies in Bhutan operate with dated and ineffective
equipment and production processes. For example, many sawmillers use sawmilling technology
from India which is decades old. A majority of firms still do not use even rudimentary
information technology as a business tool. This report makes frequent reference to the need to
"leapfrog" Indian technology in the agroprocessing and wood sectors in an effort to develop niche
market products capable of penetrating international markets. However, all firms take a long time
to acquire, buy, deliver, and commission required technology. While even large firms face
difficulties acquiring new technology, it is a particularly severe challenge for small firms that do
not have adequate capital or many external connections.
Commonly, firms cannot ascertain the appropriate capacity of machinery to be purchased as they
are unable to research the market to forecast demand. They are also often unable to access
modern equipment and must use second-hand machinery which is less costly. As observed, in the
wood sector, it may take twice as long and cost twice as much as planned to acquire and absorb a
new production technology. Finally, production managers often have difficulty in adapting to the
new technology in terms of maintaining the equipment, obtaining spare parts, and planning the
increased quantities of raw materials needed. Similar problems occur in absorbing new
technologies. The vendors of the hardware may not provide good training services; skills to
develop or customize software may be lacking; and after-sales services may be inadequate.
Marketing and Design. As noted in the section on agroprocessing, firms can offset high input
costs and labor-intensive processes and compete internationally if they focus on niche markets
with low-volume, high-value products. This is equally true in other sectors. In tourism, for
example, more and more high-income earners are participating in minority sports, such as water-
rafting or high-altitude trekking, where Bhutan has a comparative advantage. For all these niche
markets, there are well-defined needs, prices, and channels of distribution. Yet, in all of the
sectors surveyed, marketing skills are weak, due to Bhutan's isolation and the dominance of the
40 In one survey of 500 U.S. importers, 95 percent put on-time delivery as the most important buying criteria.
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government and India in market relationships. Product delivery and packaging is also an
important consideration. Products that have a low transport cost will need to be developed and
packaging must be designed to facilitate transport as well as hold consumer appeal. Frequently,
products must conform to international standards and retail packaging is required to include
certain mandatory information. Commonly, firms have to import packaging technology not only
to break into export markets but also to defend local markets from imports. Bhutanese industry
needs to adopt new technologies that will help marketing, product design, and packaging.
Unfortunately, there are few sources of information on such technologies currently available.
Learning Mechanisms. To stay competitive in existing industries and to enter niche and other
high-value markets, firms must upgrade their technology - all types of technology, including
management, production, marketing, and design - making sure that the technology which is
adopted is appropriate. It may be necessary to leap over the Indian technology on which
companies currently rely and find the internationally most competitive technology. Finding and
absorbing technology is an expensive and difficult task, and the mechanisms that help firms do
this are also weak in Bhutan. There are no networks of suppliers or international buyers to teach
firms about new technologies. There are few consultants or technical experts, and Bhutan's
isolation makes it difficult for firms to find them abroad. In addition, one of the most important
ways that technology is transferred between countries - foreign direct investment - is almost non-
existent. The government must take steps to strengthen the mechanisms that firms use to access
new technologies. Establishing matching-grants schemes, making visas for technical experts
easier to obtain, providing tax incentives for technical improvements, and most importantly
liberalizing FDI are all actions that will help firms improve their technology, raise productivity,
and make domestic industries more competitive.
Infrastructure
The survey confirms that most infrstructure in Bhutan is good compared with other countries in
the region and is adequate to meet current needs in most areas. However, in more remote
locations of central and eastern Bhutan, infrastructure is still a significant problem especially in
the provision of electricity. The only, and major, exception to this general rule, is the transport
infrastructure - both road and air.
Road Transport Transport is particularly important in an environment where on-time delivery is
a key determinant of international success. Transport problems lead to delays in taking receipt of
incoming raw materials and intermediate goods - as well as deliveries out of the country. The
difficulties are aggravated by seasonality, being worse and more expensive during the monsoon
season (which also coincides with the fruit season). During the monsoons, the cost of transport
can double and there are delays in getting trucks. The absence of loads for return trips further
leads to delays and increases costs. Trucking firms put much of the blame on the roads,
observing that their poor condition increases transport costs by around 30 percent. Law and order
problems - particularly in Assam - have also increased costs considerably in Bhutan. For
example, transport costs for hauling goods from Phuentsholing to Sarbhang have tripled recently
as they formerly used to travel through India but now have to travel within Bhutan. On- and off-
loading at the border due to regulations, including axle-weight restrictions, also causes time
delays and increases costs.
41 In the early 1990s, Zimbabwean firms realized the importance of retail packaging when the market was liberalized
and generic biscuits, imported from South Africa, started to penetrate the local market even though they were three
times the price.
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Transport infrastructure will be influential in the location of industry. It will, for example,
constrain the development of agroprocessing firms that use high-altitude crops. In the wood
sector, it is costly to make high-value hardwood products in the inland areas as hardwood is
grown along the border areas. On the other hand, conifers are processed in the border areas, but
the trees come from the inland areas. Twice as many tourists enter Bhutan from the "lowlands,"
but the main attractions (festivals and trekking routes) are in the "highlands." Policy
development must take account of such anomalies, and there is an important need for strong
coordination between ministries responsible for transport, industry, tourism, and agriculture.
Air Transport. Air service was also a major target of complaint by the private sector. This will
become more of an issue as firms increase the level of technology used in their firms. More and
more, third-country technology will be required and engineers and parts will need to be flown in.
Moreover, high-value exports in niche markets will rely on air cargo as is the case, for example,
with the fishing flies exported by Yangphel Handicrafts. It is critical that reliability of air service
be improved, particularly cargo service. In the case of tourism, it is desirable to develop new
products and marketing strategies to reduce the seasonality so that less strain is placed upon Druk
Air and/or charter tourism developed.
Other Infrastructure. Although electricity is cheap and, reportedly, plentiful, power outages
cause some difficulties. It is not uncommon for firms to report production losses of 2-6 percent
due to such outages. These loss levels are unsustainable for low-margin and delivery-sensitive
firms. These problems were most notable in Phuentsholing during the rainy season. A lack of
water is also a constraint for some firns, particularly in Phuentsholing during the monsoon.
Although the telecom systems is relatively good, as noted in the section on IT, there is no data
network. The basic message is that, even though the Government has established a strong
infrastructural base, there is an important need to ensure that this base is extended to cover
increasingly more of the country and that it is continuously upgraded to meet the more
sophisticated demands that will inevitably be placed upon it as the economy grows.
Private/Public Dialogue
Establishing a strong and ongoing dialogue between the government and the private sector is
necessary as a first step to addressing issues raised by the private sector. In this, the private sector
needs a strong voice that can confidently and competently put forth its concerns. The private
sector must be involved in identifying impediments, prioritizing how they are addressed, and then
in helping design policy prescriptions. If the private sector does not have input, it is possible that
policies and solutions, though well intended, could hamper rather than help the private sector.
The natural candidate for this role is the BCCI and the local chambers, along with the various
trade associations. The government has been supportive of BCCI but this has led, in the eyes of
many of its members, to it almost being co-opted by the government. Many private sector
managers who spoke to the survey team stated that they do not think that BCCI presented their
views sufficiently strongly. The regional chambers and industry trade groups are just forming
and are not strong enough to have a large impact yet. However, they promise to develop into
good representatives of the private sector. The private-sector representatives need to make more
efforts to organize and strengthen local chambers and trade groups and to push BCCI to become
more responsive to their needs.
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2. Sector-Specific Conclusions
The conclusions and recommendations of the four sector-specific chapters are summarized
below:
Agroprocessing. Agriculture contributes about 35 percent to GDP, and 85 percent of the
population depends on some form of agricultural production. However, only 3 percent of output
is processed for commercial use - mainly fruit and vegetables. The agroprocessing industry is
dominated by 104 small firms. There are only three large companies that export over 65 percent
of their production. More than 90 percent of the industry (excluding alcoholic beverages) is fruit
processing and worth some US$3.0 million. With respect to domestic demand, imported produce
is increasing as urban populations grow and tastes move to higher-value products.
Raw materials are uncompetitive because of poor land utilization, low crop yields, low
productivity, and high transportation costs. Downstream value-adding is adversely affected by an
absence of scale, old technology, bad packaging, a lack of branding, and costly freight.
Management is insufficiently qualified or experienced to offset these higher costs by innovation
and marketing. In the main, agroprocessing firms depend on Indian labor, which they feel is
more skilled than Bhutanese - although the most non-national dependent firms are the least
profitable. Some 90 percent of the agroprocessing work force around Phuentsholing is Indian.
Processed foods are the fastest growing component in world agri-food trade - comprising 75
percent of trade in 1996 (and worth US$384 billion). If Bhutan could overcome impediments to
growth, it has potential in two areas. First, in low-volume, high-value products selling into niche
markets based on comparative advantages such as the range of microclimates, biodiversity, and
organic production. Products in this area could include essential oils, traditional medicines,
mushrooms, incense. Second, larger-scale, foreign-investment businesses in border areas based
on the comparative advantages of flexible labor, a stable political environment, and competitive
infrastructure, predominantly using imported raw materials.
To exploit this potential, firms will need access to competitive, consistent, and high-quality raw
materials in a timely manner; supportive policy on transport, labor, and investment; innovation in
products, processes, packaging, and product positioning; and improved productivity through
better management, improved processes, and enhanced labor skills.
Wood-Based Industry. Forestry contributes some 11 percent to GDP and generates over 25,000
informal- and formal-sectorjobs. But wood-based industries, including some 120 sawmills,
furniture workshops, and board manufacturers, employ no more than 2,000 individuals.
Management in firms is inadequately qualified and experienced, technology levels are low, and
labor is unskilled resulting in low productivity. There are no economies of scale in the sector,
and firms make a diverse range of products for "walk-in" clients. The government, which buys
up to 60 percent of the sector's output, drives down quality and margins. Two recent government
policies have influenced the sector - a 1999 a ban on the export of logs encouraged firms to move
downstream to add-value; and, in mid-2000, a further extension of the export ban to also cover
the export of semi-finished products was put in place. In addition, firms are required to buy
timber in mixed-species' lots from FDC auctions, which means that they cannot get the type and
quality of the wood they need.
The sector has potential to serve regional markets, particularly Bangladesh, in specialist
categories not adequately served by local producers or by the increasing volume of imports from
Southeast Asia and Europe. Some niche markets in third-countries could be penetrated with
easily-transported, low-volume, high-value products. To realize this potential, however, firms
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must be allowed to access single-species timber in appropriate sizes and quality; the ban on semi-
finished products must be relaxed so that firms can gain experience and gradually move
downstream; productivity must be raised through improved management, the use of appropriate
equipment, and properly trained labor; and market awareness and marketing skills must be
increased. In the medium-term, as a selling point for Bhutanese wood products, it will be
desirable to ensure that Bhutanese forests are certified as being sustainably managed.
Tourism. Tourism has grown by 4 to 36 percent each year for the last decade. In 2000, a record
was set with 7,559 arrivals by air and 13,000 by road, providing over US$10.5 million in direct
foreign-exchange earnings. Hotels employ some 1,400 persons, and there are about 75 (mostly
small) tour operators. The market is highly seasonal, with average hotel occupancy under 20
percent, and repeat tourism low. Two Singaporean-based joint ventures have recently been
approved and are likely to influence the development of the industry. A key policy issue for
tourism is the pricing policy, which requires tourists pay up to US$200 per day ahead of their
holiday (and US$165 in the "lean season"), from which the government collects US$65
(US$63/lean) as a royalty. Better calibration of these rates - particularly the government royalty
- in non-peak seasons could encourage a more steady stream of tourists into Bhutan throughout
the year.
Tourism marketing is weak - the private-sector lacks resources and the government plays a
passive role - and the country is concerned about balancing income generation and maintenance
of cultural identity. Holidays in Bhutan are comparatively expensive, but good service is not
provided. Service is usually friendly in hotels, but it is poor quality and amenities are lacking .
This is partly because tourists must pay before arrival and they have little choice once they enter
Bhutan, so competition is lacking to drive up standards. The range of tourism "products"
available to tourists is limited, though some improvements have recently been introduced.
Access to Bhutan - particularly air access - is inadequate and problems are exacerbated by
seasonality.
Tourism has considerable growth potential because of its comparative advantages and the
problems in other potential destinations in the region. This potential can be realized if an
unambiguous strategy with appropriate policy and regulations is developed; pricing policy is
adjusted (particularly lean-season pricing); government and firms are more proactive in
marketing; access to Bhutan is improved; seasonality problems are addressed; new products are
developed; and standards of accommodation and service are improved.
Information Technology. IT can impact on the economy in two ways - it can be used as a
business tool in firms or produced as a tradable service. Computers are under used in the private
sector: almost no firms have local area networks; only 15 percent have Web sites; and while 62
percent of firms have e-mail, fax and telephone dominate communications. An Internet service
provider was started two years ago and, although lease lines are available, few companies use
them. Impediments to development include comparatively high connectivity charges; a lack of IT
professionals - most must be sourced in India; undeveloped regulatory and financial systems -
online banking business, for example, is not possible; and comparatively high labor costs.
Opportunities being targeted in other developing countries include small niche firms selling
services such as software development, and larger firms selling data entry or operating call
centers. However, in Bhutan the sector is still in its infancy and several challenges have to be
overcome before it can deliver internationally competitive services. These include increasingly
using IT as a business tool within the public and the private sectors; developing skilled IT
professionals; introducing appropriate regulations, (for (-xample, to permit business online);
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establishing an environment in which services to the IT sector can develop; and improving the
infrastructure by adding data networking infrastructure.
3. Vision for the Development of the Private Sector in Bhutan
With the accession of Bhutan and its main trading partners into the WTO, barriers to trade are
falling. Several of Bhutan's traditional markets in India have already been successfully
penetrated by third-country exporters. For example, the Indian market for wooden panels is being
serviced by both high-labor-cost producers from Europe and by lower-labor-cost producers from
Southeast Asia. Cement, calcium carbide, and ferro silicon (representing the main production
from Bhutan's three largest private sector companies), as well as other traditionally important
product markets for Bhutan, are also facing increasing competition from China and South East
Asia in India.
On the one hand, globalization means that Bhutan and the wider Indian market have to face
imported products made by producers with large economies of scale and cheap inputs. On the
other hand, it means that Bhutan has access to inputs and technology, which are as advanced as
any in the world. While globalization brings increased competition, it also provides opportunities
as an increasing number of consumers will become aware of, and can buy, niche-market products
- products that large-scale producers may not have an interest in.
Given increased globalization, as well as the dictates of geography in Bhutan, it would be most
appropriate for Bhutan to develop a dual track path for the private sector. Areas along the border
can continue to exploit industries which have high labor and transport cost components.
Proximity to large and important markets in India for raw materials, intermediate inputs, and
finished products - as well as access to cheap, low-skilled, non-national labor - permits Bhutan to
aggressively leverage its other considerable advantages of good governance, political stability,
abundant and low-cost electricity, and lack of labor unrest. These attributes should permit Bhutan
to produce cost-competitive products for export into India and beyond. The further development
of these types of industries could support some import substitution activities as well as assist in
further extending and diversifying export markets. They could also form a core of businesses
which would increasingly rely upon the services provided from central locations in Bhutan.
In the center of the country, where labor costs are comparatively high and transport costs
frequently prohibitive, the development of cost competitive industries needs to focus on the
service industries (IT, tourism, transport, and so on) in combination with niche markets
(mushrooms, medicinal herbs, wasabi, essential oils, artifacts, intermediate products, etc).
Bhutan has many of the attributes required to be a niche-market player - producing low-volume,
high-value products - in particular its small size, its distinct identity, its climatic diversity, and the
prospect of synergies between its positive attributes. The further development of services such as
IT (initially for the domestic market) and the expansion of tourism also show considerable
promise, as do a continued reliance upon other fast-growing service industries such as transport
and construction.
However, it is critical that Bhutan maintains and optimizes its potential while simultaneously not
creating any potential impediments to private-sector development. Presently, Bhutan is at a
crossroads and, depending on the actions it takes over the period of the Ninth FYDP, it can either
become an important, albeit small, player on the world stage, giving opportunities for its
increasingly-educated population, or continue to languish as an irrelevant player with respect to
private-sector activities, with all the implications that that has for generating future employment
opportunities for its growing population.
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In developing both additional heavy industries in the south of the country and the service and
niche markets in central Bhutan, several factors will be critical. Increasing worker productivity
will be key and this requires worker training, management training, the adoption of new and
appropriate technologies, and the expansion of FDI. Second, supporting the development of a
more competitive and innovative financial sector that provides new financial instruments to
support the increasingly complex private sector will also be key. Third, ensuring appropriate
technology linkages and better management in all stages of the product development, production,
design, and marketing phases will be critical for success All of these goals can be furthered by
supporting appropriate flows of FDI. In addition, and as a prerequisite to continued growth of the
sector, it is necessary to establish good governance and a transparent policy environment.
To support such a vision, the government will need to put in place a series of support measures.
Such measures would include (a) support and encouragement for worker and management
training to rise productivity levels through generous tax rebates or industry levies; (b) serious
implementation of the AsDB study's recommendations on financial sector reform in support of
private sector development (c) establishment of a matching grants scheme to assist in appropriate
technology transfers to private companies; (d) development of export incentives including duty
drawback schemes, pre-shipment and post-shipment financing; (e) promulgation and regulation
of an increasingly open FDI law; and (f) establishment of dry ports and fully serviced industrial
estates at strategic locations throughout the country.
4. Main Recommendations
Consequently, the main recommendations in support of private sector development for the Ninth
Five Year Development Plan include:
* TRAINNG. Establishment of a transparent system of tax relief and possibly a system
of industry levies to support radically increased worker and management training - in an
effort to increase overall productivity;
* LABOR. Develop a transparent, time-bound, policy for the recruitment of non-national
workers with an eye to ensuring the on-going cost competitiveness of Bhutanese industry;
* FINANCE. Encourage the development of innovative financial instruments and
payment modalities - based upon the AsDB study - including, inter alia, ATM machines,
greater use of lower-cost credit card transactions, introduction of leasing finance,
extension of factoring services. Simultaneously make every effort to encourage greater
financial sector competition and greater interest rate sensitivity;
* TECHNOLOGY. Support technology transfer mechanisms to enhance the private
sector through, inter alia, the immediate establishment of a Matching Grants System, use
of retired executive schemes, and so on. Incentivize technology transfer through the
establishment of, for example, tax breaks on research and development;
* FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT. Ensure that the new FDI Law is finalized and
approved in the next session of the Assembly and that supporting regulations are put in
place shortly thereafter. Actively encourage potentially high impact FDI ventures in an
early phase of implementation;
* EXPORT INCENTIVES. Immediately implement a system of duty drawback on
imported raw materials used in the production of export products (including exports to
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India) and immediately begin a dialogue with the banks on the provision of pre-shipment
and post-shipment finance to the private sector,
* POLICY ENVIRONMENT. Develop a clear, consistent, and transparent policy
environment for the private sector, within the context of the NFYDP, which takes into
account private sector views. Ensure proper and clear systematization, codification, and
regulation of private sector strategy, laws and regulations;
* AUDITING AND ACCOUNTING. Increasingly include a wider group of private
sector companies in the auditing net to encourage the greater use of financial
management information as a tool of MIS for firms - as well as to assist the tax
authorities;
* INDUSTRIAL ESTATES AND DRY PORTS. Further support private sector
development through the establishment of strategically located (for the private sector)
industrial estates as well as dry ports at strategic border locations;
* DIALOGUE. Immediately put in place support mechanisms for private sector industry
interests such as the Bhutan Chamber of Commerce and Industry as well as sector
associations - by bringing in experienced professionals from external chambers and the
private sector.
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Annex One
List of Registered Companies in Bhutan, 2001
POST Registration DATE OF
NAME OF COMANY BOX LOCATION Number REGISTRATION
1 Bhutan Polythene Company - Phuentsholing 1 27-12-90
2 Penden Cement Authority Ltd. - Gomtu 2 27-12-90
3 Bhutan Development Finance Corporation - Thimphu 4 27-12-90
4 Forest Development Corporation - Thimphu 5 27-12-90
5 Handicrafts Development Corporation - Thimphu 6 27-12-90
6 Bhutan Board Product Ltd. - Phuentsholing 7 27-12-90
7 Druk Japan Himalayan Co. - Thimphu 8 27-12-90
8 Bhutan Engineering Co. Pvt. Ltd. - Thimphu 9 27-12-90
9 Bhutan Carbide & Chemicals Ltd. - Phuentsholing 10 27-12-90
10 Bhutan Ferro Alloys Ltd. - Phuentsholing 11 27-12-90
11 Bhutan Fruit Product Ltd. - Phuentsholing 12 29-03-91
12 Bhutan Marble & Minerals Ltd. - Thimphu 14 10-04-91
13 Druk Air Corporation Ltd. - Thimphu 15 16-04-91
14 Bank of Bhutan - Phuentsholing 16 1-05-91
15 Chukha Hydro Power Corporation - Chukha 17 2-07-91
16 Royal Insurance Corporation - Phuentsholing 18 11-10-91
17 Bhutan Agro Industries Ltd. P.B. 329 Thimphu 20 24-10-91
18 Yangzom Cement Industry Ltd. - Samtse 21 3-12-91
19 Zana Bliss International Pvt. Ltd. P.B. 145 Phuentsholing 23 7-01-92
20 Bhutan Tourism Corporation Ltd. - Thimphu 25 22-04-92
21 Food Corporation of Bhutan - Phuentsholing 27 8-07-92
22 -Dangling Company Ltd. P.B. 105 Trashigang 28 3-07-92
23 Etho Metho Tours & Treks Ltd. - Thimphu 29 14-08-92
24 Malo Corporation (P) Ltd. P.B. 145 Phuentsholing 30 1-09-92
25 Chapcha Engineering Co. Ltd P.B. 641 Thimphu 31 21-09-92
26 Charry Engineering Company - Thimphu 32 29-10-92
27 Wood Craft Center P.B. 581 Thimphu 34 30-11-92
28 Chimi Wangchuk Construction Co. - Thimphu 35 11-11-92
29 Lomnekha Construction Co. - Chukha 36 30-12-92
30 Tandin Import & Export (P) Ltd. P.B. 455 Thimphu 37 22-01-93
31 Environment Friendly Construction Co. - Bumthang 38 2-03-93
32 Mindu Company (P) Ltd - Thimphu 39 16-04-93
33 Radag Company - Wangdue 40 28-04-93
34 Druk Lothuen Company Ltd. - Thimphu 41 12-05-93
35 Druk Stone & Mineral Export Co. Ltd. P.B. 230 Phuentsholing 42 3-06-93
36 Lama Tours & Treks Pvt. Ltd P.B. 704 Thimphu 43 14-06-93
37 Gahsel Pharmaceutical Pvt. Ltd. P.B. 495 Thimphu 44 17-06-93
38 Rigsar Construction Co. (P) Ltd - S/Jongkha 45 27-07-93
39 Royal Securities Exchange of Bhutan Ltd. P.B. 154 Thimphu 46 18-08-93
40 Jomo & Shaykhar Co. Ltd. - Trashigang 47 18-08-93
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41 Kuenphen Wangchuk Co. - Trashigang 48 18-08-93
42 Gangri Tours & Treks Ltd. P.B. 607 Thimphu 50 20-08-93
43 Daga Kuenphen Enterprise - Phuentsholing 51 20-08-93
44 Drook Securities Ltd. - Thimphu 52 2-09-93
45 Pagsam Company Ltd. - Lhuntse 53 4-10-93
46 BNB Securities Ltd. - Thimphu 54 12-10-93
47 Yurung Company Pvt. Ltd. P.B. 235 S/Jongkhar 55 12-10-93
48 Druk Satair Corporation Ltd. - S/Jongkha 56 14-10-93
49 Chituen Construction Co. Ltd. P.B. 470 Thimphu 57 18-10-93
50 Lhomen Tours & Trekking Co. Ltd. P.B. 341 Thimphu 58 21-10-93
51 Etho Metho Construction Co P.B. 341 Thimphu 59 22-10-93
52 Lhaki Cement Pvt. Ltd. - Gomtu 60 17-11-93
53 Army Welfare Project P.B. 92 Phuentsholing 61 18-11-93
54 Bank of Bhutan Securities Ltd. - Thimphu 62 8-12-93
55 RICB Securities Ltd. P.B. 77 Phuentsholing 63 8-12-93
56 H & K Company P.B. 74 Phuentsholing 64 27-12-93
57 Bhutan Diary Ltd. P.B. 196 Phuentsholing 65 27-12-93
58 Bhutan Adventure Pvt. Ltd. P.B. 231 Thimphu 66 28-12-93
59 Druck Petroleum Corporation Ltd. P.B. 298 Phuentsholing 67 25-01-94
60 Yeti Tours & Trekking Pvt. Ltd. P.B. 456 Thimphu 68 25-01-94
61 Shongar Construction Co. Ltd. - Mongar 69 16-02-94
62 National Construction Co. Ltd. P.B. 398 Thimphu 70 28-04-94
63 Chukha Construction Co. Ltd. - Chukha 71 10-05-94
64 Kinga tours & Treks Ltd. P.B. 635 Thimphu 72 23-05-94
65 Ratna Transport Co. Pvt. Ltd. P.B. 149 S/Jongkhar 73 5-07-94
66 Gayjur Construction Co. - Mongar 75 29-07-94
67 Eastern Bhutan Coal Co. - S/Jongkhar 76 3-08-94
68 Druk Norlha Co. P.B. 631 Thimphu 77 8-08-94
69 Hotel Kelwang Pvt. Ltd. P.B. 350 Thimphu 78 18-08-94
70 Kelwang Consultancy & Construction. Ltd. P.O. 350 Thimphu 79 24-08-94
71 Nansay Company - Gelephu 80 7-09-94
72 Perfection Engs. & Consultants Ltd. - Gomtu 81 29-09-94
73 Rhutan Shangri-La Adventure Ltd. P.R. 532 Thimphu 82 27-10-96
74 Phuensum Import & Export Co. Ltd. P.B. 772 Thimphu 83 30-11-94
75 RSA Pvt. Ltd. P.B. 321 Phuentsholing 84 9-05-95
76 International tours & Treks Ltd. - Paro 85 25-07-95
77 Druk Construction Company P.B. 204 Thimphu 86 26-07-95
78 Kuensel Corporation - Thimphu 87 16-08-95
79 Tsenphu Company - Mongar 88 20-09-95
80 Phub Bro's Construction Co. - Thimphu 89 16-10-95
81 Namgail Cement Co. Ltd. P.B. 138 Phuentsholing 90 30-10-95
82 Stade Trading Corporation of Bhutan - Phuentsholing 91 5-03-96
83 Dragon Nest Ltd. - Wangduephodrang 92 29-03-96
84 Phuensum Construction (P) Co. - Thimphu 93 29-07-96
85 Bhutan Broadcasting Service P.B. 101 Thimphu 94 15-08-96
86 Goendrap Eng. Company - Punakha 95 6-09-96
87 Bhutan National Bank - Thimphu 96 2-09-96
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88 Bhutan Postal Corporation - Thimphu 97 25-10-96
89 National Transport Company - Thimphu 98 9-12-96
90 Sakteng Health Club & Saloon Ltd. P.B. 825 Thimphu 99 8-01-97
91 T&K Construction Co. P.B. 881 Thimphu 100 4-03-97
92 Bhutan Tours & Travel Pvt. Ltd. P.B. 224 Thimphu 101 18-04-97
93 Himalayan Plastic & Chemicals - Thimphu 102 21-04-97
94 Yarkay Oxygen Ltd. P.B. 134 Phuentsholing 103 22-04-97
95 Green Wood Mftg. Corporation - Phuentsholing 104 28-04-97
96 United Construction Co. Pvt. Ltd. - Thimphu 105 29-04-97
97 Alpine Builders - Thimphu 106 28-05-97
98 Bhutan Polymers Co. Ltd. P.B. 321 Gomtu 107 12-06-97
99 Kubera Tours & Treks Pvt Ltd. - Thimphu 108 13-06-97
100 Bhutan Board Exports Ltd. - Phuentsholing 109 3-07-97
101 Druk Silicon Carbide Ltd. - Thimphu 110 11-07-97
102 Choden Chemical & Industry Ltd. - S/Jongkhar 111 21-07-97
103 Rabsel Construction Co. Ltd. P.B. 488 Thimphu 112 1-08-97
104 Namcha Construction Pvt. Ltd. - Thimphu 113 8-10-97
105 Royal Society for the Protection of Nature - Thimphu 114 29-10-97
106 Bhutan Construction Co. Ltd. - Thimphu 115 5-02-98
107 Euchok Construction Co. - Thimphu 116 11-05-98
108 Bumthang Brewery Ltd. - Bumthang 117 29-05-98
109 Hotel Druk-Yul, - Thimphu 118 30-07-98
110 Gongphel Construction Co. Pvt. Ltd. - Thimnphu 119 16-12-98
111 Pinewood Builders - Thimphu 120 8-01-99
112 Goong Construction - Phuentsholing 121 23-02-99
113 Lhaki Wood Industries Ltd. - Thimphu 122
114 Rainbow Tours & Travels Pvt. Ltd - Thimphu 123 28-04-99
115 Osang Electrical Company Pvt. Ltd. - Thimphu 124 16-06-99
116 Druk Chlorate Company - Thimphu 125 9-08-99
117 Peljorekhang Pvt. Ltd. - Tbimphu 126 9-08-99
118 Tshungmed Solar Inc - Thimphu 127 13-08-99
119 N.D. Construction - Thimphu 128 25-08-99
120 Hotel Riverview Pvt. Ltd. Thimphu - Thimphu 129 22-12-00
121 Pelchen RandinReal Estate - Thimnphu 130 10-04-01
122 BTB Pvt. Ltd. Thimphu - Thimphu 131 8-05-01
123 Singye Group of Companies Pvt. Ltd. - Thimphu 132
124 Bhutan Agrotech Research and Development - Thimphu 133 14-05-01
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Annex Two
Tax Regime/Policies
Corporate/Income Tax. The key features of the corporate/business income tax are:
* 30 percent on net profit on resident companies.
* 3 percent of the turnover for non-resident companies withheld at source.
* Business expenses are allowable deductions provided they are supported by documentary
evidence. Ceilings on salary, donations, and entertainment expenses apply.
* Depreciation of assets within the maximum prescribed limit is allowed on a straight line
method
* The personal income tax replaced the Salary Tax in 2001. Tax on Salary is charged at rates
ranging from 10 to 25 percent on the basis indicated in the table below. No tax is payable on
individual incomes below Nu 00,000 per year.
New Personal Income Tax Rates (effective from 2001)
Gross Salary Range Tax Rate
Up to NulO0,000 per year Exempted
Between NulO0,000 and Nu250,000 per year 10 percent
Between Nu250,000 and NuS00,000 per year NulO,000
Plus 15 percent over Nu250,000
Between Nu500,000 and Nul ,000,000 per year Nu25,000
Plus 20 percent over NuS00,000
More than Nu 1,000,000 per year Nu65,000
I Plus 25 percent over Nu 1,000,000
In 2001-02, the Corporate Income Tax is forecast to generate government revenues of Nu939
million (20.4 percent of total government revenues); the Business Income Tax is forecast to
generate government revenues of Nu201 million (4.4 percent); and the Salary Tax is expected to
raise Nu62 million (1.3 percent).
Tariffs. The current rates of import duties ranges from 0 to 30 percent, except for some higher
tariffs on imports of beer, alcoholic beverages, and tobacco products. Under the long-standing
free trade arrangement with India, these tariffs are applied only on third-country imports.
The benefits of trade liberalization are particularly important in Bhutan due to its small size and
the costs incurred from trade diversion from continued imposition of duties on third country
imports in conjunction with free trade with India. The main elements of the trade liberalization
program include a reduction in the number of tariff slabs and a reduction in their levels. During
2001-2002, budget tariffs were abolished on a wide range of domestic electrical appliances with
the expectation that, with rural electrification, individuals in rural areas will be able to take
advantage of time and labor savings devices. Tariffs on computers were also abolished during the
budget, an indication of the growing importance placed upon the development of IT in Bhutan.
Tariffs in Bhutan tend to be lower than corresponding rates in India
Bhutan/Business Sales Tax. Trade is also impacted by the Business Sales Tax (BST) imposed
originally on imports from India (and on sales of selected hotels and restaurants and cement from
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Penden Cement Authority Ltd.) but subsequently extended to imports from third-countries as of
September 1998. Indian exporters to Bhutan can claim the Bhutan BST as a rebate against the
Indian sales tax, and the BST has not been treated as an import tariff by Indian authorities. Since
producers of import substitutes in Bhutan do not pay this tax, it has a protective effect similar to a
tariff. Since the BST ranges from 0 to 20 percent (with higher rates restricted to beer, alcoholic
beverages, and tobacco), the actual rates of import duty on third-country imports are in the 0-to-
50 percent range, rather than the 0-to-30 percent range for import tariff schedule.
The BST already accounts for most of the taxes collected on imports. In the medium term,
consideration will be given to a reduction of the BST tax - except for a few items such as
vehicles and alcoholic or tobacco products. This will eliminate much of the protectionist
component of a BST imposed on imports but not on sales of domestically produced goods. Such
a system will eliminate the trade diversion effects of the present system, since India has a rebate
system for the sales tax and most other countries do not charge a sales tax on exports. The
medium-term goal is a commodity tax system based on a BST being applied on a non-
discriminatory basis on both imports from third-countries and from India.
In the longer run, consideration will be given to the imposition of an excise tax on domestically
produced goods at the point of production. With a relatively uniform BST applied on imports
from both India and other countries and a similar rate of excise tax imposed on at the factory gate,
Bhutan will have a very efficient, low, and relatively uniform commodity tax system in place.
The structure of import tariffs and BST duties shows the normal cascading where rates are
generally highest on final products (except for some essential goods), lower on intermediate
products and lowest on raw materials. The cascading effect of tariffs can give high levels of
effective protection to import competing activities. Thus, for instance, a 50 percent tariff on a
final product produced with an imported input that accounts for half of the costs of production
with a 20 percent tariff, results in an effective rate of protection of 90 percent. Since there is
considerable scope for waiving duties on intermediate and raw-material products as an incentive,
effective protection rates often can be even higher than suggested by the stated rates. The BST
contributes 7.2 percent to total government revenue.
Export Taxes. There are some export taxes in effect, but these contribute only a very small share
of total government tax revenue (0.3 percent of total government revenue) - and the government
has decided to eliminate these taxes. Export bans exist on antiques, animals, and plants classified
as endangered species and their parts and products, and on timber.
Excise Taxes. Excise taxes are restricted to sales of alcoholic products from the Army but are
relatively important in terms of collections - excise tax represents 10.0 percent of total
government revenues and is the most important indirect tax in Bhutan.
State Controls on Trade. There are, in general, no quantitative restrictions on imports -
although some exceptions do exist. Import licenses are required, and there is supposed to be
'automatic approval' of licenses for the import of all commodities outside a narrow negative list,
for which 'special permission' is required.
Although import licensing is supposed to be automatic, there is some complaint from the private
sector that this is not so. The government's concern over aggravating the trade deficit with hard
currency countries plays some role in this regard. Some businessmen complain about long delays
in getting import licenses to import inputs from hard currency areas, especially if these inputs are
to be used in producing goods for export to India. Investors also complain of difficulties in
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getting approval for investments in which imported inputs from hard currency areas are destined
to be used for producing exports to India.
The government maintains an effective monopoly by importing quota items such as LPG,
fertilizer, and kerosene and providing these goods to domestic users at subsidized prices. There is
an excess demand for most of these commodities at the established prices so the goods are
rationed to users.
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Annex Three
Yields of Major Crops in LDCs and Other Developing Countries
Crop Average annual yield in 1995-99 Average Yield
(tons per ha) in LDCs as
All Developing LDSs percentage of
Countries yield in all
developing
countries
Wheat 2.64 1.48 66.0
Rice 3.70 2.54 68.0
Maize 2.86 1.23 43.0
Coarse grains 1.94 0.81 42.0
Fiber Crops 0.64 0.52 81.0
Oil Crops 0.48 0.22 47.0
Pulses 0.67 0.51 77.0
Roots and Tubers 11.80 6.60 56.0
Vegetables 14.60 7.20 49.0
SOURCE: Computations based on data from FAOSTAT (2000)
Annex Four
Bhutan - Cash Crop Report, 1995 - 1998 (Quantity in MT Value in million)
1995 1996 1997 1998
Commodity Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantfty Value
Potato 14,603,698.00 72.266 16,478.600 88.785 17,030.971 55.394 18,193,596 147.201
Apple 519.231 4.125 252.945 1.869 281.435 1.799 972.745 7.113
Orange 4,010.058 16.525 3,639.693 18.211 2,915.403 14.538 3,657.400 15.879
Ginger 719.496 6.536 1,023.279 6.285 1,084.368 4.181 640.131 4.124
Dry Chilly 40.821 1.349 22.639 1.244 32.678 1.366 36.274 1.348
Rajma 36.319 0.517 69.54 0.882 102.916 1.357 38.798 0.736
Soybeans 90.957 0.742 92.356 0.726 142.921 1.425 87.008 0.692
Arecanut 192.354 1.086 182.522 0.646 104.343 0.585 75.763 0.731
Pipla 86.886 1.197 8.286 0.829 17.399 1.324 16.069 0.981
Other Fruits 3.405 0.018 1.215 0.008 3.832 0.017 2.465 0.021
Cardamom 14.785 5.526 5.838 0.376 26.630 1.972 1.34 0.07
Garllic 0.502 0.008 0.834 0.016
Lemon 54.637 0.315 47.264 0.343 34.974 0.237 2.333 0.027
Kalai Dal 3.710 0.040
Pulses 3.560 0.037 4.702 0.046 4.297 0.038 1.549 0.013
Mustard 0.629 0.006 1.314 0.013 0.683 0.006 1.721 0.016
Chirota (Herb) 6.277 0.202 0.999 0.029 2.395 0.091 3.738 0.330
Dry Bean 3.630 0.022 0.060 0.001
Stararis 0.288 0.011 0.019 0.001 0.270 0.010
Lac 0.558 0.23
Vegetables 1,136.903 7.06 1,970.567 7.950 1,362,478 6.752 1,366.566 7.651
Total 21,520,016 117.507 23,805.677 128.274 23,155,512 91.156 25,101.664 186.962
Annex Five
SWOT Analysis of the Tourism Sector
STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES
* Unique destination * Undue increase in existing throughput of visitors
* Natural beauty could be self-destructive, due to sensitive nature
* Moderate climate of product
* Friendly people * High-priced destination, but support services are
* History below expectations
* A monarchy * Insufficient attention in some hotels to detailed
* Scope for fine-tuning the visitor aspects of customer service
experience with product enhancements * Absence generally of tourist information
* Professionalism and skills of Bhutan literature, undue emphasis on tour group, to the
Tourism Corporation and other tour exclusion of individual traveler
operators * No good range of postcards, souvenirs, books
* Opportunity for outdoor activities, available
trekking, bird watching, fishing. . Range of visitor accommodation confined to
* Great opportunity for cultural tourism two-star and lower accommodation (in course of
including history, towns, monastic correction)
buildings, museums, collections, music . Government royalty on visitors is not reinvested
dance, costumes, and folklore in tourism
* Close proximity to India an important * Unduly complex trade and state structures for
market tourism
* Existing established tourist plan, * Absence of focused, well-financed state body to
including services, such as access, concentrate on overseas tourist marketing and
internal transport, guides, product development
accommodation, restaurants, outdoor, and * Access limitations (one surface and one air),
cultural tourism activities. issues with air service include poor capacity,
complex booking arrangements, and unreliability
arising from weather conditions.
THREATS OPPORTUNITIES
* Conservatism by trade and government * Further growth of visitor numbers on a limited
* Sensitive balance required between demand scale
and available resources * Focus further on top market, high-spending
* Virtual absence of repeat business visitors
* Safety fear generally, international air * Attract further international-branded hotels to
transport establish in Bhutan
* Political instability in adjoining countries . Devise a Tourism Master Plan
* Establish a national tourism training organization
* Undertake ongoing market research - particularly
customer satisfaction surveys
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Annex Six
Pilot Visitor Survey
Item % No. Item |%
Nationality Occupation
7 USA 41 5 Professional 29
4 British 24 6 Retired 35
3 Israeli 17 4 Management 24
2 Italian 12 I Technical 6
1 Norwegian 6 _ Mill worker 6
Income What influenced your visit?
10 USD100,000 plus 59 10 Personal recommendations 59
4 USD50,000-USD100,000 23 5 Been to region before 29
I Under USD50,000 6 2 Brochures (1 geographic 12
_ _ _ _ __ expedition)
2 No answer 12 _
Traveling In Bhutan = Kind of tour package
15 In group 88 10 Cultural tour 59
2 With friend or relative 12 5 Cultural and trekking 29
__1 Cultural and adventure 6
B1iking 6
= Enjoyment of visit Fulfillment _
13 Excellent 76 8 Reached expectations 47
2 Exceptional quality 12 7 Exceeded expectations 41
2 Satisfactory 12 2 Did not reach expectations 12
Obligatory regulations Value for money
11 Reasonable 65 8 Reasonable 47
4 Not acceptable 23 5 Expensive 29
2 Fully acceptable 12 2 Excellent 12
| 1 Very very expensive 6
I I I No answer 6
Arrangements in Bhutan ___IQuality of meals___
10 Excellent 59 5 1Satisfactory 29
4 Good 23 1 jPoor 6
2 Poor 12 9 ~ _Good 53
I Faultless 6 2 l Excellent 12
Types of accommodation ____|Hotel services
14 Hotels 82 5 Satisfactory 29
I Guesthouse 6 5 Excellent in superior room /poor 29
in standard room
2 Various 12 1 Excellent 6
2 Good 1 2
- 1 ~~Very unsatisfactory 6
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 2 P o o r 12
_______________________ 1_Mixed 6
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No. Item % No. Item %
_ Internal transport _ Visit Bhutan again?
6 Saisfactory 35 15 Yes 88
8 Excellent 47 2 No 12
3 Poor 18
Recommend to a friend = Highlights
15 Yes 88 5 Festivals 29
2 No 12 6 N/A (visit uncompleted) 35
_ _ _ 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
_ _ _ _ _2 T errain 12
_ ________________________________ 
2 People and landscape 12
- 1 Biking through countryside 6
1 Punhaka Monastery being 6
rebuilt
=___ Items purchased = Spending(USD)
3 Textiles 17 8 200 47
I Arts _6 _1,000 6
1 Souvenirs 6 I 1,500 _
2 Handicrafts 12 2 500 12
1 Books and stamps 6 I 90 6
5 Textiles/weaving/painting/paper/jewehry 29 1 50 6
1 Car rings and bells 6 2 0 12
3 Nothing 18 _
Objective of visit = _=_How arrived in Bhutan
6 Culture 35 5 Air 88
1 Nature 6 2 Road 12
1 Nature, religion and culture 6
4 Culture and trekking 24 _
2 Culture and philosophy 12
1 Religion and culture 6 _
I Everything except trekking 6 _ _
_General comments by visitors
Improve the hotels Limited choice for meals and accommodation
Reduce the number of dogs Prices fixed, but standards vary
Organize tours better Undue restrictions on photography
Communications cost too high and poor No public access to most religious buildings
Buses poor
Tourist informiation should be in rooms
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Annex Seven
Tourists Entering Bhutan by Nationality, 1995-2000
Nationality 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Japanese 1,192 1,211 1,173 1,032 1,102 875
USA 865 963 910 1,471 2,122 2,754
Germany 500 722 533 520 574 662
United Kingdom 418 358 642 686 646 595
French 338 331 229 366 236 399
Italian 202 242 186 218 276 156
Austrian 200 156 156 270 197 131
Thai 57 181 140 19 71 92
Swiss 220 161 186 170 296 137
Dutch 100 131 234 370 362 359
Australian 142 71 121 64 131 179
Belgian 79 77 75 95 107 95
Canadian 55 57 89 82 149 194
Spanish 22 49 33 109 118 141
Korean 41 31 11 14 3
Norwegian 43 6 12 33 7
Singaporean 45 78 77 26 31
Taiwanese 32 83 135 179 175
Danish 42 26 61 45 13 30
Finnish 8 15 21 5 60
Nepalese 15 32 23 23 50
Portuguese 13 11 43 19
Luxembourg 11 14 2
Swedish 45 7 18 58 37 48
Israeli 81 80 68
Polish 45 35 26
Russian 36 17 13
New Zealander 28 22 31
Turkish 49 34
Philipino 20 13
Brazilian 27 14 10
Czech 24 12
Greek 16 25
Chinese 12 11 10
Argentina 11 12 29
Irish 16 10
South Africa 12 7
Mexican 49 37
Malaysian 16
Others 280 180 301 90 61 24
TOTAL ARRIVAL 4,765 5,138 5,363 6,203 7,158 7,559
TREKKERS 1,851 746 1,343 830 926
CULTURAL 3,287 4,617 4,860 6,328 6,633
Source: Department of Tourism, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Thimphu, BHUTAN
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Annex Eight
Tourist Arrivals by Month and by Tour Operator (2000)
Agent Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec TOTAL
1 Bae Yul Excursion 43 21 20 3 25 6 51 26 1 196
2 Bhutan Adventure 0
3 Bhutan Expeditions 10 10
4 Bhutan Cultural Tours 1 1 2
5 Bhutan Dorji Holidays 1 5 3 9
6 Bhutan Heritage 8 7 5 2 22 1 45
7 Bhutan Himalaya Tours 7 3 1 11
8 Bhutan Holiday Tours 2 3 3 10 14 9 41
9 Bhutan Lhayul 5 2 7
10 Bhutan Mandala Tours 17 65 71 1 1 26 34 34 68 31 3 25 385
11 Bhutan Millennium 0
12 Bhutan Tours and Travels 0
13 BhutanTravelService 1 1 1 2 3 1 31 2 42
14 Bhutan Treks and Tours 19 6 1 26
15 Bhutan Vacation Inc 1 4 5
16 Bhutan Travel Bureau 2 5 10 8 1 5 12 15 44 4 4 110
17BTCL 1 22 143 137 56 4 2 17 83 331 96 17 909
18ChunduTours 2 2 22 21 6 3 1 8 77 23 4 169
19 Dechen Cultural 16 20 7 43
20 Deodgu Yangkhil 7 7
21 Discovery Bhutan 6 3 2 4 2 1 18
22 Dragon Tours 19 18 31 14 3 17 102
23 Druk Adventure 5 5
24 Eagle Tours 7 7
25 Equator Expeditions 2 3 2 4 59 32 102
26 Etho Metho Tours 11 57 197 172 114 18 34 43 110 406 121 39 1,322
27 Exotic Destination 1 3 2 4 10
28 Ezekiel Tours 3 5 8
29 Gangri Tours 3 44 75 5 18 3 11 74 149 48 430
30 Himalayan Adventure 3 3
31 Himalayan Kingdom 2 11 2 2 17
32 International Tours 8 14 120 102 43 24 19 35 34 272 105 31 807
33 Jamphel Tours 19 2 2 15 2 40
34 Khuju Tours 1 6 7
35 Kinga Tours 0
36 Kubera Tours 3 3
37 Lama Tours 4 19 19 42
38 Lotus Tours 1 1
39 Lhomen Tours 4 16 6 2 2 13 13 5 61
40 LingkorTours 3 3 15 1 1 3 2 2 30 18 5 83
41Masagang 2 3 4 5 2 3 4 23
42 Namsey Tours 16 25 6 3 7 8 38 103
43 Osang Tours 2 2
44 Prestine Yul Druk 2 2
45 Rabsel Tours 2 5 2 1 4 6 3 11 36 8 5 83
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46 Rainbow Tours 2 9 8 21 3 25 6 20 6 3 103
47 Ratna Tours 1 2 9 12
48 RikiTours 3 3
49 Rinchen Tours 11 30 41
50 Sakten Tours 3 27 14 7 5 6 7 10 24 52 8 163
51 Shangrila Tours 4 5 1 1 9 5 5 30
52 Siddarth Tours 0
53 Sky Travels 1 7 2 10
54 Snow Leopard 4 31 14 17 67 8 141
55 Sophun Tours 2 2
56 Taktsang Tours 8 8 16
57 Tara Tours 0
58 Tashi Delek Tours 0
59 Tashi Tours 15 30 69 44 14 23 58 253
60 Thimphu Tours 1 1
61 Thoesam Tours 16 10 19 2 2 1 19 18 3 90
62 Thunder Dragon 15 25 32 2 21 35 37 1 168
63 Travel Bhutan 0
64 Thunder Bolt 3 3
65 Vajra Tours 4 3 7
66 White Lotus Tours 13 2 15
67 White Tara Tours 4 1 5
68 Wangchuk Tours 4 4
69 Wings Tours 4 5 14 5 3 3 6 27 11 2 4 6 90
70 Wild Horse Tours 4 2 1 1 6 5 4 23
71 Yangphel Tours 4 11 100 50 31 4 4 6 59 249 103 19 640
72 Yarkey Tours 2 2 3 7
73 Yeti Tours 1 1 5 1 2 1 14 29 25 4 83
74 Yodsel Tours 4 5 24 19 6 3 2 3 31 38 1 136
75 Yudruk Tours 3 2 44 5 15 17 2 27 63 22 6 206
76 EXPATRIATE GUEST 3 2 5
77 TAB GUEST 1 3 4
TOTALPAX 65 223 1,066 995 415 187 162 307 683 2,247 996 213 7,559
TOTAL FAMS 4 4 5 5 5 8 1 2 12 16 4 66
TOTALFOCS 3 3 1 1 1 9
ACTUAL FAX FOR2000 61 219 1,058 987 409 178 161 305 671 2,231 992 212 7,484
Arrivals in 1999 148 322 1,145 604 395 108 132 348 1,069 1,856 841 190 7,158
Arrivals in 1998 96 154 542 1,167 267 97 152 340 1,107 1,329 678 274 6,203
Arrivals in 1997 108 254 1,062 662 275 90 123 231 276 1,488 640 154 5,363
Arrivals in 1996 133 304 605 689 215 91 160 306 788 1,128 508 211 5,138
Source: Department of Tourism, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Thimphu
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Annex Nine
Tourist Arrivals, 1984 to 2000
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
January 35 40 43 59 26 21 35 25 91 67 101 120 133 108 96 148 65
February 76 39 45 63 43 39 34 82 118 139 175 134 304 254 154 322 223
March 91 237 409 122 390 250 146 270 346 232 643 341 605 1,062 542 1,145 1,066
April 406 214 172 466 230 118 265 152 265 587 274 1,022 689 662 1,167 604 995
May 114 130 134 145 140 87 99 110 140 124 373 337 215 275 267 395 415
June 52 22 49 16 31 38 12 32 68 60 115 81 91 90 97 108 187
July 62 94 92 91 62 32 44 47 118 51 99 119 160 123 152 132 162
August 208 182 306 235 147 133 84 181 117 161 301 183 306 231 340 348 307
September 204 237 338 253 298 164 262 402 355 494 465 466 788 276 1,107 1,069 683
October 459 452 573 709 670 375 249 426 701 426 787 1,168 1,128 1,488 1,329 1,856 2,247
November 134 160 112 268 118 179 205 268 300 475 418 599 508 640 678 841 996
December 59 88 132 97 44 44 103 111 144 168 220 195 211 154 274 190 213
TOTAL 1,900 1,895 2,405 2,524 2,199 1,480 1,538 2,106 2,763 2,984 3,971 4,765 5,138 5,363 6,203 7,158 7,559
Growth -0.26% 26.91% 4.95% -12.880/o-32.70%3.92%36.930/o31.200/o8.000/o33.08%19.99%7.830/o4.38%15.66%15.40% 5.600/o
Trek 1,851 746 1343 830 926
Culture 3,287 4,617 4,860 6,328 6,633
Foreign Exchange Earnings in US$
Gr Earnings 1.91 1.99 2.97 3.23 3.97 5.83 6.52 6.55 7.98 8.88 10.50
Government Revenue 0.31 0.98 1.13 1.39 2.04 2.32 2.48 3.02 3.46 4.10
Source: Department of Tourism, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Tbimphu
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